The Dissertation Committee for Luis Antonio Camacho Solís certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation (or treatise):

The Political Origins of Support for Redistribution: Argentina and Peru in Comparative Perspective

Committee:

Kurt Weyland, Supervisor

Zachary Elkins

Kenneth Greene

Raul L. Madrid

Nicholas Valentino

The Political Origins of Support for Redistribution: Argentina and Peru in Comparative Perspective

by

Luis Antonio Camacho Solís, B.A.; M.A.

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Dedication

To my grandparents:

Mami Dori, Tata Lucho, Mami Rosi, and Tata Adolfo.

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The Political Origins of Support for Redistribution: Argentina and Peru in Comparative Perspective

Luis Antonio Camacho Solís, Ph.D.

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Supervisor: Kurt Weyland

Why do some individuals endorse public policies aimed at reducing income inequality while others oppose them? Why is there widespread support for such policies in certain countries, but not in others? This dissertation advances scholarship toward a general theory of support for redistribution by analyzing variation in redistributive attitudes within and across two developing democracies, Argentina and Peru. Support for redistribution is higher in the former country.

It examines existing theories based on interests and group identity, explanations whose predictions have been almost exclusively evaluated in the context of advanced industrial democracies. It also introduces and assesses a belief-based explanation that focuses on inequality frames, simplified mental models of the issue of inequality comprised of individuals' beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, about the extent to which society provides equal opportunities, and about the nature of wealth

accumulation. This dissertation argues that these theories are complementary and identifies the contextual factors that condition the extent to which the considerations emphasized by these accounts inform redistributive attitudes. Interests and group identity are salient in contexts where individuals have access to material and informational resources that make them more cognizant of their position along economic and ethnic cleavages. In contrast, inequality frames inform redistributive attitudes regardless of context because of their inside-the-head nature. This study shows that the relative dominance of redistributive beliefs in Argentina and self-reliance beliefs in Peru help explain why support for redistribution is higher in the former country.

Finally, this dissertation develops a politico-historical explanation for why and how these frames became relatively dominant. This account argues that individuals' inequality frames are relatively stable during times of normal politics, but malleable during certain critical political junctures brought about by major events like mass political incorporation or economic crises. During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and messages that are transmitted not only via rhetoric but also via public policies. Redistributive beliefs become dominant wherever political actors whose discourse features elements consistent with the redistributive frame are able to implement successful comprehensive social policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in countries where this combination of rhetoric and policies does not take place during a critical juncture.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Redistribution is one of the central activities carried out by states. By extracting income and wealth from some and transferring them to others, states can significantly alter their citizens' life chances. Accordingly, redistribution tends to be a contentious issue that lies at the heart of many theories seeking to account for political phenomena.

In some of the regime transitions and democratic consolidation literature, for example, distributional conflicts between worse-off and well-off individuals drive cycles of democratization, radical politics, repression, and democratic breakdown (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2003). Theories of welfare state development are built on the premise that certain groups of society demand redistribution while others oppose it, and welfare states develop as a consequence of the relative power of these coalitions (e.g., Stephens 1979; Iversen 2005). Finally, theories of voting behavior and partisanship consider citizens' views over the issue of redistribution to be a fundamental political cleavage (e.g., Kitschelt and Rehm 2004).

But, why do some individuals endorse public policies aimed at reducing income inequality, alleviating poverty, and transferring resources to vulnerable populations while others oppose them? And, why is there widespread support for such policies in certain countries, but not in others? In short, what explains variation in redistributive attitudes across individuals and countries? To date, existing scholarship does not provide a comprehensive answer to these important questions.

There are two main existing theories that seek to answer these questions: accounts that focus on interests and those that focus on group identity. Interest-based theories posit that redistributive attitudes reflect individuals' interests, which are in turn determined by the distribution of the costs and benefits of redistributive policies across the population. Thus, individuals whose position in the economic structure makes them likely winners from redistribution should be more supportive of it than those who are likely losers (e.g., Iversen 2005; Meltzer and Richard 1981).

Theories based on group identity emphasize ethnic or racial divisions. One strand within this paradigm argues that attitudes reflect a sense of shared interests between individuals who identify with a particular ethnic or racial group. Thus, those who identify with groups that benefit from redistribution should be more supportive of it than those who do not identify with these groups (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 148-154; Alesina and Guiliano 2009). Another strand focuses on individuals' tendency to categorize others into groups and discriminate against outgroup members as well as on deeply held symbolic attitudes. Accordingly, individuals who hold negative or prejudiced attitudes toward ethnic or racial groups that disproportionately benefit form redistribution should be less supportive of it than those who do not hold such attitudes (e.g., Gilens 1995; Gilens 1996).

The vast majority of the evidence supporting the expectations suggested by interest- and group identity-based accounts comes from studies of redistributive attitudes in advanced industrial democracies—in fact, several expectations from these theories have been assessed only with data from these countries. Moreover, scholars have

generally found unqualified support for their theoretical expectations—a fact likely due, at least in part, to the similarities in the economic, political, and social contexts where they test them. This has resulted in a body of scholarship that can be best characterized as a list of factors that have been found to explain individual-level variation in redistributive attitudes within advanced industrial democracies. Some of the factors emphasized by interest-based theories are current income, unemployment risk, and social class. Theories based on group identity emphasize ethnic identification and prejudice.

Scholarship on redistributive attitudes is underdeveloped on many fronts. First, as a result of the geographical limitation of existing research, little is known about how well existing theories travel to explain redistributive attitudes in developing democracies. There is a particular dearth of evidence when it comes to theories emphasizing group identity. Second, from a theoretical standpoint, this body of scholarship is in urgent need of efforts at theoretical synthesizing—of attempts to integrate current knowledge into a general explanation of redistributive attitudes that can account not only for individual-level variation, but also for divergence in these attitudes across countries. In addition, such a theory would need to incorporate a third type of explanation that focuses on the role of subjective beliefs; to date, such an account has been completely overlooked by comparative politics literature seeking to understand support for redistribution.

This dissertation seeks to improve the current understanding of attitudes about redistribution by analyzing variation in such attitudes within and across two developing democracies, Argentina and Peru. In addition to examining existing theories focused on interests and group identity, this study introduces and assesses a belief-based explanation

that focuses on inequality frames, simplified mental models of the issue of inequality that inform individuals' opinions about redistribution. Rather than advancing this type of explanation to the detriment of the other two, this dissertation argues that these theories are complementary.

In turn, this study identifies the contextual factors that condition the extent to which interest-based and group identity-based accounts are useful in explaining individual-level variation in redistributive attitudes. This dissertation also moves scholarship forward by explicitly examining the extent to which individual-level factors can explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. Finally, the dissertation advances a politico-historical explanation to shed light on the origins of inequality frames, an area that is currently under-theorized within the literature.

Main Argument

This dissertation demonstrates the explanatory power of a belief-based theory of redistributive attitudes. By focusing on individuals' social beliefs, this theory stands in contrast to those that emphasize interests and group identity and thus focus on individuals' objective position with regard to structural cleavages. According to this belief-based theory, "conceptual frames" about the issue of inequality fundamentally inform individuals' opinions about redistributive public policies. Conceptual frames are simplified mental models of reality that help people navigate complex issues (Lakoff 2006). Frames are collections of cognitions that allow individuals to make sense of new information and form opinions, similar to other types of organized prior knowledge. Inequality frames, in particular, contain information about the causes of economic

outcomes and poverty that inform individuals' judgments about the fairness of the distributive status quo and about the moral worthiness of helping those in need.

This dissertation identifies two ideal-type inequality frames: the redistributive frame and the self-reliance frame. According to the first frame, society does not give people a fair chance at getting ahead and forces over which individuals have no control, like luck and birth, determine economic standing. Moreover, society is rigid, with very low social mobility, and wealth is relatively finite, making economic advancement resemble a zero-sum game. In contrast, according to the self-reliance frame, society lives up to the ideal of equality of opportunity, giving everyone who is willing to try hard enough a fair chance to get ahead. These alternative conceptions about the causes of economic disparities lead to opposing policy positions.

According to the redistributive frame, social conditions cause inequality and are to blame for poverty. Thus, individuals who hold beliefs that are in line with this frame should support policies that transfer income or wealth from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals. In turn, according to the self-reliance frame, individuals themselves, their own traits and behaviors, are responsible for inequality and poverty. As a result, individuals whose views are in line with this frame should oppose these policies.

This belief-based theory of redistributive attitudes complements, rather than competes against, accounts emphasizing interests and group identity. Indeed, each of these accounts identifies a number of considerations that might combine to inform

redistributive attitudes.[1] In turn, this dissertation identifies the contextual factors that make particular considerations more or less salient in shaping support for redistribution. Considerations derived from structural cleavages inform support only in contexts where individuals have access to material and informational resources that make them more cognizant of their position along these cleavages. While this is often the case in advanced industrial democracies, it is not in Argentina and Peru. And this is likely the case in other developing countries.

To analyze the causes of cross-national variation in support for redistribution, this dissertation departs from the premise that such variation is the product of differences at the individual level. Indeed, a given polity does not hold attitudes; rather the level of support for redistribution in a given country is a reflection of the opinions of the individuals within that polity. There are three potential individual-level differences that can help explain cross-national divergence in redistributive attitudes.

The first type is differences in the distribution of a given consideration among the population between countries. Consider the following example. As argued above, individuals who hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame should support redistribution, while those whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame should oppose it. Aggregate-level divergence in support for redistribution between two societies can arise from differences in the proportion of the population that holds each of these beliefs. In other words, divergence could arise because the population of one country

[1] Considerations are factors or reasons that might lead an individual to decide his opinion on any given political issue (Zaller 1992, 40).

consists of more individuals who hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame, while the population of the other country consists of more individuals who hold beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame. Differences in other considerations could explain aggregate-level divergence in the same way. This dissertation refers to these types of differences as "compositional differences."

The second type of individual-level differences is differences in the extent to which a given consideration informs support for redistribution across countries—i.e., differences in the effect of a given consideration on support. Continuing with the example above, consider two countries with divergent levels of support for redistribution but with populations equally split between the two inequality frames. It could be that holding beliefs in line with a given inequality frame leads individuals to support or oppose redistribution more adamantly in one country than in the other. In other words, the effect of these beliefs on support could be greater in magnitude in one country. In this case, divergences in support for redistribution across the two countries do not arise from compositional differences, as the distribution of beliefs among the countries' populations is the same. Instead they arise from what this dissertation refers to as "salience differences."

The third and final type of individual-level differences is what this dissertation refers to as "population-wide differences." These are those differences in aggregate levels of support that compositional and salience differences cannot explain. To illustrate this type of difference imagine that inequality frames are equally distributed across the populations of two countries and that the effects of these inequality frames on support for

redistribution are equal across both countries. Yet, the level of support observed among individuals is higher in one country than in the other. This would imply that, as a whole, individuals within the first country are more supportive of redistribution than individuals in the other country, regardless of their individual-level characteristics.

This dissertation finds that a combination of compositional and salience differences in inequality frames can help explain why support for redistribution varies across Argentina and Peru. In turn, it develops an explanation for why and how one of the two frames becomes relatively dominant in a given country. This political theory of the origins of mass inequality frames draws on the critical juncture framework (Collier and Collier 2002) to understand the historical evolution of these frames. It argues that individuals' inequality frames are relatively stable during times of normal politics, but malleable during certain periods, like times of mass political incorporation or the aftermath of economic crises.

During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and messages that are provided not only through rhetoric but also through public policies. The redistributive frame becomes dominant wherever political actors whose discourse features elements consistent with this frame are able to implement relatively successful comprehensive social policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in countries where this combination of rhetoric and policies during a critical juncture does not take place. By analyzing the origins of mass inequality frames, this dissertation helps explain present cross-national divergences in support for redistribution.

Research Design

The research question guiding this study is: what accounts for divergence in support for redistribution between Argentina and Peru? In the process of answering this question, this dissertation achieves the following goals. First, it evaluates the extent to which considerations derived from interest and group identity are useful to explain individual-level variation in support for redistribution in these two countries. By doing so, it examines the generalizability of these theories outside advanced industrial democracies, with an eye toward identifying the contextual factors that condition the explanatory power of these theories. Second, it develops a belief-based theory that focuses on inequality frames and assesses the extent to which this theory can account for within-country variation in redistributive attitudes.

Third, this dissertation analyzes whether compositional and salience differences in the considerations emphasized by these three theories can explain variation across the two countries. It finds that differences in inequality frames can account for part of this variation, but that differences in other types of considerations cannot. Finally, this study develops and examines a politico-historical theory of the origins of inequality frames. This theory explains how inequality frames become dominant in a given country.

To do this, this dissertation relies on a multi-method empirical strategy. First, expectations regarding considerations derived from interests, group identity, and social beliefs are examined by estimating models in which support for redistribution is a linear function of these various considerations as well as control covariates. These regression analyses evaluate the extent to which each of these considerations informs support for

redistribution. The data used to estimate these models come from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).

The politico-historical theory of the origins of inequality frames is evaluated using comparative historical case studies. These case studies analyze the political development of Argentina and Peru since the early twentieth century. Using process tracing (George and Bennett 2005), this analysis identifies critical junctures and the causes of inequality frame dominance. This method is also used to rule out alternative explanations. These case studies rely primarily on secondary sources. Wherever possible, historical public opinion data on social beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution—from both primary and secondary sources—are also incorporated in the analyses.

Latin America constitutes an important context in which to analyze redistributive attitudes. Given the region's stark and chronic levels of inequality (Milanovic 2002; de Ferranti, Perry, Ferreira, and Walton 2004, 53-57), the issues of inequality and redistribution have played an important role in political development. In particular, distributional conflicts fueled by inequality have helped to give rise to cycles of democracy and dictatorship (Diamond, Hartlyn, Linz, and Lipset 1999; Sheahan 1987; Smith 2005). More recently, the enactment of market reforms in the region was followed by a period of popular support for these reforms, during which issues of redistribution were sidelined. However, the recent revival of left political alternatives in the region has brought the issue of redistribution back to the forefront of the political arena (Cleary 2006; Stokes 2009).

Argentina and Peru are interesting countries within Latin America for examining redistributive attitudes for at least a couple of reasons. First, the two countries have divergent levels of support for redistribution. Support is relatively high in Argentina and relatively low in Peru. Within the region, these two countries might be considered representative of other countries with similar levels of support for redistribution. As shown in Chapter 3, Argentina and Peru are "typical cases" (Gerring 2006, 88-89) when it comes to the relationship between support for redistribution and provision of redistributive policies in Latin America.

Second, the divergence in redistributive attitudes across the two countries, with Argentines being more supportive of redistribution than Peruvian, is particularly puzzling given these countries' levels of poverty and certain aspects of their political development. Given that poverty is much more widespread in Peru than in Argentina, one would expect Peruvians to be more concerned about inequality and more supportive of redistribution than Argentines, but this is not the case. Additionally, until fairly recently, Argentines viewed themselves (with pride) as living in a relatively egalitarian society (Rohter 2006), which presumably would make them less concerned about inequality and less demanding of redistributive policies. With regard to political development, the organized political left has never been strong in Argentina, but it has had an important role in Peruvian politics during some periods. In light of this, one might expect the issue of inequality to be more salient and support for redistribution to be higher in Peru than in Argentina.

Plan of the Dissertation

The remainder of this dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2 provides a thorough overview of existing theories that focus on interests and group identity. It also develops a theory of redistributive attitudes based on inequality frames. The chapter argues that the considerations emphasized by existing theories should not be as important in shaping redistributive attitudes in Argentina and Peru, and in developing democracies, more generally, as they are in advanced industrial democracies. The chapter attributes this expectation to a number of contextual factors. Finally, Chapter 2 advances a politico-historical theory that explains why one inequality frame becomes dominant to the detriment of the other within a given polity.

Chapter 3 uses public opinion data to characterize redistributive attitudes in Argentina and Peru. It shows that Argentines want more equality and state involvement in the provision of welfare than Peruvians. The chapter also examines redistributive policies in both countries, showing that the Argentine state spends more on such policies and taxes its citizens more progressively than its Peruvian counterpart. Chapter 3 concludes that when it comes to redistributive attitudes and policies, Argentina is similar to Europe, while Peru is similar to the U.S.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 examine variation in attitudes about the issue of redistribution within the two countries under study. Chapter 4 develops and assesses hypotheses derived from interest-based and group identity-based theories. This chapter shows that, with the exception of income, considerations suggested by these theories do not seem to shape support for redistribution in Argentina or Peru. It also develops an

explanation for why this is the case, identifying a number of contextual factors that make structural cleavages less salient in these two countries.

Chapter 5 develops and assesses hypotheses derived from the belief-based theory of redistributive attitudes. It provides evidence suggesting that social beliefs shape support for redistribution according to expectations: individuals who hold beliefs that are in line with the redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution than those whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame. Chapter 5 also shows that, in contrast to income, differences in the composition and salience of social beliefs can help explain the divergence in levels of support across Argentina and Peru.

Chapter 6 provides an explanation for why the redistributive frame is relatively dominant in Argentina and the self-reliance frame is relative dominant in Peru. This chapter traces the origins and evolution of mass social beliefs by analyzing the political development of the two countries since the early twentieth century. In Argentina, the dominance of the redistributive frame is attributed to President Juan Perón's rhetoric and policies when the popular and working classes were incorporated into politics. In Peru, the redistributive frame did not become dominant due to bad timing and ineffective policies. The public's reaction to consistently exclusionary social policies finally led to the relative dominance of the self-reliance frame at the peak of the neoliberal era.

Chapter 7 concludes. It first summarizes the main findings of the previous chapters and then discusses their theoretical and substantive implications. Finally, this chapter highlights some promising avenues for future research.

Chapter 2
Toward a General Theory of Support for Redistribution

Existing theories of support for redistribution focus on individuals' position with regard to structural cleavages. Interest-based accounts contend that those who benefit from redistributive policies should support them while those who lose from them should oppose them. To identify winners and losers, these accounts make assumptions about interests based on individuals' socioeconomic characteristics like income, class status, and sectors of employment. Theories emphasizing group identity focus on divisions along ethnic or racial lines. They argue that individuals who belong to ethnic or racial groups that disproportionately benefit from welfare policies should be more supportive of them regardless of their own material interests. Moreover, they contend that those who hold prejudiced attitudes toward such economically disadvantaged groups should be less supportive of these policies.

In contrast to these theories that focus on structural cleavages, this chapter develops a theory that focuses on individuals' social beliefs. More specifically, this account contends that variation in support for redistribution is explained by diverging views about the causes of economic outcomes, the extent to which society provides equal opportunities, and the nature of wealth accumulation. Individuals who believe that factors like birth or luck are essential in determining economic standing, that society is rigid and does not give people a fair chance at getting ahead, or that wealth can only be acquired by stripping it from others should support redistributive policies. Those who believe that

hard work and effort determine income, that society lives up to the ideal of equality of opportunity and is open to advancement, and that wealth can be accumulated by creating more of it should oppose such policies. Together, these "social beliefs" (Alesina and Angeletos 2005) make up inequality frames, simplified mental models of the causes of inequality that shape support for redistribution by informing individuals' judgments about the distributive status quo.

These three sets of theories identify distinct types of considerations that might explain variation in redistributive attitudes. Thus, they may be seen as complementary rather than competing accounts. This dissertation identifies the contextual factors that condition the extent to which structural cleavages inform views about redistribution. As will be discussed below, considerations derived from interests and group identity should be particularly salient in contexts that provide individuals with material and informational resources that make them more cognizant of their position with regard to structural cleavages. Wherever this is not the case, these considerations should not be very useful in explaining variation in support for redistribution.

This chapter also develops a politico-historical theory of the origins of social beliefs. Beliefs are expected to be relatively stable during times of normal politics, and malleable at specific periods brought about by major developments like economic crises and political incorporation. During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and messages provided not only through rhetoric but also through public policies. The actions (or omissions) of political actors at these junctures cause certain social beliefs to rise to prominence. These beliefs become consolidated as normal politics

resume. Using this critical juncture framework, this chapter develops an account of the political origins of inequality frames in Argentina and Peru.

Interest-Bases Theories

Casual observers and scholars alike have traditionally considered individuals' redistributive attitudes to be a reflection of their position in the income distribution. Those who are well-off should oppose redistribution as their interests lie in avoiding taxation, while those who are worse-off should endorse it as they would be the likely beneficiaries of increased transfers and social services.[2] Not surprisingly, multiple studies have found that the poor are more supportive of redistribution than the rich, and this result is robust across a wide cross-section of developed and developing countries. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2004), Alesina and Giuliano (2009), and Fong (2001) all find a negative correlation between income and support for redistribution in the U.S. Corneo and Grüner (2002), Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006), Iversen (2005), and Rehm (2005) report similar findings for various cross-sections of advanced industrial democracies. In the developing world, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) and Gaviria (2007) find this negative correlation in Russia and Latin America, respectively.

These studies also find, however, that income is not nearly as powerful of a predictor of attitudes as simple pocketbook logic suggests. As discussed below, a couple of refinements seek to account for deviations from the basic pocketbook expectation

[2] More specifically, models à la Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Romer (1975) predict that individuals with incomes below that of the median voter will vote for higher taxes—and thus for more redistribution—, while those with incomes above it will vote for the opposite. In turn, the key factor determining the size of government is the difference between average and median income: the higher the difference, the higher the level of taxation chosen by the median voter.

while still focusing on individuals' interests. These consider the relationship between redistributive attitudes and future income prospects on the one hand, and exposure to labor market risks on the other.

Given that "today's poor may be [or at least believe they will be] the wealthy of tomorrow, and vice versa" (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005, 898), economic prospects are likely to shape support for redistributive policies. Worse-off individuals expecting to move above the median income might refrain from demanding redistribution in the present to avoid increased taxation in the future. This expectation is known as the prospects of upward mobility (POUM) hypothesis (Benabou and Ok 2001). Conversely, well-off individuals expecting to move below the median income might demand redistribution in the present to receive the benefits of increased taxation in the future. Past mobility experiences should also inform support for redistribution as they are likely predictive of future chances of economic improvement (Piketty 1995).

Again, several studies have found support for these arguments. For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) show that positive expectations about future living standards, objective indicators predicting higher future income, and upward income trajectories decrease support for redistribution in the U.S. Also in that country, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) find that upward trajectories in occupational status are associated with lower demands for welfare policies. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find that upward income mobility decreases support for such policies in Russia. The authors also report that expectations of downward mobility increase support among well-off individuals. Using data from a number of Latin American countries, Gaviria (2007) finds that, in line

with expectations, positive perceptions of past mobility are associated with more negative attitudes toward redistribution. However, the author also finds that positive perceptions of future mobility are associated with more positive attitudes toward redistribution, but fails to discuss this unexpected result.

Exposure to labor market risks is also likely to shape individuals' redistributive attitudes as a number of welfare state policies serve social insurance purposes. Consider, for example, unemployment insurance. This policy redistributes income from sectors where the risk of becoming unemployed is low to those where that risk is high. This is because individuals in both sectors contribute equally to the insurance scheme, but those in the latter benefit more from it. Given that welfare state policies not only redistribute resources from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals but also from low-risk to high-risk sectors (Moene and Wallerstein 2003), individuals employed in high-risk sectors should be particularly supportive of redistributive policies. The level of specificity of individuals' skills should also inform support, as it is an indicator of the ease with which displaced individuals can transition into new occupations (Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2001).

Once again, several studies have found support for expectations related to labor market risks. Cusack et al. (2006), Iversen (2005), and Rehm (2005) show that skill specificity, unemployment risk, and unemployment status have positive effects on support for redistribution in various cross-sections of advanced industrial democracies. These expectations have yet to be analyzed in the developing world, however.

Finally, in a more sociological vein and focusing once again on redistribution from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals, one should consider the possibility that class interests shape redistributive attitudes. As power resource theorists would argue, members of the working class should be particularly supportive of welfare policies, while members of the business class should be opposed to them (Huber and Stephens 2001; Stephens 1979). Thus, one would expect factors such as occupational status and union membership to shape individuals' attitudes. In particular, one should find high levels of support for redistribution among those who are employed in manual occupations or who are union members.

Again, several studies have found evidence in line with these expectations, although these are limited to the context of advanced industrial democracies. The abovementioned studies by Cusack et al. (2006), Iversen (2005), and Rehm (2005) find that union membership has a positive effect on support for redistribution. Guillaud (2008) analyzes attitudes in Great Britain, Sweden, France, and Germany, finding that individuals with manual occupations are substantially more supportive of redistribution than those with managerial or professional occupations, while the attitudes of those with clerical or service sector occupations lie somewhere in between. That study also finds that individuals reporting that they belong to the upper class are less likely to support redistribution than those reporting that they belong to the middle class, and that the latter are less likely to support redistribution than those reporting that they belong to the working class. Isaksson and Lindskog (2007) report similar findings in their analysis of redistributive attitudes in the U.S., Germany, Sweden, and Hungary.

To sum up, the discussion thus far suggests a number of expectations from interest-based theories. Income, future income prospects, and occupational status should be negatively correlated with support for redistribution. Risk exposure should be positively correlated with support. Finally, union membership should be associated with higher levels of support.

Theories Based on Group Identity

A second set of explanations rests on the observation that solidarity has a hard time traveling across ethnic or racial lines.[3] Indeed, diverse societies seem to be less able to implement and sustain effective redistributive policies than their more homogenous counterparts.[4] Accordingly, the two main arguments focus on ethnic division. They differ, however, on the mechanisms via which they link group membership to attitudes. One highlights group conflict and interests; the other, social identity.

In diverse societies, ethnic groups might conceive of each other as competing for access to scarce goods, social status, and privileges (Blumer 1958; Bobo and Hutchings 1996). These conflicting interests over valuable commodities in turn become a central component of animosities between groups. In contexts in which inter-group relations are

[3] This dissertation uses "race" or "racial group" to refer to populations that share a number of phenotypic characteristics, the most salient of which is skin color. "Ethnicity" or "ethnic group" are used to refer to populations that share one or any combination of characteristics such as common geographical origin, history, culture, language, race, and so forth. To ease exposition, "ethnicity" and "ethnic group" are used to refer to both types of populations henceforth.

[4] The literature documenting the negative correlation between diversity and redistribution is ample. For example, Desmet, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber (2008) find that greater levels of linguistic heterogeneity are associated with lower levels of redistributive spending across countries. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) conclude that racial fragmentation accounts for a substantial portion of the differences in welfare spending across Europe and the U.S. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), Gould and Palmer (1988) and Hero and Tolbert (1996) show that this latter type of fragmentation is strongly and negatively correlated with welfare spending across American states.

particularly strained and perceptions of threat between groups are high, individuals might develop the belief that their life chances are linked to whatever happens to their ethnic group as a whole, positive or negative. This should be the case especially among those who strongly identify as members of disadvantaged groups. Such a sense of "linked fate" explains, for example, the relative homogeneity of African American political attitudes across class lines and economic status (Dawson 2001; Jaynes and Williams 1989).

As a result, in contexts in which a given ethnic group is overrepresented in the low-income population, its members should be more supportive of redistributive policies, as the group benefits disproportionately from them. Conversely, one would expect individuals who identify with privileged groups to oppose these policies because they, as a group, bear a disproportionate share of its costs. Note that this support reflects group interests rather than self-interests because it cuts across income, class, and social status lines. Thus, for example, this argument implies that well-off individuals who are members of a disadvantaged group support redistributive policies even if this support is at odds with their own pocketbooks.

Explanations based on social identity highlight individuals' ubiquitous tendencies to categorize others into social groups and to prefer members of groups with whom they identify. These tendencies often translate in discrimination against outgroup members (Bradley 1978; Miller and Ross 1975; Bar-Tal 1976). Preference and discrimination manifest themselves in many ways. For example, individuals tend to attribute positive traits and behaviors to themselves and members of their ingroup, but negative ones to the "others." They also tend to attribute their failures or negative outcomes to structural

causes beyond their control, but attribute those of others to their traits and behaviors. Moreover, individuals are more disposed to help those who are similar to them.

Thus, individuals might oppose redistributive policies because they conceive of them as benefiting ethnic groups to which they do not belong and toward which they have negative affect. On the extreme, some individuals might develop fully-fledged prejudiced attitudes toward these groups—attitudes that could themselves be informed by the fact that these groups are receiving assistance—and oppose redistribution even further. Indeed, wherever means-tested programs disproportionately benefit individuals that can easily be labeled as "others" by the general population, a process of stigmatization generally ensues, which in turn reinforces prejudice and erodes public support for such programs (Katz 1990).

The symbolic politics approach offers an alternative explanation for the origins of attitudes toward outgroups as well as for the relationship between these attitudes and individuals' policy positions and other political opinions. According to this theory, individuals learn affective responses to symbols in their pre-adult years, which become quite stable as political socialization ends in early adulthood. In turn, these affective predispositions might shape individuals' opinions whenever a given attitude object is related to one of these symbols (Sears and Funk 1991, 13-15). At least in the U.S., racial prejudice is one of them most salient predispositions identified by the symbolic politics literature, shaping individuals' opinions on policy issues such as "busing" and school integration, unemployment benefits, and welfare spending (e.g., Sears, Hensler, and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980). More specifically, among whites,

negative affect toward African Americans is associated with lower levels of support for these public policies, which evoke the "black" symbol, among others.

Evidence supporting the claim that members of minority groups support redistributive spending when these groups benefit disproportionately from it comes almost exclusively from the U.S. In that country, African Americans are more supportive of redistribution than whites, even after controlling for other individual-level characteristics (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 148-154; Alesina and Guiliano 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Soroka, Banting, and Johnston (2007) question the generalizability of this finding using data from Canada, which is usually considered to be the most similar country to the U.S. among advanced industrial democracies. The authors find that membership in linguistic or racial minority groups—Anglophone majority vs. Francophone minority, and Caucasian majority vs. Chinese, South Asian, and Black minorities, respectively—has no or very little substantive effect on support for unemployment insurance, welfare programs, health care, and pensions.

With regards to the second expectation, in the U.S., prejudiced attitudes toward African Americans and symbolic racism have a negative effect on support for social programs and welfare spending (Gilens 1995; Gilens 1996; Jacoby 1994). But research that explores the relationship between opinions on the issue of redistribution and attitudes toward (immigrant) minority groups in Europe finds a more complex picture. Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist (2011) find that increases in the share of immigrants in Swedish municipalities caused by a refugee relocation program decrease support for redistributive policies, especially among well-off individuals.

Using data from the European Social Survey, Finseraas (2007) finds that attitudes towards immigrants have mixed effects depending on respondents' income and the type of attitudes whose effects are explored. Specifically, perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the national culture have a negative effect on support for redistribution among respondents with high incomes, but no effect among those with low incomes. In contrast, perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the national economy have a negative effect on support among respondents with low incomes, but no effect among those with high incomes. The author concludes that predictions of decreasing support for European welfare states in the face of increasing immigration are likely overstated.[5]

In sum, the preceding discussion of theories emphasizing group identity suggests two expectations. First, individuals who belong to ethnic groups that are overrepresented in the low-income population should be more supportive of redistribution than those who belong to other groups. And, second, prejudiced attitudes towards groups that are overrepresented in the low-income population should be negatively correlated with support for redistributive policies.

A Belief-Based Theory of Redistributive Attitudes

In contrast to the structural-based arguments presented thus far, this section advances a belief-based theory of attitudes regarding redistribution. This explanation builds on recent research in the field of economics showing that opinions on this issue

[5] There are indeed numerous studies arguing that the increased diversity caused by immigration might threaten the generous European welfare states because it is likely to erode public support for redistribution. These studies base their predictions on cross-national and sub-national studies such as those mentioned in fn. 4, but there is very little research that actually analyzes the effects of immigration on redistributive attitudes. See Banting (2005) for a summary and critique of the studies with grim predictions about the future of European welfare states.

reflect beliefs related to the causes of individuals' economic standing and to the extent to which society provides people with equal opportunities. In addition to these two types of beliefs, this explanation also considers the ways in which individuals conceive of wealth accumulation. Finally, it argues that these social beliefs matter because they inform individuals' judgments about the fairness of the distributive status quo and about the moral worthiness of helping those in need.

Consider, for example, beliefs about the factors that determine income. Some individuals might think that income is a product of personal effort and ability, while others might consider that factors over which people have no control such as birth, connections, and luck are more important. In the former case, individuals should be more likely to consider inequality as fair—to extent that "one gets what one deserves and deserves what one gets" (Alesina and Angeletos 2005, 966)—and refrain from demanding actions to address it. In the latter case, they should be more likely to support redistribution to offset an unfair status quo and provide assistance to those who are in need because of no fault of their own. Individuals might of course have beliefs and corresponding attitudes toward welfare policies that lie somewhere in between these two extremes. Similar expectations could be laid out for other related beliefs, such as those about the extent to which hard work is rewarded by society, about the causes of poverty, about equality of opportunity, and the like.

There is ample empirical support for these expectations, even after controlling for income and other variables suggested by interest-based accounts. Studies analyzing attitudes in the U.S. also control for racial group membership. Using data from this

country, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) find that those who believe that people can get ahead through their own hard work are less likely to demand redistribution than those who think that getting lucky breaks or help from others are more important; those who deem both sets of factors as important lie somewhere in between.[6] The authors also report that individuals who state that family background or knowing the right people matter for economic success are more likely to support redistributive policies than those who think that these factors do not matter. Finally, they report that those who believe that there are equal opportunities are more averse to welfare policies than those who think that this is not the case.

Also in the U.S., Fong (2001) finds that beliefs about the causes of economic (mis)fortunes shape support for redistribution as one would expect. Those who attribute poverty to lack of effort rather than to circumstances beyond individuals' control are more supportive of it. The same is true about those who think that strong effort explains wealth, as opposed to luck and other factors external to individuals. The author also reports that respondents who believe that there is plenty of opportunity for the average person to get ahead are less likely to support redistributive policies than those who think that the opposite is true.

Analyzing data from the U.S., Sweden, Germany, and Hungary, Isaksson and Lindskog (2007) report findings that are consistent with expectations regarding beliefs about the importance of family origin for economic advancement. They also report that beliefs about whether or not society rewards intelligence and skills, on the one hand, and

[6] Alesina and Giuliano (2011, 20-21) report a similar finding.

effort, on the other, shape support for state involvement in the alleviation of income inequality in line with expectations. Using data from a number of advanced industrial democracies and former communist countries,[7] Corneo and Grüner (2002) find that individuals who think that hard work is important for getting ahead in life are less likely to support redistribution. The authors also report obtaining results consistent with expectations when using an item that asks individuals about the importance of coming from a wealthy family.

Using data from Latin America, Gaviria (2007) finds that individuals who believe that success depends on connections are more likely to demand redistributive policies than those who feel that this is not the case. The author also finds that those who think that hard work does not guarantee success are more likely to support such policies than those who consider that it does. Finally, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) analyze the effects of social beliefs with pooled data from all waves and countries of the World Values Survey (WVS). They find that the more an individual agrees with the view that hard work brings a better life, the more he will support government responsibility in ensuring that everyone is provided for.

In addition to beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes and the extent to which society affords equal opportunities, this dissertation also considers individuals' conceptions about wealth accumulation. Some individuals might think that wealth is relatively finite and that accruing it likely entails taking it from others. These individuals

[7] The cross section includes 11 countries: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Germany (although East and West Germany are analyzed separately), Hungary, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, and the U.S.

will likely view those who are well-off as undeserving of their status and those who are worse-off as victims of this state of affairs. As a consequence, they should be more supportive of redistributive policies. In contrast, others might feel that everyone who is willing to try can create and accumulate wealth. Individuals who hold these beliefs should be more averse to redistribution because they are likely to judge existing inequalities to be fair and individual prosperity to be the product of industriousness. The view that wealth is relatively finite is part of the redistributive frame of inequality while the opposite belief is part of the self-reliance frame.

To date, social beliefs remain completely overlooked by the comparative politics literature seeking to understand support for redistribution; economists are the ones who have produced much if not all work on the relationship between social beliefs and redistributive attitudes. In spite of their importance, the mechanisms by which social beliefs shape atttiudes, on the one hand, and the origins of such beliefs, on the other, remain under-theorized. The remainder of this section elaborates on the former issue while the following develops a politico-historical theory of the origins of social beliefs.

The social beliefs introduced thus far are most likely not independent of each other. Individuals who think that society does not give people a fair chance at getting ahead are also likely to believe that forces over which individuals have no control determine economic standing. Moreover, they are likely to view those in need as having little chance to escape poverty. Beliefs in the opposite direction should also go together; those who think that society lives up to the ideal of equality of opportunity are also likely

to deem effort and hard work as the main determinants of economic standing as well as to view social structure as open to personal advancement.

Thus, rather than disconnected thoughts, social beliefs should be understood as the components of larger "conceptual frames" about the issue of inequality. Conceptual frames are simplified mental models of reality that help people navigate complex issues (Lakoff 2006).[8] Their key feature is that they provide individuals with information about the causes and consequences of social phenomena, which they then use to interpret new information and form opinions.[9] The two sets of beliefs described above constitute two ideal-type inequality frames: the first set of beliefs comprises the "redistributive frame" which is associated with support for redistributive polices, and the second set of beliefs comprises the "self-reliance frame" which is associated with opposition to these policies. Individuals might, of course, hold beliefs—and corresponding redistributive attitudes—in between these two ideal-type frames.

In the redistributive frame, factors external to individuals like injustice and exploitation are to blame for inequality and poverty. In the self-reliance frame, individuals themselves and their own traits and behaviors are responsible for their fates.[10] The former conception is conducive to greater support for welfare policies because individuals who hold beliefs in line with it should be more likely to judge the distributive

[8] Axelrod (1974) uses the term cognitive map to refer to a similar concept.

[9] Conceptual frames are thus similar to schemas (Conover and Feldman 1984). The main difference between the two is that conceptual frames contain beliefs about the causes and consequences of social phenomena, while schemas store all types of cognitions—i.e., factual information, beliefs, evaluations, and so forth. Another important difference is that while conceptual frames are organized and stored as simple narratives, schemas are organized and stored as networks of cognitions. In sum, one could argue that conceptual frames are a type of cognitive structure that likely populates larger schemas.

[10] Lane (2001, 475-476) refers to these as circumstantial and dispositional attributions, respectively.

status quo as unfair and the poor as morally deserving of assistance. This formulation implies that judgments about fairness and moral worthiness—or values—are a reflection of inequality conceptions. This is true to some extent, as individuals generally strive to be fair to others when dealing with issues of distributive justice (Hochschild 1981). However, this is more like a simplification, as beliefs and values usually interact to shape policy positions (Mitchell, Tetlock, Newman, and Lerner 2003, 520).

Because beliefs and values are likely endogenous, focusing on one of them is a sensible choice. And focusing on beliefs over values is appropriate for at least a couple of reasons. First, given that beliefs are thoughts about what is held to be true in the world and values are cognitions about what ought to be true, the former are likely further away from redistributive attitudes in the "funnel of causality" (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960, 24-25). Indeed, this proximity makes the findings of studies analyzing the relationship between values and support for redistribution not very surprising.

For example, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) find that humanitarian orientations—i.e., "a sense of obligation to help those in need"—are positively correlated with support for social welfare policies in the U.S. Also in that country, McClosky and Zaller (1984) report that those who value equality over individualism are more supportive of these policies. Jacoby (1994) and Jacoby (2006) report similar findings. In a comparative study of a number of advanced industrial democracies, Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) find that egalitarianism is conducive to greater support for government assistance to the unemployed and the elderly.

Second, experimental research has provided strong evidence suggesting that social beliefs shape support for redistribution. For example, Krawczyk (2010) conducted an experiment in which a monetary incentive was initially allotted among participants either according to chance or to performance in a competitive task. The incentive was distributed after participants selected their preferred transfer levels. The author finds that transfers were substantially higher when the incentive was assigned randomly. Durante and Putterman (2007) report similar experimental findings. No similar evidence is available in the case of values.

To summarize, the belief-based account of redistributive attitudes suggests three expectations. The more an individual believes that factors over which people have no control are responsible for wealth and poverty, and for economic outcomes more generally, the more he should support redistribution. The more an individual considers that society does not afford people with equal opportunities for advancement, the more he should support redistribution. Finally, the more an individual believes that wealth is finite and that accumulating wealth requires depriving others of it, the more he should support redistribution. In addition, individuals should hold relatively cohesive beliefs, which, at the extremes, should be consistent with the redistributive and self-reliance frames.

Toward a General Theory of Support for Redistribution

Redistributive attitudes, as any other opinion, are mental constructs. As such they are not automatic reflections of underlying interests, attitudes toward outgroups, or beliefs. Rather, these are considerations that can combine to lead individuals to support or oppose redistribution. Given the evidence reviewed in the preceding sections, all of these

considerations appear to matter to some extent, at least in advanced industrial democracies. Thus, rather than thinking of theories focusing on interests, group identity, and beliefs as competing, one should see them as complementary.

Having this in mind, this dissertation advances scholarship on support for redistribution by identifying the contextual factors that make particular considerations more or less salient in shaping support for redistribution. As the following chapters reveal, explanations that focus on structural cleavages are useful only in certain contexts. Specifically, interests and attitudes toward outgroups are relevant wherever individuals have access to material and informational resources that make them more cognizant of their position along these structural cleavages. While this is often the case in advanced industrial democracies, it is not in Argentina and Peru.

In the case of material interests, individuals in Argentina and Peru, and in the developing world more generally, are devoid of access to these resources because of the relative weakness of social and political organizations advancing the interests of groups defined by employment status, class, or sectors of occupation. The relative underdevelopment of social protection systems, which are characterized by insufficient coverage and targeted benefits, further contributes to this situation. In addition, the volatility that characterizes developing economies in combination with the greater complexity of their social stratification, make it more difficult for individuals to develop attitudes in line with their economic interests. The only exception to this assessment is income, which shapes support for redistribution in Argentina and Peru as expected. This

is likely the case because the link between individuals' position in the income distribution and winning or losing from redistribution is rather straightforward.

Considerations derived from theories based on group identity do not play a role in shaping support for redistribution in Argentina because of its ethnic homogeneity. In more diverse Peru, the weakness of ethnic-based organizations and the underdevelopment of social protection systems help explain why these considerations are not relevant. Extensive ethnic intermixing in this country has further contributed to making ethnic cleavages less salient.

In contrast, overall, social beliefs shape support for redistribution as expected in Argentina and Peru. This is because social beliefs are inside-the-head constructs about inequality and poverty, issues that individuals are permanently confronted with in most societies. Moreover, social beliefs provide a partial explanation for why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. This divergence arises from heterogeneity in the distribution of inequality frames across countries' populations. In Argentina, the redistributive frame is dominant with the average individual's beliefs being closer to the redistributive ideal type. In contrast, the self-reliance frame is dominant in Peru with the average individual's beliefs being closer to the self-reliance ideal type.

This finding is in line with a number of studies suggesting that social beliefs play an important role in explaining divergences in redistributive attitudes across Europe and the U.S. (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 183-216). These studies find that Europeans are more likely to believe that society is rigid, allowing for

very limited mobility. They also tend to view birth, connections, and luck as playing a defining role in determining economic standing and to view the poor as being stuck in that condition. In contrast, individuals in the U.S. are more likely to believe that economic advancement is a product of personal effort and ability, and that those living in poverty can escape from it through hard work and industriousness. These compositional differences in social beliefs help explain why support for redistribution is higher in Europe than in the U.S.

The Political Origins of Inequality Frames

How does a particular inequality frame become dominant? A critical juncture framework is useful to understand this process. In line with Zaller (1992), one should expect individuals to have relatively stable social beliefs during times of normal politics. The public (or at least a large share of it) should be receptive to new ways of thinking about inequality and poverty—and the issue of redistribution more generally—during certain periods of a country's political development. There are three historical moments during which social beliefs are expected to be malleable.

One is the period during which welfare systems are initially introduced. At such times, the mass public should be lacking well-organized information about the social problems public policy aims to tackle and about the system's characteristics and likely consequences. Indeed, before the invention of the modern welfare state, the minimal state was the norm, and assistance to those in need was left, for the most part, to private initiative. While individuals might have already had some inequality "proto-frames" by

this time, these were likely not linked to the idea of state-sponsored redistribution in the minds of the mass public.

Another critical period is during mass political incorporation. Being relatively foreign to politics, the newly incorporated should be lacking well-developed political predispositions, including frames about inequality. They should therefore be particularly receptive to new information. Finally, another period is during the aftermath of economic crises, as these trigger periods of uncertainty during which individuals are particularly open to new ideas and policy innovations (Blyth 2002; Weyland 2008).

These periods are not, of course, mutually exclusive. For example, in several developing countries, including Argentina and Peru, the period of initial implementation of welfare and social protection systems significantly overlapped with the period during which the working class and the urban popular sectors were incorporated into politics. Likewise, in several advanced industrial democracies, initial implementation of welfare policies or major welfare reform took place immediately following economic crises (Blyth 2002; Huber and Stephens 2001).

During critical junctures, political actors that achieve power can tilt the balance in favor of one inequality frame over the other by implementing—or failing to implement—social policies and using rhetoric to justify their policy choices. Political elites and societal actors supporting and opposing particular policies use debate, deliberation, or more extreme means of political persuasion to advance their positions and to discredit those of the opposing side. Once in power, the winners of such political debates are in a position to consolidate the dominance of their inequality frame both by implementing

their preferred policies and by reiterating the beliefs that lend support to their policy positions using their increased access to state and political resources.

Social policies themselves are important because they provide individuals with additional information that reinforces inequality frames. Generous welfare systems generally feature universal programs. Given that these programs tend to foster high levels of social trust and social cohesion (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005), they should prompt individuals to develop social beliefs that are sympathetic to the poor and thus in line with the redistributive frame. In contrast, relatively modest welfare systems tend to rely on means-tested, targeted programs, which often lead to stigmatization, a process by which negative traits and behaviors are ascribed to program beneficiaries.[11] This stigmatization likely fosters social beliefs that are hostile to the poor and that feature prominently in the self-reliance frame. Whenever generous welfare systems are implemented, it is also important that they are relatively successful at reducing inequality or producing welfare gains, as individuals will reject ineffective policies along with the rhetoric that justifies them.

Thus, the redistributive frame should become dominant wherever progressive-oriented political actors whose discourse prominently features populist, egalitarian, or class struggle elements are able to implement relatively successful comprehensive social policies. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant in countries where this combination of rhetoric and policies does not materialize. For example, this is the case wherever

[11] The literature on stigmatization of welfare program beneficiaries is ample (e.g. Spicker 1984; Colton, Casas, Drakeford, Roberts, Scholte, and Williams 1997; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Goffman 1963; Katz 1990).

conservative elites introduce relatively modest welfare systems and actively use the self-reliance frame to justify this choice; or wherever comprehensive policies are implemented, but do not produce welfare gains or result in economic or social turmoil.

Finally, once normal politics resume, the window of opportunity provided by a given critical juncture closes and social beliefs become resilient to change. As time elapses, inequality frames should become more and more engrained in the minds of the public and become deeply held predispositions that inform more peripheral attitudes. This stability helps explain why support for redistribution is relatively stable over time. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, at this stage, the dominant inequality frame and its corresponding levels of support for redistribution become constraints on the range of options that politicians and bureaucrats can pursue in this policy domain. As a result, policy changes should be relatively rare and, for the most part, incremental during times of normal politics.

As this dissertation shows, in the two countries under study, the first critical juncture was the political incorporation of the working and the popular classes. This development overlapped with the period during which modern welfare systems were implemented in both countries. By the end of this juncture, the redistributive frame had risen to prominence in Argentina because President Juan Perón was able to implement extensive and relatively successful social policies while embracing anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric. In contrast, the redistributive frame remained weak in Peru because the progressive political force of the time, the Peruvian Aprista Party, was unable to attain power. Later on, the progressive-oriented Revolutionary Government of the Armed

Forces (GRFA) failed to produce redistributive frame dominance because it attempted radical change during a period of normal politics when Peruvians held strong predispositions in line with the self-reliance frame.

A second critical juncture took place in Argentina following the economic and political crises of the 1970s and 1980s. While the redistributive frame weakened during this time, allowing for the implementation of market reforms in the early-1990s, a new and deeper economic crisis in the early-2000s restored it to prominence. In Peru, the dominance of the self-reliance frame was consolidated after a major economic and political crisis in the late 1980s and the successful implementation of neoliberal reforms in the early-1990s.

With regard to alternative explanations of inequality frame dominance, scholars have argued that social beliefs diverged across Europe and the U.S. because of differences in historical mobility experiences, arable land endowments, and religious beliefs (e.g., Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006; Piketty 1995). Specifically, a class structure open to personal advancement and land abundance might have fostered relatively optimistic beliefs about mobility and opportunity in the U.S. Similarly, settlers' Protestant religious background might have made the early Americans more inclined to believe in the power of effort and personal willpower in shaping life outcomes.

While intuitively appealing, these ideas cannot account for divergence in social beliefs in Argentina and Peru. As will be shown in Chapter 6 in detail, if either of the two countries was, at some point in time, to be regarded as a "land of opportunity" it would

be Argentina at the turn of the twentieth century. Current levels of social mobility across the two countries are also comparable and thus cannot explain diverging social beliefs. Given that both countries had a deep-rooted Catholic tradition since colonial times and well into the twentieth century, it would be hard to make the case that religious beliefs can account for divergence in inequality frames and corresponding levels of support for redistribution. In contrast, the politico-historical explanation advanced here can successfully account for this divergence.

Conclusion

As this chapter has argued and the empirical analysis in the ensuing chapters will document, with the exception of current income, considerations suggested by theories that focus on structural cleavages are relatively unsuccessful in accounting for variation in redistributive attitudes in Argentina and Peru. In contrast, the belief-based theory advanced in this chapter is able to account for variation in both these countries. Indeed, individuals who hold beliefs that are in line with the redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution than those whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame. In turn, the distribution of conceptual frames in the minds of the mass public helps explain the divergence in support for redistribution between Argentina and Peru.

The dominance of a particular inequality frame is contingent on the actions of political elites at critical political junctures. The redistributive frame becomes dominant whenever progressively oriented elites are able to implement social policies that benefit large sections of the population while using rhetoric that invokes beliefs in line with the redistributive frame to justify their positions. The self-reliance frame becomes dominant

wherever social policies develop in an incremental manner, as concessions from generally conservative elites, or whenever ambitious social policy reform is attempted outside the windows of opportunity provided by critical junctures.

The following four chapters assess the expectations developed here in the context of Argentina and Peru. Chapter 3 characterizes support for redistribution and social policies in both countries. It also compares them to other Latin American countries as well as to European countries and the U.S. Chapter 4 examines expectations derived from theories focused on interests and group identity, while Chapter 5 explores the role played by social beliefs and examines the causes of divergence in levels of support for redistribution between Argentina and Peru. Finally, Chapter 6 analyzes the origins of inequality frames in these two countries through comparative historical case studies.

Chapter 3
Redistributive Attitudes and Policies in Argentina and Peru

Europe and the U.S. are the contexts in which attitudes toward redistribution have been most extensively studied (e.g. Alesina and Glaeser 2009; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Iversen 2005; Cusack et al. 2006). In line with the conventional wisdom, this research shows that Europeans tend to be more supportive of redistribution than individuals in the U.S. and that actual levels of spending on welfare state policies are aligned with citizens' opinions on both sides of the Atlantic. Extant theories of redistributive attitudes have been developed with this characterization in mind. They seek to account for the emergence of these two equilibria: one with high levels of public support for redistributive policies and high levels of spending on these policies and the other with low levels of support and spending.

This chapter examines redistributive attitudes and policies in Argentina and Peru. It shows that the former country is more similar to Europe and the latter is more similar to the U.S. Argentines are more supportive of redistribution than Peruvians and levels of support in these countries are comparable to those observed in European countries and the U.S., respectively. The chapter also analyzes patterns of polarization in redistributive attitudes and shows that Argentines are more divided over this issue than Peruvians. In terms of actual levels of spending on welfare state policies, the parallel also applies, with Argentina spending substantially more than Peru—although both spend substantially less than their more advanced counterparts.

The remainder of the chapter is divided into five sections. The first one introduces the survey data used for the analyses throughout the dissertation as well as the specific items that are used to measure redistributive attitudes. The second section examines support for redistribution in Argentina and Peru as well as the dispersion of attitudes on this issue. The third section characterizes redistributive policies in Argentina and Peru. The fourth section compares levels of support for and spending on redistribution in the two countries with other Latin American countries. Finally, the fifth section concludes.

Data and Measurement

This dissertation uses survey data from two main sources to examine attitudes toward redistribution in Argentina and Peru (and beyond). The World Values Survey (WVS) is the source on which the dissertation relies most heavily. The WVS is an ongoing study that collects data on individuals' attitudes, values, and beliefs in a large number of countries throughout the world. Thus far, five waves of surveys have been completed, 1981-1984 (Wave 1), 1989-1993 (Wave 2), 1994-1999 (Wave 3), 1999-2004 (Wave 4), and 2005-2008 (Wave 5); a sixth wave, 2010-2012, is currently underway.[12] Argentina and Peru were both included in the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the study. Argentina was surveyed in 1995 (Wave 3), 1999 (Wave 4), and 2006 (Wave 5), and Peru was surveyed in 1996 (Wave 3), 2001 (Wave 4), and 2008 (Wave 5). The WVS is useful because it includes items gauging not only individuals' redistributive attitudes but also their social beliefs. Chapter 5 uses these items to characterize social beliefs and evaluate the belief-based explanation of support for redistribution.

[12] For further details about the WVS, visit www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

The second source is the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). The Americas Barometer has collected survey data on individuals' political attitudes and behaviors in almost all countries in the Americas in 2006, 2008, and 2010.[13] Items measuring support for redistribution were only included in the latter two years, however. This dissertation thus only uses data from these years. Given that they collect extensive data on individuals' socioeconomic status, economic prospects, and ethnicity, LAPOP studies are especially useful for the analysis of existing structural explanations presented in Chapter 4.

Table 3.1 summarizes the wording of the four items used to measure support for redistribution throughout the dissertation. EQUALITY is a measure of the extent to which individuals think that income inequality should be increased or decreased. RESPONSIBILITY gauges the extent to which individuals hold views consistent with individual vs. government responsibility in providing for people. INEQUALITY measures the degree to which individuals think that the government should implement policies to address inequality. Finally, WELL-BEING gauges the degree to which individuals think that the government, as opposed to individuals, is responsible for people's well-being.

The EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY items are available for both Argentina and Peru in the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS. The INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING items are available in the 2008 and 2010 surveys of the LAPOP. Table

[13] More information about LAPOP can be found at www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop.

A1.1 in Appendix 1 presents the descriptive statistics for these items.[14] These and other very similar items have been used in a number of studies to measure support for redistribution.[15]

Table 3.1
Items Used to Measure Support for Redistribution

Source	Label	Item Wording
WVS	EQUALITY	How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement "Incomes should be made more equal;" 10 means you agree completely with the statement "We need larger income differences;" and if your views fall somewhere in the middle, you can choose any number in between.
	RESPONSIBILITY	How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves;" 10 means you agree completely with the statement "The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for;" and if your views fall somewhere in the middle, you can choose any number in between.
LAPOP	INEQUALITY	In the following scale, 1 represents "strongly disagree" and 7 represents "strongly agree." Numbers between 1 and 7 represent an intermediate score. The (nationality) government/state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?
	WELL-BEING	In the following scale, 1 represents "strongly disagree" and 7 represents "strongly agree." Numbers between 1 and 7 represent an intermediate score. The (nationality) government/state, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Note: wording has been slightly modified to ease presentation.

[14] Waves rather than years are used to present responses to the EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY items. Again, Argentina was surveyed in 1995, 1999, and 2006, and Peru in 1996, 2001, and 2006 as part of the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS, respectively. These are labeled Wave 3, Wave 4, and Wave 5 for simplicity throughout this study. Also, whenever the text uses "years" the reader should keep in mind that these refer to "waves" in the case of items taken from the WVS.

[15] Alesina and Giuliano (2009) use RESPONSIBILITY among other items. Chong and Gradstein (2006) and Lindqvist and Östling (2010) use EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY among other items. Gaviria (2006) uses an item very similar to RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING available in the 1996 Latinobarómetro. Corneo and Grüner (2000), Corneo and Grüner (2002), Cusack et al. (2006), and Iversen (2005) all use an item very similar to the INEQUALITY item that is available in several waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Rehm (2005) uses an item very similar to INEQUALITY that is available in the 2002/2003 European Social Survey.

These items provide good measures of individuals' attitudes about income inequality and government involvement in its alleviation, but they are not free of potential limitations. One limitation is that the wording of the EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, and WELL-BEING items makes responses potentially dependent on the redistributive status quo. In a context of extensive welfare provision, even individuals who support redistribution could be inclined to believe that more income differences and more individual responsibility are needed (Lindqvist and Östling 2010, 546). However, as will be shown below, support for redistribution as measured by these items is higher in Argentina than in Peru and welfare state policies are more developed in the former country. If anything, the items might underestimate the extent to which support differs across the two countries under study.

Another limitation pertaining to INEQUALITY is that the item does not specify which "strong policies" should be used to reduce income inequality. Thus, it is possible that one individual might answer "7" while thinking that the government should fight inequality by improving education and health services while another provides the same answer but with policies like direct cash transfers to the poor or more radical measures such as expropriation in mind. The latter type of individual would be more supportive of redistribution than the former, but the item does not discriminate between the two. This could be potentially damaging especially if "stronger policies" carries substantially different meaning for respondents across Argentina and Peru. This item is still useful, however, because it discriminates between those who believe that the state should do nothing or very little to reduce inequality from those who believe it should do something

or very much, regardless of the specific policies they have in mind. Moreover, given that the welfare state is more extensive in Argentina than in Peru, individuals in Argentina should be more likely to have policies that directly transfer income in mind when answering this question. Again, this might result in underestimating the differences in support across the two countries.

Finally, it is worth noting two limitations shared by the RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING items. First, respondents might have different interpretations of what government as opposed to individual "responsibility" entails. Similarly, the meanings of ensuring "that everyone is provided for" and "well-being" are also open to interpretation. For example, some might answer having an abstract "moral responsibility" in mind, while others might conceive of responsibility in more concrete terms, expecting direct action from the state to provide for individuals. In the worst-case scenario, respondents would interpret the items differently across contexts. Once again, given the extent of welfare state development in Argentina and Peru, one would expect individuals in the former country to be more prone to interpreting these terms in a concrete way than those in the latter. Differences in support for redistribution across the two countries would be underestimated if this were the case.

It is also worth noting the design differences among the items. First, EQUALITY and INEQUALITY differ from RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING in important ways. While the former pair of items makes references to income inequality, the latter make reference to government as opposed to individual responsibility in "providing for" and "ensuring the well-being of" the people. Moreover, EQUALITY and INEQUALITY

differ in that the former asks respondents for their opinion on income inequality alone, while the latter inquires whether government should implement strong policies to reduce such inequality. Finally, items also differ in the scales they employ to record responses. Those from the WVS (EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY) use a ten-point scale with opposite statements at each end, while those from the LAPOP studies (INEQUALITY and WELL-EBING) use a seven-point scale with "strongly disagree" and "strongly agree" at each end. While the former forces individuals to make a choice between alternatives, the latter is probably susceptible to individuals' tendency to acquiescence—i.e., the tendency to agree with assertions made in a statement regardless of its content (Krosnick 1999, 552).

Despite the fact that these items tap into the same underlying construct, the design differences just highlighted result in diverging estimates of support for redistribution across measures. These divergences should not be surprising given the vast literature on survey design effects; therefore, the ensuing analysis refrains from explaining them.[16] Instead, the analysis focuses on within-item cross-country comparisons to demonstrate that support for redistribution is substantially higher in Argentina than in Peru. As discussed earlier, the conclusions presented below can only be strengthened by the fact that the available items likely underestimate the extent to which support differs across the two countries under study.

[16] For a review of survey design effects see Krosnick (1999, 543-559).

Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru

Figure 3.1 presents the mean response to the four items for each of the available country-years. As the figure shows, mean support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru for all the available item-year pairings. Differences are quite substantial in the case of EQUALITY, especially in Wave 4 and Wave 5. It is also important to point out that the smallest differences in EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY are observed in Wave 3. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, this is likely due to the political circumstances of the mid-1990s when this wave was conducted. Differences in INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING are relatively modest.

Figure 3.1
Mean Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru,
by Item and Year



Table 3.2 compares mean support for redistribution across the two countries and assesses the statistical significance of observed differences. As the table shows, all differences are statistically significant at the 5% level; in fact, all but one of them are significant at the 0.1% level. Most importantly, the differences in mean support for redistribution across the two countries are quite substantial, especially in the case of the EQUALITY item. Indeed, in Wave 4, mean responses to this item across the two countries diverge by 2.59 points out of a possible nine and by 2.23 points out of a possible nine in Wave 5. Differences in support for redistribution as measured by the other items are more modest, but clearly not negligible. Observed differences are more remarkable if one considers that the items used to measure support are likely to underestimate the divergence in opinion across the two countries.

Together, Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 also show that mean support for redistribution is quite stable over time within each country. While mean responses to the items vary from year to year, change is only incremental. The largest changes are observed in the case of the EQUALITY item; from Wave 3 to Wave 4, mean response increased by 21.37% in Argentina and dropped by 20.30% in Peru. The mean is, of course, very sensitive to extreme values and thus might overstate the extent to which support varies over time. Median responses are presented below to address this weakness.

Figure 3.2 presents the medians for the four items. The figure shows that median support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. The median response to the

Table 3.2
Comparisons of Mean Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru, by Item and Year

Item	Wave/Year	Mean		Difference	Standard Error	t	Prob(T>t)[a]
		Argentina	Peru				
EQUALITY	Wave 1	5.01	4.38	0.63	0.1368	4.64	0.000
	Wave 2	6.08	3.49	2.59	0.1191	21.76	0.000
	Wave 3	5.73	3.50	2.23	0.1394	15.99	0.000
RESPONSIBILITY	Wave 1	5.77	5.46	0.31	0.1368	2.29	0.011
	Wave 2	6.64	5.29	1.35	0.1241	10.87	0.000
	Wave 3	6.05	5.14	0.91	0.1429	6.34	0.000
INEQUALITY	2008	6.17	5.75	0.42	0.0521	8.05	0.000
	2010	5.90	5.56	0.34	0.0565	5.97	0.000
WELL-BEING	2008	6.01	5.5	0.51	0.0541	9.35	0.000
	2010	5.82	5.35	0.47	0.0574	8.16	0.000

All results reported correspond to independent samples t-tests assuming unequal variances.
[a] Ho: Difference=0; Ha: Difference>0.

EQUALITY item in Argentina is "5" in the third wave and "6" in the other two waves, while the median response in Peru is "3" in all waves. In the case of RESPONSIBILITY, the median responses are "6," "7," and "6" in Argentina and "6," "5," and "5" in Peru. Thus the only instance in which median support does not diverge is RESPONSIBILITY-Wave 3. As mentioned earlier, the fact that opinions in the two countries are more similar during the mid-1990s, as measured by both EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY, is likely a product of the political circumstances of the time. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.

Figure 3.2
Median Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru,
by Country and Year



In the case of the items taken from the LAPOP surveys (i.e., INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING), all median responses are "7" in Argentina and "6" in Peru. Overall, differences in support for redistribution across the two countries are quite substantial in the case of EQUALITY, but more modest in the case of the other three items. Again, it is worth noting that these differences are likely underestimated because of the limitations of the items discussed in the previous section. Finally, the analysis of median support also confirms that support for redistribution is quite stable over time in the two countries.

In sum, as the above figures and table show, support for redistribution is clearly higher in Argentina than in Peru. This divergence is consistently observed in all of the years for which data are available in the WVS and the LAPOP surveys—the only exception being the case of median support for redistribution as measured by RESPONSIBILITY in Wave 3 of the WVS. The following section discusses the policy implications of these differences in public opinion.

Redistributive Policies in Argentina and Peru

The level of support for redistribution within countries has implications for the policies that get implemented. Indeed, a country's social policies are usually rather aligned with the opinions of its public. The following paragraphs detail Argentina's rather extensive welfare state, especially compared to Peru's less redistributive social policies. In addition to providing an overview of the social policies and revenue collection systems in Argentina and Peru, this section also considers their distributive implications.

Table 3.3 summarizes several indicators of government spending. All figures correspond to 2007, the last year for which data are available, and are expressed as a share of GDP to facilitate comparison. First, consider total government expenditures, which is a common proxy for the amount of welfare provision in a given country. Looking at this measure in the table, the Argentine state seems massive when compared to that of Peru. In the former country, government expenditures amount to about one third of gross domestic product (GDP), while in the latter, government expenditures are well below 20%. As the table shows, Argentina devotes three times as much of its GDP as

Peru to social spending. Disaggregated data provide a more detailed picture of redistributive efforts in each country. Argentina spends more than Peru in each of the four categories, with disparities ranging from a little over twice as much in education to a little over four times as much in health.

Table 3.3
Government Expenditures in Argentina and Peru,
as a percentage of GDP, 2007

Country	Education[a,c]	Health[a,d]	Social Protection[a,e]	Housing[a,f]	Total Social Spending[a]	Total Expenditures[b]
Argentina	5.46	5.07	10.80	1.91	23.23	33.60
Peru	2.60	1.24	3.70	0.60	8.14	17.72

All figures include central, state, and local levels of government; in addition, social spending figures include expenditures made by nonfinancial public enterprises. Source: total expenditures figure taken from IMF (2011); all others taken from ECLAC (2011a).

[a] Includes expenditures in education, culture, recreation, and sports.

[b] Includes expenditures in health and nutrition; might also include some expenditures in sanitation.

[c] Includes expenditures in social security, social protection, social work, social assistance, and training.

[d] Includes expenditures in housing, water, sanitation, and other areas not included in previous categories.

Following a trend in Latin America (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens 2008, 423-425), expenditures in education and health are allocated more progressively than expenditures on social insurance schemes like old-age pensions and unemployment compensation. Also like in the rest of the region, funds allotted to highly progressive social assistance programs such as conditional cash transfers are on the rise in both countries, but are still limited to a small fraction of total social spending. Thus, altogether, government cash transfers—i.e., pensions, unemployment compensation, and social assistance receipts—do not improve the distribution of income in either of the two countries under study. Indeed, the Gini coefficient remains at 0.49 in Argentina and at

0.50 in Peru before and after considering these transfers (Goñi, López, and Servén 2011, 1560). However, if both cash and in-kind transfers—i.e., the value of free public health and education services—are included in the income calculations, the coefficient drops to 0.45 in Argentina and to 0.49 in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1565). The greater improvement in Argentina is due to higher levels of spending on education and health, as patterns of spending on these services are equally progressive in the two countries.

Beyond levels of spending, there are also a number of other differences in social policies across the two countries that are worth highlighting. When looking at pensions, the major differences between the two countries are related to coverage and institutional design. In Argentina about 76% of those that are 70 or more years old receive pensions or retirement benefits; in Peru the figure is only 27% (ECLAC 2006, 117). The difference stems not only from better coverage by the contributory pension system, but also from a more developed scheme of non-contributory pensions in the former country.

In terms of institutional design, a single, state-run, pay-as-you-go system is in place in Argentina. In contrast, Peruvians have the option of choosing between a public, pay-as-you-go system and a privately run, individual capitalization system.[17] The latter system, which by definition does not redistribute income, is the preferred option of high-

[17] In the 1990s, pension systems in both countries underwent major reforms. In Argentina, a mixed system was put in place, in which workers contributed to both a pay-as-you-go system that guaranteed a minimum pension upon retirement, and to an individual capitalization system. In 2008, all funds in the private system were nationalized and a single, state-run, pay-as-you-go system reinstated. In contrast, in Peru a parallel system in which individuals are given the option of choosing between a public pay-as-you-go system and a private individual capitalization system upon entering the labor force was put in place. Only those who initially chose the public system have the option to switch to the other system. In 2007, a series of reforms were introduced including a state funded, minimum pension scheme for individuals in the private system.

income Peruvians. Given these characteristics, the Argentine pension system is clearly more redistributive in aim than that of Peru.

Additionally, the social security system in Argentina includes two schemes whose likely outcome is to redistribute from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals, at least among the formally employed. Unemployment insurance provides income replacement for an amount and a period of time that are contingent on contributions while employed. A system of family allowances (*asignaciones familiares*) financed by a payroll tax allots transfers to workers with low incomes for a number of reasons, including marriage, maternity, birth, and number of children. In contrast, in Peru, workers are protected from unemployment by a system of individual savings accounts paid for by employers, and there is nothing that resembles the system of family allowances in place in Argentina. Again, there are striking differences in the coverage of social security; in Argentina, 56.0% of the employed urban population contributes to social security; in Peru, only 18.7% does (ECLAC 2006, 45).

With regard to social assistance programs, the two countries share some similarities, but Argentina's programs are more ambitious. Both countries have several nutritional programs targeting vulnerable populations and temporary employment programs in public works and community services. More recently, conditional cash transfer programs have been added to the mix. Figures that would allow one to compare the scope of social programs across the two countries are hard to come by, but highlighting a program recently introduced in Argentina can help shed light on the differences in redistributive efforts across the two countries. The *Asignación Universal*

por Hijo ("Universal Allowance per Child") extends access to family allowances to the unemployed and those employed in the informal sector. As a condition, children in participating households are required to attend school and receive vaccinations. No plan with such an ambitious mandate exists in Peru where the only conditional cash transfer program in existence is still very targeted and timidly expanding.

Moving on to revenue collection, Table 3.4 presents several indicators. Like in the previous table, all figures correspond to 2007, the last year for which data are available, and are expressed as a share of GDP to facilitate comparison. Again, looking at total government revenue, the Argentine state seems massive when compared to that of Peru. Most of the difference across the two countries is explained by indirect taxes, but the Argentine state collects more than one percentage point of its GDP more than that of Peru in direct taxes and almost three times as much in social contributions.

Table 3.4
Government Revenue in Argentina and Peru,
as a percentage of GDP, 2007

Country	Direct Taxes	Indirect Taxes	Social Contributions	Total Revenue
Argentina	8.67	15.53	4.51	31.52
Peru	7.54	7.85	1.56	20.91

All figures include central, state, and local levels of government. Source: total revenue figures taken from IMF (2011); all others taken from ECLAC (2011b).

A number of differences in the tax systems across the two countries are worth highlighting. First, the tax rate on corporate profits is 35% in Argentina and 30% in Peru. These are also the highest marginal tax rates on individual income in each country.

Nominal tax rates in each country for a number of incomes are shown in Figure 3.4. Detailed information about income brackets and tax rates used to build the figure can be found in Table A1.2 of Appendix 1. As shown by the figure, nominal rates are much higher in Argentina than in Peru regardless of income level. For example, the rate for an individual earning US$ 12,000 a year would be about 17.6% in Argentina while it would be only about 3.5% in Peru. This is a product of two reasons: income brackets are much more narrow and the highest marginal tax rate starts to apply at a lower income level in Argentina. Moreover, while the nominal individual income tax is progressive in both countries, individuals at the lower end of the income distribution are taxed in Argentina but not in Peru.

Figure 3.4
Nominal Tax Rates on Individual Income in Argentina and Peru, by Income



Source: author's calculations based on PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011).

These characteristics lead to different outcomes in terms of effective income tax rates. In Argentina, all income quintiles pay income tax; the first three contribute about 1% of their gross income, while the fourth and fifth ones contribute about 2% and 4%, respectively. In Peru, only the fifth quintile pays this type of tax, contributing about 5% of its gross income (Goñi et al. 2011, 1563). The distributive implications of these income tax schemes are quite similar, however. After considering direct taxes, income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient decreases by one point in each country. More specifically, the coefficient drops from 0.49 to 0.48 in Argentina and from 0.50 to 0.49 in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1560).

Second, with regard to indirect taxes, the Argentine state obtains significantly more revenue from this source than that the Peruvian state and, in turn, this could potentially have regressive implications. However, value added taxes are almost neutral in Argentina, but severely regressive in Peru. Indeed, all income quintiles pay around 10% of their gross income for this type of tax in Argentina, while the first and fifth quintiles pay around 17% and 12%, respectively, in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1563). After considering indirect taxes, the Gini coefficient remains at 0.48 in Argentina, but increases from 0.49 to 0.51 in Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1560).

Moreover, in Argentina, a big proportion of indirect tax revenue comes from two sources: export and financial transactions taxes. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these taxes collected revenue amounting to about 4% of the GDP in 2004 (IMF 2005, 12). In Peru, there is no export tax, and at 0.08%, the financial transactions tax is substantially lower than the 0.6% charged in Argentina (IMF 2005, 23). Given that

export and financial transaction taxes are likely to place a higher burden on the rich, overall, the Argentine tax system is more progressive than its Peruvian counterpart.

To sum up, Argentina not only spends substantially more funds than Peru in social policies but also allocates a larger share of this spending progressively across income groups. Social insurance transfers are regressive in both countries, but less so in Argentina. Additionally, education and health spending is more progressive in Argentina than in Peru. On the revenue side, the Argentine tax system is progressive, while that of Peru is regressive. Overall, and in line with citizens' opinions on this issue, Argentine public policies redistribute more income from well-off individuals to worse-off individuals than Peruvian public policies.

Support for Redistribution and Social Policy in Latin America

Looking beyond Argentina and Peru, this section explores the relationship between support for redistribution and redistributive policies in other Latin American countries. Figure 3.5 presents the relationship between support for redistribution and government social expenditures as a share of the GDP. Support is measured as mean responses to EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY in Wave 5 of the WVS and to INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING in the 2008 surveys of the LAPOP.

Figure 3.5
Support for Redistribution and Government Social Spending in Latin America, circa 2005-2008



Figures for EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY correspond to Wave 5 (2005-2008) of the WVS; figures for INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING correspond to the 2008 LAPOP surveys; government expenditures figures correspond to 2007 in plots involving items from the WVS and to 2008 in plots involving items from the LAPOP; included countries are Argentina (AR), Bolivia (BO), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), Colombia (CO), Costa Rica (CR), Dominican Republic (DR), Ecuador (EC), El Salvador (SV), Guatemala (GT), Honduras (HN), Jamaica (JM), Mexico (MX), Nicaragua (NI), Panama (PA), Paraguay (PY), Peru (PE), Trinidad and Tobago (TT), and Uruguay (UR). Source for government expenditures: ECLAC (2012).

As the figure shows, there is a positive correlation between mean support for redistribution and government social spending in Latin American countries. The correlation is particularly strong in the case of EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY. These correlations suggest that there is correspondence between levels of support for redistributive policies and levels of provision of such policies. In other words, when it comes to the issue of redistribution, Latin Americans seem to be getting what they ask for. This is similar to what is observed in Europe and the U.S., where the demand for

redistribution and the supply of redistributive policies are in equilibrium (Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Benabou and Tirole 2006).

Finally, as can be seen in Figure 3.5, Argentina (AR) is among the countries in which both support for redistribution and government spending are relatively high. Also evident is the fact that Peru (PE) is among the countries in which levels of support and spending are relatively low. And this is the case regardless of the item used to gauge support for redistribution. Having this in mind, one could argue that when it comes to the politics of redistribution, Argentina is similar to Europe and Peru is similar to the U.S.

Conclusion

Argentina and Peru are located on distinct redistributive equilibria in which citizens' demands and public policies on this issue domain are in line with one another. With high levels of public support for and government provision of welfare policies, Argentina has a high-redistribution equilibrium. With low levels of support and provision, Peru has a low-redistribution equilibrium. Thus, when it comes to the politics of redistribution, the former country is more similar to Europe while the latter is more similar to the U.S. The next two chapters explores how well the theories introduced in Chapter 2 explain variation in support for redistribution within Argentina and Peru and the extent to which these individual-level insights help explain differences in aggregate levels of support across the two countries.

Chapter 4
Interests, Social Identity, and Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru

This is the first of two chapters that together seek to explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. The present chapter analyzes the role that the considerations emphasized by theories based on interests and group identity play in shaping redistributive attitudes. The following chapter explores the role of social beliefs and examines the sources of divergence in support for redistribution across the two countries under study.

The evidence provided below suggests that, with the exception of current income, the factors suggested by interest-based and group identity-based theories do not shape support for redistribution to a significant extent. Current income informs attitudes as one would expect: the higher the income of an individual, the less he supports redistribution. The other considerations emphasized by interest-based theories—economic prospects, exposure to risks, class status, and union affiliation—do not shape support for redistribution according to expectations. With regard to the factors suggested by accounts emphasizing group identity, support for redistribution is not higher among disadvantaged ethnic groups nor is it undermined by prejudice against these groups in Argentina. In Peru, the evidence is mixed at best. With these findings, this chapter shows that explanations focused on structural cleavages do not seem to travel well outside the context of advanced industrial democracies to explain support for redistribution in the developing contexts of Argentina and Peru.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in five sections. The first one derives specific hypotheses from the interest-based and group identity-based explanations discussed in Chapter 2. The second section provides details about the empirical strategy and data used for the analyses. Results of the statistical analysis are presented and discussed in the other two sections. The third one deals with hypotheses derived from interest-based theories; the fourth one, with those derived from explanations emphasizing group identity. The last section summarizes the main findings and concludes.

Hypotheses

Interest-based explanations suggest that income and future income should have a negative effect on support for redistribution, while exposure to risk, union membership, and class status should have a positive effect. Expectations regarding income and union membership can be stated as hypotheses in a straightforward way:

Hypothesis 4.1.1 *The higher the income of an individual, the less he should support redistribution.*

Hypothesis 4.1.2 *Individuals who belong to unions should be more supportive of redistribution than their non-unionized counterparts.*

Expectations regarding future income, exposure to risk, and class status require further discussion. As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars have analyzed both subjective assessments about economic prospects and past mobility experiences to tap into individuals' future income (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2004; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Gaviria 2007; Ravallion and Lokshin 2000). These constructs seem to predict individuals' future trajectories in the reasonably stable, predictable economic contexts of

advanced industrial democracies. Data available for the countries under study only allow for testing expectations about subjective assessments.[18] Thus only hypotheses pertaining to this construct are stated here:

Hypothesis 4.1.3 Individuals who expect their economic situation to improve should be less supportive of redistribution than those who expect no change.

Hypothesis 4.1.4 Individuals who expect their economic situation to worsen should be more supportive of redistribution than those who expect no change.

Scholars generally decompose exposure to risk into three interrelated concepts: skill specificity, unemployment risk, and realized risk (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2005). Since data limitations make it impossible to test hypotheses related to the first two constructs, a single hypothesis pertaining to realized risk, namely being currently unemployed, is presented here.[19]

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[18] More specifically, available surveys for Argentina and Peru—the studies from the WVS and the LAPOP introduced in Chapter 3—do not contain measures capturing individuals' past mobility experiences of any kind—i.e. intergenerational or intragenerational income, occupational, or educational mobility. LAPOP studies do contain items capturing individuals' subjective assessments about their past economic situation, but given that these are very correlated with subjective assessments about future economic situation, only the latter are used in the ensuing analyses.

[19] Existing studies measure skill specificity using a set of alternative indicators first introduced by Iversen and Soskice (2001, 881-883). One set of measures is calculated for occupational categories using the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and national labor force surveys. An alternative set of measures is calculated using an item that asks individuals to assess their prospects of finding an acceptable job in case of unemployment, which was included in the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) surveys used by the authors. Unemployment risk is measured with unemployment rates by occupational categories at the two- or three-digit level of the ISCO. These are calculated using national labor force surveys (Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2005). Unfortunately, the surveys available for Argentina and Peru do not ask respondents about their occupations using a classification scheme that is compatible with the schemes used by these countries' national labor surveys. Available surveys do not include items gauging individuals' prospects of finding a job in case of unemployment either. A question gauging individuals' fears of becoming unemployed was included in the 2008 LAPOP study but only for Argentina and thus is not considered in the ensuing analysis.

Hypothesis 4.1.5 Individuals who are unemployed should be more supportive of redistribution than those who are employed.

"Class" is a multi-dimensional concept. As such, classifying individuals into distinct classes could potentially require considering a number of socioeconomic factors such as income, wealth, occupation, educational attainment, values, and consumption patterns. Following the arguments of power resource theorists summarized in Chapter 2, the ensuing analyses use occupation as the defining characteristic determining class membership. Three occupational categories are particularly important: business owners and managerial and professional occupations; non-manual clerical, supervisory, or technical occupations; and manual occupations of all skills levels.

Individuals with the first type of occupations are assumed to belong to the upper class while those with the last type of occupations are assumed to belong to the working class. In the Latin American context, scholars of social stratification have labeled the former group as the "dominant classes" and the latter as the "manual formal proletariat" (Portes 1985; Portes and Hoffman 2003). Individuals with non-manual occupations are assumed to belong to the middle class. The following hypotheses reflect expectations based on class:

Hypothesis 4.1.6 Individuals who are business owners or are employed in managerial or professional occupations should be less supportive of redistribution than those who are employed in non-manual occupations.

Hypothesis 4.1.7 Individuals who are employed in manual occupations should be more supportive of redistribution than those who are employed in non-manual occupations.

One important feature that distinguishes developing from developed economies is the size of the "informal sector," comprised of micro-entrepreneurs, workers of small, unregistered businesses, and independent workers in the service sector. In Latin America, the size of the informal sector has been estimated to be around 40% to 50% of the employed urban population (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 372). According to statistics compiled by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the figures corresponding to Argentina and Peru in 2009 are 39.9% and 57.6%, respectively (ECLAC 2012).

Developed with the class structure of advanced industrial democracies in mind, existing scholarship is silent about the relationship between employment in the informal sector and redistributive attitudes. Following the logic of interest-based explanations, one needs to analyze whether informal workers win or lose from redistribution in order to hypothesize about their position on this issue.

Since informal workers do not benefit from or contribute to employment-based programs—e.g., old-age pensions and unemployment benefits—, it is reasonable to assume that considerations regarding this type of programs do not inform their redistributive attitudes. Informal workers have the lowest incomes of all occupational

classes in Latin America (Portes and Hoffman 2003, 55-65).[20] Being relatively worse-off, they likely benefit from spending on education, health, education, and social assistance. On the revenue side, while informal workers do not pay income tax, they pay indirect taxes and thus contribute to fund government spending. However, given that the bulk of government revenue is collected from the highest income quintiles in both Argentina and Peru (Goñi et al. 2011, 1563), it seems reasonable to assume that informal workers are net winners from redistributive policies. Accordingly, following the logic behind interest-based theories, employment in the informal sector should be associated with higher levels of support for redistribution.

Hypothesis 4.1.8 Individuals who are employed in the informal sector should be more supportive of redistribution than those who are employed in the formal sector.

Explanations based on social identity suggest two additional expectations. First, individuals who belong to ethnic groups that are overrepresented in the low-income population should be more likely to support redistribution than those who belong to other groups. Second, levels of prejudice towards groups that are overrepresented in the population benefiting from redistributive policies should be negatively correlated with support. The following paragraphs develop these general expectations into hypotheses that take into account the characteristics of the two countries under study.

[20] According to the ECLAC (2011c, 25-26), the share of workers employed in the informal sector in urban areas in Latin American has fallen from 48.1% in 1990 to 42.7% in 2009, but the income gap between the two sectors has significantly widened. This is due to the fact that wages in the formal sector significantly increased during this period, while wages in the formal sector remained stagnant. Moreover, those who transitioned from the informal to the formal sector were probably disproportionately well-off.

Argentina's population is quite homogenous. While there are no official figures about the ethnic composition of the population, whites are a clear majority with around 95% of the population. With between 4% and 6% of the population circa 2005, the Afro-descendent population is the largest minority group, followed by the indigenous population with about 1.56%.[21] The few studies that exist on the topic point to the fact that Afro-descendent and indigenous minorities are more burdened by poverty and have more limited access to education and health services than the white majority (Universidad Nacional del Tres de Febrero 2006; Villalpando 2005).

Official narratives of racial homogeneity have kept widespread prejudiced attitudes and practices in the shadows in Argentina.[22] Discrimination against the poor and members of the working class by the white middle and upper class of Buenos Aires is common, however. They use the derogatory terms *negro* (black) or *cabecita negra* (little black head) and *villero* (village-dweller) to refer to members of these groups, who are

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[21] Figure for the Afro-descendent population was taken from Dawnes, Patricio. April 2, 2005. Negros en el país: censan cuántos hay y cómo viven. Clarín (cited in Universidad Nacional del Tres de Febrero 2006, 11). The Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (INDEC) estimated Argentina's population to be 38,592,150 in 2005 (INDEC 2012a). The Encuesta Complementaria de Pueblos Indígenas (ECPI) 2004-2005, estimated the indigenous population at 600,329 (INDEC 2012b), thus the 1.56% estimate. A question asking respondents whether any members in the household were indigenous or had indigenous ancestry was first included in the 2001 Census. Information from this census was then used to carry out the ECPI 2004-2005, the first nationally representative sample of people with indigenous ancestry. The 2010 Census was the first census in over 100 years to include a question on African ancestry. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, 97% of the population is white while the remaining 3% is comprised of various minorities (CIA 2012a).

[22] According to the popular narrative, Argentina is a *crisol de razas* (a melting pot of races) where racial, cultural, and linguistic unity is the product of extensive mixing (Carrasco 2000, 15). This intermixing took place among whites of different national, ethnic, and religious origins, as indigenous and Afro-descendent populations were "seen as having conveniently disappeared" (Sutton 2008, 107). The alleged disappearance of the indigenous population was attributed to conquest and military occupation of their territories and that of Afro-descendants to death in war and disease. Both groups "disappeared" in the 1800s. It is also worth noting that there was a deliberate effort by local elites to "Argentinize" white immigrants (Devoto 2003). About the *crisol de razas* narrative and "Argentinization" see also Caggiano (2005).

often dark-haired and brown-skinned and reside in shantytowns located in the inner city and outskirts of Buenos Aires.[23] More recently, undocumented immigrants from Bolivia, Paraguay and Peru have also become targets of discriminatory attitudes. On the one hand, being poor and mostly indigenous and *mestizo*, they have been included in the *negro* and *villero* categories. But, most importantly, they are the victims of a xenophobic discourse that accuses them of contributing to the increase of social maladies and that resonates not only among the upper and middle class, but also among poor and working-class Argentines as well as among some sectors of the press and the political establishment.[24]

In sum, being overrepresented in the low-income population, one should expect Afro-descendents and indigenous minorities to be more supportive of redistribution. At the same time, prejudiced attitudes toward these groups should be associated with less support for redistribution among whites. Finally, as in the case of Europe, prejudiced attitudes toward immigrants should be associated with less support for redistribution among all Argentines.

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[23] Starting in the 1930s, a significant migration process brought relatively poor, dark-haired, and dark-skinned *mestizos* from rural areas in the provinces to serve as manual workers in the capital. As it grew in size, this group later became part of the popular base of Peronism. Upper and middle class white Porteños (natives of the port city of Buenos Aires), who were also generally opposed to Peronism, started to refer to the poor *mestizos* as *cabecitas negras* (Ratier 1971a). The term *villero* started to take hold in the 1950s as economic decline led *mestizo* immigrants to permanently settle in shantytowns—as opposed to using them as temporary dwellings en route to permanent and adequate living arrangements (Ratier 1971b).

[24] This discourse accuses new immigrants of occupying vacant land and property, contributing to the spread of disease, and being responsible for increases in crime, drug trafficking, and unemployment. Since there has always been a sizable share of immigrants from neighboring countries in Argentina, authors blame the development of this xenophobic discourse to the intersection of three factors: the predominantly indigenous and *mestizo* character of the new immigrants, their arrival *en masse* to Buenos Aires starting in the 1990s, and the economic troubles that started in the last years of that decade and the deep 2001-2002 recession. For more information see Casaravilla (2000), Caggiano (2005), and Grimson (2005).

Hypothesis 4.2.1 *In Argentina, Afro-descendents and the indigenous should be more supportive of redistribution than those who do not self-identify as such.*

Hypothesis 4.2.2 *In Argentina, the higher an individual's level of prejudice against Afro-descendent or indigenous minorities, the less he should support redistribution.*

Hypothesis 4.2.3 *In Argentina, the higher an individual's level of prejudice against immigrants, the less he should support redistribution.*

The Peruvian population is much more diverse than that of Argentina. According to the National Continuous Survey of 2006, 57.6% of those who answered the question about ethnic origin self-identified as *mestizo* (a mix of white and indigenous), 26.9% as indigenous, 4.8% percent as white, and 1.5% as black or mulatto. The remaining 9.1% includes those who self-identified with other categories or declined to answer (INEI 2012a).[25] Whites and *mestizos* generally have higher incomes and greater access to educational opportunities, assets, and services, while the indigenous population is the most socioeconomically disadvantaged; Afro-descendents are located in between the other groups (Benavides, Torero, and Valdivia 2006; Ñopo, Saavedra, and Torero 2007; Valdivia, Benavides, and Torero 2007).

Given that they are relatively worse-off, one should expect the indigenous to be the group most supportive of redistribution, while the relatively well-off whites and

[25] According to CIA World Factbook, 45% of the Peruvian population is indigenous, 37% is *mestizo*, 15% is white, and the remaining 3% is of African, Asian, or other descent (CIA 2012b).

mestizos should be at the other extreme. In turn, the attitudes of Afro-descendents are likely to be informed by two competing considerations. On the one hand, they might feel inclined to oppose redistribution, as it disproportionately benefits the indigenous. At the same time, however, they might feel inclined to support redistribution given that they benefit more from it than whites and *mestizos*. The following hypotheses assume that the attitudes of Afro-descendents are equally informed by both considerations and thus are located in between those of the indigenous and those of whites and *mestizos*.

Hypothesis 4.2.4 *Peruvians who self-identify as indigenous should be more supportive of redistribution than those who self-identify as Afro-descendents or* mestizos.

Hypothesis 4.2.5 *Peruvians who self-identify as Afro-descendent should be more supportive of redistribution than those who self-identify as whites or* mestizos, *but less supportive than those who self-identify as indigenous*.

Understanding prejudiced attitudes and practices in Peru is not an easy task given their complex and covert nature. The indigenous and Afro-descendents are the most important targets of such practices, but the discrimination they face is different. In the case of Afro-descendents, discrimination is based on physical appearance; in the case of the indigenous, elements such as clothing, language, and social origin are also important (Valdivia et al. 2007, 613). Thus while discrimination is somewhat inescapable for Afro-Peruvians, people of indigenous ancestry might be able to avoid it by "shedding their culture," getting formal education, or improving their economic standing—that is, by

doing what the white elite might refer to as becoming *mestizo* (de la Cadena 2000, 3-6). Another consequence of this type of discrimination is that *mestizos* can become targets of prejudice or actively discriminate against other *mestizos* (Twanama 1992).[26]

Even if covert and complex, prejudiced attitudes and practices are widespread in Peru.[27] For example, racist narratives have traditionally blamed underdevelopment on the indigenous population, who was seen as "racially degenerate" and "irrationally tied to the past […] and adverse to capitalism" (Drinot 2006, 19). These narratives advocated for *mestizaje* as a solution to this problem. More recently, a survey study (Sulmont Haak 2005) documented the prevalence of racist and discriminatory practices. It found that 30% or more of respondents had found themselves in the following situations: "people behaved as if they were better than me;" people treated me "with less respect than other people;" and people treated me "as if I were not intelligent." Around 15% of those who experienced these situations believed that this was due to their race or ethnic origin. This was the third most mentioned reason, after economic status and age (just under 45% and 25%, respectively).[28] Finally, another recent study (Espinosa, Calderón-Prada, Burga, and

[26] Indeed, a given *mestizo* can be more indigenous, less educated, or economically worse-off and thus discriminated against when interacting with another *mestizo* (or white). The same *mestizo* can discriminate against others that are more indigenous, less educated or economically worse-off than him.

[27] Racist and discriminatory practices against the indigenous in Peru can be traced back to the institutions of colonial times and those against Afro-descendents to the institution of slavery. Those against the indigenous are well documented; for a historical overview see Drinot (2006). In contrast, practices against Afro-descendents remain understudied. This is likely a function of a process of "invisibilization," by which the rest of society (and the state) systematically ignored this population (Valdivia et al. 2007, 623).

[28] The study also finds that those who speak an indigenous language or who identify themselves as "people from the mountains" experience more discrimination than those who do not, and that the opposite is true about those that identify as "people from the coast," "Limeños," and "*mestizos*." Another interesting result is that only between 10% and 15% of respondents thought that indigenous people could enforce their rights "all the time" or "almost all the time." The figure for Afro-descendents is between 25% and 30%, that for *mestizos* is between 45% and 50%, and that for whites is around 95% (Sulmont Haak 2005).

Güímac 2007) found that the Andean indigenous were described as "sad," "hard-working," "backward," "prone to solidarity," and "conformist," and Afro-descendents as "happy," "conformist," "untrustworthy," "lazy," and "backward." Characterizations of these groups are in stark contrasts with that of whites, which were seen as "developed," "individualists," "successful," "corrupt," and "capable."[29]

Given data limitations, ensuing analyses cannot analyze hypotheses about attitudes toward each of the ethnic groups identified in Peru. Depending on the survey used for analysis, only hypotheses about attitudes toward ethnic outgroups as a whole or towards the indigenous population can be explored. Thus, the hypothesis below formalizes expectations about prejudice toward the indigenous population only.

Hypothesis 4.2.6 In Peru, the higher an individual's level of prejudice against the indigenous minorities, the less he should support redistribution.

Methods and Data

The following equation represents a generic model of the *i*-th individual's level of support for redistribution ($SUPPORT_i$):

$$\begin{aligned} SUPPORT_i = \; & \beta_0 + \beta_1 INCOME_i + \beta_2 UNION_i + \beta_3 POUM_i \\ & + \beta_4 FODM_i + \beta_5 UNEMPLOYED_i + \beta_6 MANAGER_i \\ & + \beta_7 WORKER_i + \beta_8 INFORMAL_i + \beta_9 MINORITY_i \\ & + \beta_{10} PREJUDICE_i + \beta_{11} MINORITY_i * PREJUDICE_i + \boldsymbol{\psi Z_i} + e_i \end{aligned} \qquad (4.1)$$

[29] *Mestizos* were characterized as "hard-working," "unreliable," "corrupt," "happy," and "conformist." The same attributes were the most salient in descriptions of Peruvians in general, which is in line with the fact that the average Peruvian is (or self-identifies as) *mestizo*. The study also explored characterizations of the Amazonian indigenous and population of Asian-descent (Espinosa et al. 2007).

where $INCOME_i$ is the individuals' income; $UNION_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he belongs to a union; $POUM_i$ and $FODM_i$ are dichotomous variables indicating whether he expects his economic situation to improve or to worsen, respectively; $UNEMPLOYED_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he is unemployed; $MANAGER_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he is a business owner or has a managerial or professional occupation; $WORKER_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he has a manual occupation; $INFORMAL_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he is employed in the informal sector; $MINORITY_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether he self-identifies with a minority group; $PREJUDICE_i$ is the individuals' level of prejudice toward economically disadvantaged groups; the term *MINORITYi*PREJUDICEi* is included to allow the effect of prejudice to vary across groups; $\mathbf{Z_i}$ is a vector of control covariates—with its corresponding vector of coefficients ($\boldsymbol{\psi}$)—; and e_i is a random error term.

The ensuing analyses evaluate the hypotheses laid out above by estimating parameters β_0 through β_{11} in Equation 4.1. Given hypotheses 4.1.1 through 4.1.8, the coefficients associated with income (β_1), prospects of upward mobility (β_3), and being a business owner or being employed in managerial or professional occupations (β_6) should be negative, while those associated with union membership (β_2), prospects of downward mobility (β_4), unemployment (β_5), being employed in manual occupations (β_7), and being employed in the informal sector (β_8) should be positive. Expectations about the coefficients associated with group membership and prejudice require more discussion.

The models estimated for Argentina do not include the interaction term ($\beta_{11}MINORITY_i*PREJUDICE_i$) due to data limitations discussed below. Hypothesis 4.2.1 suggests that individuals self-identifying as Afro-descendent or indigenous should be more supportive of redistribution. Thus, the coefficient associated with minority self-identification (β_9) should be positive. Hypothesis 4.2.2 specifies that prejudice should have a negative effect on support. Thus, β_{10} should be negative. Hypothesis 4.2.3 is explored by adding the *i*-th individual's level of prejudice toward immigrants ($IMMIGRANT_i$) to the model with its corresponding coefficient (say β_{12}), which is expected to be negative.

In Peru, the hypotheses regarding racial and ethnic minorities are group-specific. Thus, the term $\beta_{10}MINORITY_i$ in the model above will be replaced with three dichotomous variables to identify the four groups in that country, whites (the baseline category), *mestizos*, Afro-descendents, and the indigenous, with their corresponding coefficients ($\beta_M MESTIZO_i$, $\beta_A AFRO\text{-}DESCENDENT_i$, and $\beta_I INDIGENOUS_i$). Accordingly, the interaction term ($\beta_{11}MINORITY_i*PREJUDICE_i$) will be replaced with the following three interaction terms: $\beta_{M*P}MESTIZO_i*PREJUDICE_i$, $\beta_{A*P}AFRO\text{-}DESCENDENT_i*PREJUDICE_i$, and $\beta_{I*P}INDIGENOUS_i*PREJUDICE_i$. These interactions allow the identification of the effect of prejudice among whites, the group for whom the effect of prejudice is most relevant.

Assuming that *mestizos* support redistribution more than whites, and given hypotheses 4.2.4 and 4.2.5, the effects of the three ethnic identification variables should be positive. Additionally, the effect of being indigenous should be greater than the effect

of being an Afro-descendent, and the latter should be greater than the effect of being *mestizo*. Stated mathematically, this translates into the following expectation: $\beta_M+\beta_{M*P}PREJUDICE_i > \beta_A+\beta_{A*P}PREJUDICE_i > \beta_I+\beta_{I*P}PREJUDICE_i > 0$. Finally, given hypothesis 4.2.6, the effect of $PREJUDICE_i$ should be negative among whites. Thus, β_{10} should be negative.

No single available survey contains items measuring all the hypothesized covariates of support for redistribution for the two countries under study. In an effort to assess all of the hypotheses laid out above, the ensuing analyses use data from five surveys: the third, fourth, and fifth waves of the WVS, and the 2008 and 2010 LAPOP studies. What follows is a detailed discussion of the dependent and independent variables used in the analyses reported and discussed later in this chapter.

Dependent Variables

Support for redistribution ($SUPPORT_i$ in the generic model above) is measured using the four items introduced in Chapter 3: EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY in the WVS, and INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING in the LAPOP studies. These four items are available for all of the relevant country-year pairings. The variables constructed using these items ($EQUALITY_i$, $RESPONSIBILITY_i$, $INEQUALITY_i$, and $WELL\text{-}BEING_i$) are treated as continuous in the ensuing analyses.

The two items from the WVS ask respondents to provide their level of agreement with two opposing statements using a 10-point scale in which a response of "one" represents total agreement with the statement not in support of redistribution, and a response of "10" represents total agreement with the statement in support of

redistribution. The statements for EQUALITY are "We need larger income differences" and "Incomes should be made more equal." The statements for RESPONSIBILITY are "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves" and "The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for."

The LAPOP items, INEQUALITY and WELL-BEING, ask respondents to provide their level of agreement with a single statement using a seven-point scale in which "one" represents total disagreement and "seven" represents total agreement. The statements in these items are "The (nationality) government/state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor" and "The (nationality) government/state, more than individuals, is the most responsible for ensuring the well-being of the people," respectively. Full wording for these four items is provided in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3.

Independent Variables

$INCOME_i$ is measured using items that ask respondents to locate themselves in one of 10 income brackets in both the WVS and LAPOP studies. The WVS income item is available for all waves in Peru, but only for Wave 3 in Argentina. To avoid losing Wave 4 and Wave 5 for Argentina, the income variable is imputed for these waves according to the procedure detailed in Appendix 2. This variable is treated as continuous.

The way in which $UNION_i$ is measured depends on the data source. In the case of the WVS, it is measured using an item that asks respondents about their membership status in labor unions. In the case of LAPOP, for lack of a better alternative, $UNION_i$ is measured using an item that asks respondents about their attendance to labor union

meetings. All respondents who stated that they had attended meetings are coded as union members. The WVS item is available for all waves, but the LAPOP item is only available in 2008.

The only study that contains an item gauging individuals' economic prospects is the LAPOP 2010 survey. This survey asks respondents the following question: "Do you think that in 12 months your economic situation will be better than, the same as, or worse than it is now?" Response categories are "Better," "Same," and "Worse." This item is used to measure $POUM_i$ and $FODM_i$.

$UNEMPLOYMENT_i$ is measured using an item that asks respondents about their employment status. It is available for all country-years. Since the item about employment status mentioned above classifies individuals into several categories, additional dichotomous variables are constructed to make currently employed individuals the base category with which to compare unemployed individuals. $SELF\text{-}EMPLOYED_i$, $RETIRED_i$, and $STUDENT_i$ are self-explanatory. $OTHER\ STATUS_i$ indicates whether the individual declared being a homemaker, not working and not looking for work, or in another status. For lack of a better alternative, self-employment is used as a proxy for employment in the informal sector (a proxy for $INFORMAL_i$). Thus, being self-employed is expected to have a positive effect on support for redistribution. Retired people should also be more supportive of redistribution as at least some of them are likely to be recipients of government pensions. There are no clear expectations for students and those in the residual category.

The LAPOP surveys include another measure related to $UNEMPLOYMENT_i$. It asks currently employed individuals if they experienced an unemployment episode in the recent past. A dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual experienced such an episode ($UNEMPLOYMENT\ EXPERIENCE_i$) was constructed using this item. Like current unemployment, having recently experienced unemployment is expected to have a positive effect on support for redistribution.

$MANAGER_i$ and $WORKER_i$ are measured using items that classify the occupations of employed individuals. In the WVS, this item is available in all waves for Argentina and in Wave 3 and Wave 4 for Peru. In the LAPOP studies, the item is available in 2008 for Argentina and in 2008 and 2010 for Peru. Individuals who are business owners or have managerial or professional occupations are considered members of the upper class, and those with manual occupations at all skill levels are considered members of the working class. To facilitate the discussion of results, individuals in the former group are referred to as "managers" or said to have "managerial occupations," while those in the latter are referred to as "workers" or said to have "manual occupations."

The way in which ethnic group membership is measured depends on the data source. In analyses using data from the LAPOP, it is measured using a self-identification item that is available for all country-years. The following dichotomous variables are created: $MESTIZO_i$, $INDIGENOUS_i$, $AFRO\text{-}DESCENDENT_i$, and $OTHER\ MINORITY_i$ (with whites comprising the base category). In the case of WVS data, ethnic group membership is measured using an item that asks interviewers to classify respondents by observation. The item is available for Peru in all three waves. The same four dichotomous

variables constructed using data from the LAPOP are also constructed using this WVS item, but only for Wave 3 and Wave 5. The Wave 4 fails to appropriately distinguish between *mestizos*, indigenous, and Afro-descendents, so only two variables, $MESTIZO_i$ and $OTHER\ MINORITY_i$, are constructed for this wave. In Argentina, this item is only available in Wave 5. Given the response categories and distribution of responses in Argentina, a single dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual is a minority ($MINORITY_i$) is constructed.

The way in which prejudice is measured depends on the data source. Analyses of WVS data include $RACE_i$, a variable constructed using an item that asks respondents to select groups of people who they would not like to have as neighbors from a list. The item is available for all country-waves. An individual is considered prejudiced (and thus $RACE_i = 1$) if he selected "people from a different race." This variable does not capture prejudice towards a specific group; rather it reflects attitudes towards racial outgroups in general, and is used because no better alternative is available.

In the case of the LAPOP studies, items about ethnic prejudice are only available for Peru in 2010. One item presents respondents with the following prompt: "Racial mixing is good for Peru. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?" The prompt in the other item is: "I would agree with a daughter or son of mine getting married to an indigenous person. To what extent to do you agree or disagree with this statement?" Responses to both items are recorded on a seven-point scale where "one" is "strongly agree" and "seven" is "strongly disagree." In other words, higher values reflected higher levels of prejudice. It is important to note that while the first item

captures attitudes towards racial outgroups, it could also reflect identification with the ingroup. Responses to these items are used to construct two variables that are treated as continuous in ensuing analyses, $PREJUDICE1_i$ and $PREJUDICE2_i$.

Prejudice against immigrants ($IMMIGRANT_i$) is measured using the item in the WVS that asks respondents to select groups of people who they would not like to have as neighbors from a list. An individual is considered prejudiced against immigrants (and thus $IMMIGRANT_i = 1$) if he selected "immigrants or foreign workers." This item is only constructed for Argentina as hypothesis 4.2.3 only pertains to that country. The LAPOP surveys contain no items that could be used to measure prejudice against immigrants.

Analyses reported below also include a number of controls. Control variables from the WVS data include the following: a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent is female ($FEMALE_i$); continuous variables capturing the respondents' age (AGE_i) and its square (AGE_i*AGE_i), which is included to allow its effect to vary along the life cycle; and a set of dichotomous variables indicating the highest level of educational attainment that the individual completed ($PRIMARY\ SCHOOL_i$, $SECONDARY\ SCHOOL_i$, and $COLLEGE_i$). Analyses using data from the LAPOP include these controls as well as a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent resides in a rural area or not ($RURAL_i$).

Expectations about these controls are tentative and not central to the analyses below. Briefly, women might be expected to be more supportive of redistributive policies given their role as primary caregivers in family units, as this puts them at a disadvantaged

position in the labor market compared to men (Cusack et al. 2006, 372). Moreover, this role also makes them more concerned with family welfare (Sapiro 1997, 499).

With regard to age, there are two distinct expectations. From a political life cycle perspective, one would expect individuals to incrementally but steadily transition from progressive to conservative orientations. This suggests that the effect of age on support for redistribution should be negative. From an economic life cycle perspective, one would expect young adults and the elderly to be more dependent on—and thus to be more supportive of—social policies than mature adults at the peak of their productive years. Thus, one would expect an inverted-U relationship between age and support: support should decrease at progressively lower rate as age increases until a critical age beyond which it should increase at a progressively higher rate.

Educational attainment is included in all analyses to control for the possibility that more educated individuals might be less supportive of redistribution because of better economic prospects. Support might also decrease with educational attainment because it is related to socioeconomic status—i.e., individuals with higher educational attainment generally have higher socioeconomic status than their less educated counterparts. The effect of educational attainment on support could also be positive due to the greater exposure to progressive ideologies among the more educated.

Finally, individuals residing in rural areas are expected to be less supportive of redistribution than those residing in urban areas given their more limited exposure to progressive ideologies.

Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables measures as well as for all the independent variables used in the current and the following chapters are reported in Appendix 1. Table A1.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the four measures of support for redistribution; Table A1.3 presents those corresponding to the independent variables in the analyses that use data from the WVS; and Table A1.4 presents those corresponding to the independent variables in the analyses that use data from the LAPOP.

Interest-Based Explanations: The Role of Income, Employment, and Class

All the models reported below are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The independent variables available for analysis vary across countries, surveys, and years. Accordingly, several regression models of the four measures of support for redistribution are estimated for each of these triads. To ease the presentation and discussion of results, only results corresponding to models of support for redistribution as measured by the EQUALITY and INEQUALITY items are discussed here. Results corresponding to RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING are presented in tables A1.5 to A1.7 in Appendix 1. The results for models using those items are largely consistent with the results presented here. It is also worth noting that, as a general rule, dichotomous variables are only included in the regressions below when the categories they identify include 30 or more respondents. This is to avoid presenting misleading estimates based on few respondents. Specifics about the excluded variables are provided in the notes to each table.

Results

Table 4.1 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Argentina as measured by the EQUALITY item. These models only include independent variables suggested by interest-based explanations, along with the controls. Model 1, Model 3, and Model 5 explore the effects of income, union membership, and employment status for Wave 3, Wave 4, and Wave 5, respectively. In these models, the levels of support for redistribution of individuals that are unemployed, self-employed, retired, studying or in other employment status are compared to those of currently employed individuals (the base category). This model specification is referred to as "base model" henceforth. Note that Model 3 and Model 5 do not include the control variables because they were used to predict—and thus are highly correlated with—the income variable for these waves in the case of Argentina; this will be the case for Model 4 and Model 6 discussed later as well.

The negative and significant effect of income in all three waves indicates that, in line with expectations, support for redistribution decreases with income. In Wave 3, the only one in which a true measure of income is available, individuals in the highest income category are, on average, 1.15 points less supportive of redistribution than individuals in the lowest category. This effect is substantively important, but not nearly as strong as one would expect if self-interest were the primary factor shaping support.[30]

[30] The reader should remember that the EQUALITY item measures support for redistribution on a 10-point scale.

Table 4.1
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina
(EQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Income	-0.1278 ***	-0.1249 ***	-0.3787 ***	-0.3760 ***	-0.2251 ***	-0.2178 **
	(0.0451)	(0.0456)	(0.0679)	(0.0700)	(0.0784)	(0.0849)
Union	0.0475	0.0639	0.1441	0.1366	-0.5668	-0.5665
	(0.3967)	(0.4036)	(0.6115)	(0.6156)	(0.3666)	(0.3660)
Unemployed	-0.1879	-0.0054	0.2816	0.2550	0.4694	0.6844
	(0.3730)	(0.4101)	(0.3241)	(0.3655)	(0.4390)	(0.4875)
Self-Employed	0.1309	0.3085	-0.8278 ***	-0.8550 ***	-0.4509	-0.2367
	(0.3236)	(0.3646)	(0.2650)	(0.3114)	(0.3290)	(0.3905)
Retired	0.5542	0.7540	-0.3159	-0.3406	-0.4437	-0.2220
	(0.4399)	(0.4801)	(0.3048)	(0.3547)	(0.3746)	(0.4352)
Student	0.2212	0.3694	-0.8905 **	-0.9193 ***	0.3356	0.5469
	(0.4948)	(0.5161)	(0.3488)	(0.3836)	(0.4148)	(0.4650)
Other Status	0.1620	0.3305	-0.2108	-0.2359	-0.2943	-0.0757
	(0.3420)	(0.3779)	(0.2844)	(0.3365)	(0.3122)	(0.3797)
Manager		0.4853		-0.3691		0.3451
		(0.4736)		(0.5623)		(0.4947)
Worker		0.3369		0.0158		0.3243
		(0.4708)		(0.3412)		(0.3539)
Female	0.1825	0.2184				
	(0.2329)	(0.2354)				
Age	-0.0072	-0.0083				
	(0.0406)	(0.0407)				
Age*Age	-0.0002	-0.0002				
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)				
Primary School	0.2331	0.2409				
	(0.3908)	(0.3932)				
Secondary School	-0.1971	-0.1539				
	(0.4101)	(0.4138)				
College	0.5920	0.6340				
	(0.5341)	(0.5375)				
Constant	6.0928 ***	5.8992 ***	8.1952 ***	8.2086 ***	6.9828 ***	6.7307 ***
	(0.9569)	(0.9819)	(0.3939)	(0.4628)	(0.4713)	(0.5624)
N	864	864	1239	1239	974	974
R-squared	0.0266	0.0280	0.0401	0.0404	0.0159	0.0169

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01.
Controls not included in waves four and five as they were used to predict—and thus are highly correlated with—the income variable, which is the one of substantive interest.

The effect of union membership is in the hypothesized positive direction in waves three and four, and the effect of unemployment status is in the expected positive direction in waves four and five, but none of these effects is statistically significant. Contrary to

expectations, the effect of being self-employed, used as a proxy for employment in the informal sector, is negative and statistically significant in Wave 4; it is in the hypothesized positive direction only in Wave 3, but it is not statistically significant. In turn, the effects of being retired or in the "other employment status" category are not statistically significant and are inconsistent across waves; positive in Wave 3, but negative in the other two waves. The effect associated with being a student is negative and statistically significant in Wave 4 and is positive but not statistically significant in the other waves. Finally, none of the controls has a statistically significant effect.

Model 2, Model 4, and Model 6 explore the effects of class status as measured by occupational categories by adding $WORKER_i$ and $MANAGER_i$ to the base specification model with income. Employed individuals who are not managers or workers are the base category for comparison of all variables related to employment status in these models.

The effect of having a manual occupation is in the expected positive direction in all waves but is not statistically significant. The effect of being a manager is in the hypothesized negative direction only in Wave 4, but it is not statistically significant. Thus, the levels of support for redistribution among managers and workers are no different from the levels of support observed among other employed individuals. The effect of income remains significant in this specification in all waves. Also, the negative effects of self-employment and student status remain statistically significant with this model specification in Wave 4.

The negative and significant effects of self-employment and student status in Wave 4 for both specifications deserve further discussion since these variables have

essentially no effect in the other waves. The result corresponding to self-employment is likely due to the intersection of two factors. First, self-employment might not be an accurate measure of employment in the informal sector as this category is also likely to include independent professionals, contractors, and skilled technicians who are relatively well-off. This type of self-employed individual, who is so by choice rather than necessity, might be inclined to oppose redistribution. For example, Iversen and Soskice (2001, 883) argue that the self-employed are expected to favor the free market and low levels of social protection "because they depend on flexible labor markets and often on relatively low-paid workers."[31] This factor helps explain why the effect of being self-employed is not positive and statistically significant in any of the waves, but not why it is negative and significant in Wave 4 and not in the other waves.

The political circumstances in 1999, the time when the Wave 4 survey was carried out, provide a plausible explanation for that significant effect. It was an election year in Argentina. In that election, the eventually victorious opposition coalition of the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) focused its strategy on social issues and a commitment to increased social spending (Corrales 2002, 34-35). The prominence of these issues during the campaign likely made the self-employed "by choice" particularly concerned about potential increases in labor market regulations, hiring costs, taxes, and the like. This salience would in turn explain the lower than usual support for redistribution within this group in Wave 4. Similar concerns might

[31] Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, 915) mention that the self-employed might be less supportive of redistribution because they have a higher propensity to take risks or more "individualistic" attitudes, among other possible reasons. Of course, it is also possible that they might be less supportive because they have more limited access to benefits such as pensions or unemployment insurance than dependent workers.

explain the negative and significant coefficient associated with being a student in Wave 4. Not yet integrated into the labor market, students might have worried about the consequences of increased costs and regulations on their future employment chances.

Table 4.2 reports estimates for the same two sets of models of support for redistribution in Peru. In the base models (Model 1, Model 3, and Model 5), the effect of income is negative as hypothesized and statistically significant in waves three and five. It is also negative but not significant in Wave 4. The effect in the first two waves is also quite sizable. In Wave 3, the wave in which it is the smallest, individuals in the highest income category are, on average, 1.68 points less supportive of redistribution than individuals in the lowest category.

Other significant effects are those associated with union membership in Wave 3 and unemployment status in Wave 4, respectively. In both cases, the effect is in the expected direction; union members are more supportive of redistribution than non-unionized individuals, and the unemployed are more supportive of redistribution than the currently employed. The effects of all other substantive variables are not statistically significant. The one corresponding to self-employment is in the hypothesized positive direction only in Wave 4 and that of being retired is in the expected positive direction in waves three and four.

Table 4.2
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru
(EQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.1870 ***	-0.1929 ***	-0.0232	-0.0173	-0.2087 ***
	(0.0543)	(0.0552)	(0.0456)	(0.0460)	(0.0501)
Union	0.6395 **	0.6288 **	0.0382	0.0425	-0.3120
	(0.2678)	(0.2729)	(0.3873)	(0.3856)	(0.2756)
Unemployed	0.3870	0.1703	0.4568 *	0.7155 **	-0.3966
	(0.4649)	(0.6005)	(0.2660)	(0.3304)	(0.4165)
Self-Employed	-0.0904	-0.3174	0.1771	0.4411	-0.0670
	(0.2990)	(0.4835)	(0.2213)	(0.2954)	(0.2201)
Retired	0.8129	0.5919	0.4049	0.6806	-0.2648
	(0.6362)	(0.7462)	(0.4419)	(0.4866)	(0.4482)
Student	-0.1924	-0.3909	0.2205	0.4650	-0.2761
	(0.3540)	(0.5238)	(0.2723)	(0.3326)	(0.3224)
Other Status	0.1230	-0.1004	0.2495	0.5172	0.1612
	(0.3062)	(0.4974)	(0.2379)	(0.3068)	(0.2903)
Manager		-0.3169		0.3573	
		(0.5173)		(0.3398)	
Worker		-0.1790		0.3065	
		(0.5202)		(0.2930)	
Female	-0.0814	-0.0801	-0.1004	-0.1123	-0.1512
	(0.2221)	(0.2281)	(0.1706)	(0.1720)	(0.1727)
Age	0.0616	0.0669	-0.0616	-0.0633	-0.0388
	(0.0514)	(0.0518)	(0.0413)	(0.0416)	(0.0329)
Age*Age	-0.0009	-0.0010	0.0007	0.0007	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
Primary School	-0.6712	-0.7246 *	0.3360	0.3355	-0.1599
	(0.4249)	(0.4293)	(0.3737)	(0.3741)	(0.3002)
Secondary School	-1.4335 ***	-1.4628 ***	0.2380	0.2352	-0.3318
	(0.4092)	(0.4150)	(0.3667)	(0.3678)	(0.2977)
College	-2.2379 ***	-2.1960 ***	0.6217	0.5850	-0.1667
	(0.4580)	(0.4891)	(0.4075)	(0.4276)	(0.3741)
Constant	5.0974 ***	5.2656 ***	4.2831 ***	4.0579 ***	5.4665 ***
	(1.0603)	(1.1440)	(0.8778)	(0.9288)	(0.7462)
N	977	963	1479	1477	1371
R-squared	0.0698	0.0701	0.0085	0.0099	0.0271

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01.
Occupational category variable not included because item was not available in Wave 5.

With regards to the controls, support for redistribution decreases as educational attainment increased in Wave 3. Individuals with less than a primary school education (the base category) are more supportive of redistribution than individuals who completed primary school; this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level in the specification that includes occupational categories (Model 2). Those who finished secondary school are less supportive than those who completed primary school, while college graduates are the least supportive. This finding is in line with the expectations derived from educational attainment's link with socioeconomic status and economic prospects.

As shown in Model 2 and Model 4, when it comes to supporting redistribution, managers and workers seem no different than other employed individuals. The effect of being a manager is in the hypothesized direction only in Wave 3, while that of being a worker is in line with expectations only in Wave 4. Neither of these effects is significant, however. It is also worth noting that all the effects that are significant in the base models remain so in this specification.

Some of the estimated effects are not consistent across models. The negative effect of income is not statistically significant in Wave 4, unlike the other two waves in which it is. While the effect of being a union member is essentially non-existent in Wave 4 and Wave 5, it is positive and significant in Wave 3. Likewise, the effect of unemployment status is positive and significant in Wave 4, but not in the other waves. Finally, the effects of the variables measuring educational attainment are negative and significant in Wave 3, but not in other waves.

As in Argentina, political circumstances seem to provide a plausible explanation for these inconsistencies. The survey corresponding to Wave 3 in Peru was carried out in 1996, just following the first reelection of Alberto Fujimori. That election was essentially a referendum on the neoliberal policies adopted by Fujimori, including privatization, social program restructuring, and pension system reform. During his campaign, Fujimori emphasized his economic accomplishments as well as his triumph over terrorism, while promising to focus on social issues like unemployment and poverty (Wehner 2004, 47-50). In this context, it is possible that actors who were "losers" from the reforms and who viewed them as too socially costly were more willing to demand redistribution, while winners were less willing to do so. This in turn might explain why union membership matters in Wave 3 since union members were typically losers in the wake of neoliberal reforms, and the election likely enhanced the salience of these concerns. This might also help explain why educational attainment matters in Wave 3 but not in the other waves since neoliberal reforms placed an especially high burden on less educated individuals.

The political circumstances are also helpful in understanding some of the results for Wave 4. Wave 4 was conducted in 2001, an election year. That electoral season witnessed the remarkable political comeback of ex-president Alan García. By the end of his 1985-1990 presidency, the country was facing a major recession, hyperinflation, and extreme political violence. In spite of his disastrous record in office, and having returned to the country only 10 weeks before the first round of the election after several years in exile, García was able to squeeze into the runoff by making use of his electioneering skills and his party's (APRA) apparatus, and by campaigning on social issues (Taylor

2005, 575-576). While García eventually lost the election, his prominent role likely had important consequences on Peruvians' positions on many issues.

The memory of García's disastrous record, including failed redistributive fiscal policies, likely led many low-income individuals who would have normally supported redistribution to oppose it. In contrast, several higher-income individuals who would have normally opposed redistribution might have supported it because they actually benefited from García's previous policies. Together, these two patterns could account for the non-significance of income's effect in Wave 4. In turn, the prominence of social issues during the campaign might have channeled the discontent of the unemployed into higher than usual demands for redistribution, and thus explain why unemployment status matters in this wave but not in others.

Table 4.3 presents the estimates of models of support for redistribution in both countries, as measured by the INEQUALITY item from the LAPOP surveys. In addition to the base specification and the specification including occupational categories, a third specification with individuals' income prospects is included for both countries in 2010 (Model 4 for Argentina and Model 9 for Peru). Results corresponding to these models are of particular interest because they are the only ones that allow an assessment of hypotheses 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, which relate to economic prospects. In this model specification, the base category includes individuals who have neutral expectations about their economic prospects—i.e., they expect their future situation to be the same as their current situation.

Table 4.3
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru
(INEQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables	ARGENTINA				PERU				
	2008		2010		2008		2010		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Income	-0.0591 ***	-0.0590 ***	0.0055	0.0066	-0.0602 **	-0.0607 **	-0.0287	-0.0280	-0.0354
	(0.0185)	(0.0186)	(0.0285)	(0.0286)	(0.0240)	(0.0241)	(0.0227)	(0.0227)	(0.0239)
Unemployed	-0.4545	-0.5199	0.0642	0.0064	0.0656	0.0886	0.3583 *	0.3710 *	0.4091 **
	(0.3835)	(0.3852)	(0.1767)	(0.1844)	(0.1861)	(0.1971)	(0.1859)	(0.2015)	(0.1802)
Unemployment Exp.	0.4693	0.4562	0.4853 ***	0.6036 ***	0.0984	0.1069	0.3058 **	0.3067 **	0.3177 **
	(0.3165)	(0.3189)	(0.1488)	(0.1626)	(0.2536)	(0.2545)	(0.1441)	(0.1446)	(0.1557)
Self-Employed	-0.1736	-0.2582 **	-0.1427	-0.1684	-0.0242	-0.0039	-0.0254	-0.0122	-0.0042
	(0.1128)	(0.1178)	(0.1263)	(0.1291)	(0.1165)	(0.1338)	(0.1042)	(0.1305)	(0.1102)
Retired	-0.2363	-0.3203	-0.0930	0.0144	-0.1493	-0.1246	-0.0484	-0.0265	-0.0334
	(0.1992)	(0.1985)	(0.2710)	(0.3270)	(0.2644)	(0.2723)	(0.2489)	(0.2612)	(0.2767)
Student	-0.4964 ***	-0.5599 ***	-0.1912	-0.1941	0.0637	0.0867	-0.1006	-0.0818	-0.0655
	(0.1750)	(0.1763)	(0.2196)	(0.2235)	(0.1727)	(0.1849)	(0.1687)	(0.1852)	(0.1749)
Other Status	-0.2012	-0.2601 *	0.0945	0.1748	0.0496	0.0706	0.0348	0.0482	0.0766
	(0.1537)	(0.1551)	(0.1716)	(0.1815)	(0.1418)	(0.1538)	(0.1376)	(0.1532)	(0.1446)
Union[a]	0.3028 ***	0.3105 **			0.0361	0.0269			
	(0.1120)	(0.1147)			(0.1375)	(0.1380)			
Upper Service[b]		-0.2547				0.0963		-0.0043	
		(0.1699)				(0.2371)		(0.1943)	
Manual[b]		-0.3150				0.0252		0.0249	
		(0.1953)				(0.1872)		(0.1814)	
POUM[c]				0.3997 ***					0.1499 *
				(0.1049)					(0.0871)
FODM[c]				-0.6967 ***					0.0455
				(0.1515)					(0.1477)

(cont…)

(cont…)

Independent Variables	ARGENTINA				PERU				
	2008		2010		2008		2010		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Female	0.0061	-0.0315	0.1545	0.1812 *	-0.0461	-0.0476	-0.2118 **	-0.2088 **	-0.2298 **
	(0.0851)	(0.0868)	(0.0986)	(0.1014)	(0.0977)	(0.0982)	(0.0934)	(0.0951)	(0.0988)
Age	-0.0058	-0.0053	-0.0077	-0.0097	0.0303 *	0.0308 *	0.0146	0.0164	0.0140
	(0.0185)	(0.0186)	(0.0239)	(0.0253)	(0.0175)	(0.0175)	(0.0154)	(0.0154)	(0.0168)
Age*Age	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002	0.0002	-0.0003	-0.0003	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0002
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Primary School	-0.3452 ***	-0.3528 ***	-0.2396 *	-0.2887 **	0.2061	0.2085	0.1194	0.1156	0.0954
	(0.1181)	(0.1177)	(0.1374)	(0.1436)	(0.1598)	(0.1599)	(0.1698)	(0.1700)	(0.1876)
Secondary School	0.0881	0.0708	0.2008 *	0.2301 *	0.0171	0.0181	0.0821	0.0791	0.1056
	(0.0941)	(0.0952)	(0.1144)	(0.1179)	(0.1155)	(0.1157)	(0.1135)	(0.1139)	(0.1232)
College	0.0169	0.1156	-0.3108	-0.2752	-0.0409	-0.0583	0.0523	0.0675	0.0844
	(0.1501)	(0.1513)	(0.1967)	(0.1946)	(0.1339)	(0.1493)	(0.1140)	(0.1263)	(0.1200)
Rural	0.2973 **	0.3084 **	-0.0301	-0.0623	-0.0830	-0.0808	-0.1565	-0.1542	-0.1655
	(0.1181)	(0.1179)	(0.1643)	(0.1695)	(0.1035)	(0.1038)	(0.1006)	(0.1006)	(0.1085)
Constant	6.9688 ***	7.0500 ***	6.0157 ***	5.9614 ***	5.2889 ***	5.2588 ***	5.4201 ***	5.3743 ***	5.3442 ***
	(0.3771)	(0.3739)	(0.4542)	(0.4849)	(0.4178)	(0.4286)	(0.3744)	(0.3877)	(0.4044)
N	996	992	1045	933	1268	1267	1313	1310	1157
R-squared	0.0484	0.0522	0.0222	0.0914	0.0110	0.0113	0.0186	0.0188	0.0227

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *<0.10; **<0.05; ***<0.01.

[a] Item used to construct union membership dummy was only available in 2008 surveys.

[b] Items used to construct occupational category dummies were only available for Argentina in 2008.

[c] Item used to construct economic prospects dummies was only available in 2010 surveys.

Contrary to hypothesis 4.1.3, individuals with positive prospects are more supportive of redistribution than those with neutral expectations. These effects are significant at the 1% level in Argentina and at the 10% level in Peru. Also contrary to hypothesis 4.1.4, the effect of having negative prospects is negative and significant—and almost twice the magnitude of that corresponding to positive prospects—in Argentina. The effect is positive, but not significant, in Peru.

The effects of economic prospects reported here are in stark contrast to those found in other studies carried out in the U.S. and Russia. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) find that positive economic prospects have a negative effect on support for redistribution in the U.S. Using data from Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) find that expectations of downward mobility increase demands for redistribution among well-off individuals—for insurance purposes, the authors argue.

It might be the case that the hypothesized rationale linking economic prospects and support for redistribution is not the only possible one. For example, it is reasonable to imagine that individuals who expect their economic situation to improve could actually be more willing to help others to a greater extent than those who are less optimistic about the future. Similarly, the expectation of tough economic times could make individuals less willing to help others.

It is also possible that rather than reflecting expectations or educated guesses about future income, economic prospects are a reflection of individuals' personality attributes. In particular, they might be reflective of individuals' pessimistic or optimistic orientations. Individuals with the first type of orientations tend to be less politically

efficacious and attempt to avoid conflict (Miller 1958, 249). This might in turn explain why individuals with negative expectations might be less inclined to demand strong policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor than those with positive expectations.

Moving on to other substantively important variables, the effect of income is statistically significant and in the expected negative direction in both countries in 2008. It is also in the hypothesized direction, but not significant, in 2010 in Peru. Its effect is essentially nonexistent in 2010 in Argentina.

The effects of all other covariates of substantive importance are either not significant or significant in one year but not in the other. In Argentina, the effect of unemployment experience is positive and thus in line with expectations in both years, but is only significant in 2010. The effect of self-employment is negative in all models but it is significant only in the second specification in 2008. Thus, in that year, the level of support for redistribution among the self-employed was significantly different when compared to that among all the employed, but not when it is compared to that among those employed in non-manual occupations. In turn, the effect of union membership is positive and significant, as hypothesized, in the only year for which the variable is available. In Peru, only the effects of unemployment and unemployment experience are significant and in the expected positive direction in 2010. Both effects are in the opposite direction, but not significant in the other year. In the two countries, the effects of occupational categories are not significant.

Finally, with regard to the control variables, the only effect that is consistently significant across the two years is that of primary education in Argentina. The negative effect indicates that those who completed primary school are less supportive of redistribution than those who did not complete it or did not attend school at all. This effect is not in line with any of the expectations regarding educational attainment laid out earlier in the chapter.

Like in the analyses of WVS data, the effects of some variables vary within countries across the two years. Changing political circumstances might also help understand the differing results. In Argentina, 2008 was a time of political and social turmoil caused by the government's attempt to increase export taxes on agricultural commodities. President Cristina Fernández and her husband, ex-president Néstor Kirchner, justified this measure as an attempt to redistribute a larger share of the windfall profits caused by high international prices among the poorest sectors of the population (Leira and Cruzalegui 2009, 234). In turn, 2010 might have been an atypical year because of the general elections that took place in both countries the following year. These changing circumstances may have made some considerations more salient in a given year.

Overall, political circumstances seem to play a role in explaining within-country over-time variation in the salience of considerations informing support for redistribution. The shift from a political environment centered on neoliberal adjustment in the 1990s to one in which social issues became prominent in the 2000s is the overarching theme for the changing political environment discussed throughout. During the 1990s, there are

inconsistencies in results that can be explained by the stances adopted by political actors with regard to the economic reforms. During the late-1990s and 2000s, inconsistencies in results correspond to political actors' positions on social issues that were central to political debates at that time.

Altogether, the results presented thus far only provide consistent support for hypothesis 4.1.1. The higher the income of an individual, the less supportive of redistribution he tends to be. Other hypotheses do not hold up well against the data; they are either supported only sporadically or not at all. For example, hypotheses 4.1.2, 4.1.5 and 4.1.8, which concern union membership, unemployment, and self-employment, respectively, are supported sporadically. None of the results support the hypotheses about class status (4.1.6 and 4.1.7). Finally, the results do not support hypotheses 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 pertaining to economic prospects, and even outright contradict them in the case of Argentina.

Discussion

Why do interest-based explanations fare poorly in these two Latin American countries? Certain features of the economies, political systems, and redistributive social programs of Argentina and Peru that are also common to most developing countries are the likely culprits. Due to exposure to international markets, terms of trade fluctuations, and financial constraints, developing economies are more volatile than those of advanced industrial democracies (Wibbels 2006). This volatility creates economic opportunities as well as vulnerability at the individual level and causes individuals' income to be permanently in flux (Graham and Pettinato 2000: 69-70). In this context, economic

prospects might become more reflective of individuals' personality attributes than of educated guesses about their future income.

Economic volatility, paired with greater structural complexity, might also explain the lack of support for hypotheses derived from power resource theory. In Latin America, the rise and demise of import substitution industrialization (ISI) along with an accelerated process of urbanization, and the later enactment of market reforms have led to great complexity in the class structure. The concentration of income in the top decile of the population increased, public sector employment contracted, and the "classes" of micro-entrepreneurs and informal sector workers rapidly expanded (Hoffman and Centeno 2006; Portes and Hoffman 2003). Class interests are not likely to shape redistributive attitudes in contexts where a large share of the labor force does not have secure employment and is forced to transition between the formal and informal sectors, and where the size of the informal proletariat dwarfs the business and working classes.

Moreover, unlike in advanced industrial democracies, manual workers and union members are generally not part of the lowest strata in developing countries. At least in Latin America, the consequence of this stratification pattern is that welfare states generally offered disproportionate benefits to an "elite proletariat" comprised of skilled blue-collar workers employed in strategic economic sectors, while sidelining relatively worse-off peasants, unorganized rural workers, and underemployed and unskilled urban workers (Mesa-Lago 1978, 5-16). This has been the case in Peru since the introduction of modern social security systems in the first half of the 1900s and is increasingly the case in Argentina after the collapse of ISI and the economic crises of the 1980s and 2000s. In

this context, workers and union members are less likely to be supportive of social policies aimed at producing greater equality as these might not necessarily benefit them—and might in fact involve stripping them of their privileged status.

Another important difference between developing and developed democracies that helps explain the lack of support for interest-based explanations is related to the strength of political and social organizations of interest aggregation and representation. For Varieties of Capitalism scholars, sector-based risk coalitions of workers and employers are essential to explain demands for and later implementation of social insurance policies (Mares 2003; Mares 2005). For power resource theorists, strong labor unions and leftist parties, as well as strong ties between these actors, are essential to sustain demands for redistribution among the working class (Huber and Stephens 2001; Stephens 1979). Among other resources, these organizations provide people with information that makes them more likely "to discover their own position in the stratification system" and "to develop attitudes consistent with that position" (Kumlin and Svallfors 2007, 21).

In most of the developing world, in general, and in Latin America, in particular, these vehicles of interest aggregation and representation have tended to be weak or altogether absent (Schmitter 1974). Arguably, the Argentine labor movement does not fit this characterization as it has been relatively strong and successful at establishing and maintaining ties with that country's major political movement, Peronism.[32] As shown

[32] Throughout the mid-1900s, the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) provided important support to Perón in his route to power, although only to be controlled by the populist leader later on. This period saw

above, union membership and working-class status fail to significantly predict support for redistribution even in this relatively favorable context.

Finally, another reason that might explain the underperformance of interest-based explanations is related to the characteristics of the social protection systems in the countries under study. As argued by Pierson (1993), redistributive policies provide material resources and incentives that are key to sustaining collective action efforts aimed at protecting acquired benefits, organized interest groups included. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, such policies provide individuals with cues and information "that may influence individuals' perceptions about what their interests are" (Pierson 1993, 621). Together, these material and cognitive influences help create new bases of support for welfare policies among mass publics (Pierson 1993; Pierson 1996).

As discussed in Chapter 3, social protection systems in Argentina and Peru have limited coverage. For example, in Argentina about 76% of those that are 70 or more years old receive pensions or retirement benefits, and 56% of the employed urban population contributes to social security; in Peru the figures are only 27% and 19%, respectively. The difference in pension coverage stems not only from better coverage by the contributory pension system in Argentina but also from the introduction of non-contributory pension schemes targeted at the poor. A state-run unemployment benefit

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unprecedented, pro-working class changes in labor legislation and industrial and social policies (Collier and Collier 2002, 337-350). Like in the rest of Latin America, the abandonment of ISI, the debt crisis of the 1980s, and the introduction of market reforms in the 1990s significantly weakened Argentina's labor movement, as well as its ties with the Peronist Party (Hagopian 1998; Levitsky 2003, Oxhorn 1998). The CGT in fact split in 1991, when a number of unions defected from the Confederation and created the leftist Central Union of Argentine Workers (CTA). During the last decade, however, labor recovered a significant share of its lost power, and the CGT became a political ally of the two Peronist presidents that have governed the country since 2003 (Etchemendy and Collier 2007).

scheme based on workers' contributions is available only in Argentina—although targeted workfare programs were introduced in both countries during the 2000s.

The combination of limited coverage and targeting likely accounts for the absence of pockets of support for redistribution among populations like the retired and the unemployed, which are, at least in theory, net beneficiaries. The combination of these strategies divides the population of potential beneficiaries and thus makes their opinions on the issue of redistribution less cohesive. Those that are covered will likely support redistribution, but those that are not might be indifferent or even choose to oppose it. Moreover, limited coverage and targeting can have an indirect effect by hindering the development of interest groups that could raise awareness about programs and contribute to solidify support. While the unemployed are likely hard to organize given their (hopefully) temporary status, the American Association of Retired People (AARP) shows that retiree associations can become pivotal interest groups (Campbell 2003).

Explanations Based on Social Identity: The Role of Ethnic Groups and Prejudice

This section evaluates hypotheses about ethnic group identification and prejudice. As in the previous section, results for models estimated with WVS data are presented first. These are followed by the results for models using data from the LAPOP. Finally, the results are discussed. Results corresponding to the RESPONSIBILITY and WELL-BEING items are presented in tables A1.8 to A1.10 in Appendix 1.

Results

Table 4.4 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Argentina, as measured by the EQUALITY item. These models include the independent variables from the base model specification plus ethnic identification, racial prejudice, and prejudice against immigrants. Models including interactions between ethnic identification and prejudice are not estimated because of data limitations (see table notes for details). The different prejudice variables are included in separate models because they are highly correlated with one another. Model 1 and Model 3 include the variable measuring prejudice against racial outgroups. Model 2 and Model 4 include the variable measuring prejudice against immigrants. Finally, Model 5 includes the variable indicating minority status as well as prejudice against immigrants.

The effect of minority status is in the hypothesized positive direction but not significant in the only wave in which it is estimated (Wave 5). Thus, levels of support for redistribution among minority respondents are no different from those among white respondents. The effect of racial prejudice is negative as expected in Wave 4 (Model 1), and prejudice against immigrants is negative as expected in all waves (models two, four and five). These effects are not statistically significant, however.

Table 4.4
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina,
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice
(EQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables[a]	Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.1263 ***	-0.1279 ***	0.3844 *	0.3906 *	-0.0032
	(0.0451)	(0.0450)	(0.2183)	(0.2177)	(0.2633)
Union	0.0451	0.0644	0.1754	0.1705	-0.4161
	(0.3963)	(0.3958)	(0.6020)	(0.6017)	(0.3713)
Unemployed	-0.2077	-0.1613	0.1920	0.2019	0.4526
	(0.3749)	(0.3732)	(0.3189)	(0.3187)	(0.4554)
Self-Employed	0.1348	0.1358	-0.7135 ***	-0.7097 ***	-0.3246
	(0.3238)	(0.3236)	(0.2709)	(0.2710)	(0.3427)
Retired	0.5678	0.5219	-0.5419	-0.5383	0.2247
	(0.4408)	(0.4406)	(0.3924)	(0.3916)	(0.4868)
Student	0.2320	0.2069	-1.0902 ***	-1.0964 ***	-0.0452
	(0.4947)	(0.4943)	(0.3891)	(0.3886)	(0.4619)
Other Status	0.1750	0.1460	-0.2634	-0.2623	0.0276
	(0.3423)	(0.3424)	(0.3076)	(0.3078)	(0.3386)
Minority[b]					0.4377
					(0.4104)
Race[c]	0.4639		-0.2812		
	(0.5382)		(0.4490)		
Immigrant		-0.5868		-0.1085	-0.2050
		(0.4666)		(0.4121)	(0.7729)
Female	0.1797	0.1847	0.4750 **	0.4779 **	-0.2112
	(0.2330)	(0.2325)	(0.2213)	(0.2216)	(0.2621)
Age	-0.0068	-0.0088	-0.0676 **	-0.0673 **	-0.0466
	(0.0403)	(0.0407)	(0.0315)	(0.0315)	(0.0394)
Age*Age	-0.0002	-0.0002	0.0008 **	0.0008 **	0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Primary School	0.2336	0.2562	-1.9058 ***	-1.9069 ***	-1.0087 *
	(0.3903)	(0.3888)	(0.4030)	(0.4034)	(0.5413)
Secondary School	-0.1810	-0.2082	-3.2916 ***	-3.2968 ***	-1.7941 **
	(0.4093)	(0.4094)	(0.7191)	(0.7188)	(0.8877)
College	0.6046	0.6050	-4.4798 ***	-4.4937 ***	-1.4622
	(0.5334)	(0.5335)	(1.2232)	(1.2225)	(1.4875)
Constant	6.0597 ***	6.1413 ***	7.7400 ***	7.7027 ***	8.5312 ***
	(0.9491)	(0.9579)	(1.1013)	(1.0955)	(1.3356)
N	864	864	1239	1239	952
R-squared	0.0276	0.0286	0.0604	0.0601	0.0399

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; **<prob<0.05; ***prob<0.01.

[a] Interactions between minority identification and the two types of prejudice not included because intersections contained less than 30 respondents.

[b] Item used to construct ethnic identification dummy was only available in Wave 5.

[c] Dummy indicating prejudice toward racial outgroups not included in Wave 5 because category contained less than 30 respondents.

Table 4.5 reports estimates of similar models for Peru. Interactions between identification and racial prejudice are only included as allowed by the data (details are provided in the table's notes). Contrary to expectations, the effect of Afro-descendent identification is negative and significant in Wave 3. The effect of *mestizo* identification is also contrary to expectations—i.e., negative and significant—in Wave 3 among those who are not prejudiced ($RACE_i$=0). All other estimated effects corresponding to ethnic identification are not significant, and only those corresponding to indigenous identification in Wave 3 and Afro-descendent identification in Wave 5 are in the expected positive direction.

With regards to prejudice toward racial outgroups among whites, its effect is in the hypothesized negative direction in waves three and five, but it is not significant. This indicates that prejudiced whites are equally supportive of redistribution as their non-prejudiced counterparts. In sum, as in the case of Argentina, evidence from the WVS fails to provide support for hypotheses pertaining to ethnic identification and prejudice in Peru (hypotheses 4.2.4, 4.2.5, and 4.2.6).

Table 4.5
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru,
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice
(EQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables[a]	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Income	-0.2012 ***	-0.0264	-0.2436 ***
	(0.0558)	(0.0492)	(0.0505)
Union	0.6509 **	-0.0041	-0.3580
	(0.2695)	(0.3869)	(0.2872)
Unemployed	0.4593	0.4580 *	-0.6286
	(0.4610)	(0.2658)	(0.4062)
Self-Employed	-0.1040	0.1575	-0.0718
	(0.2969)	(0.2220)	(0.2281)
Retired	0.7668	0.3701	-0.2787
	(0.6497)	(0.4379)	(0.4600)
Student	-0.1038	0.1754	-0.2054
	(0.3598)	(0.2721)	(0.3257)
Other Status	0.0972	0.1982	0.2925
	(0.3080)	(0.2399)	(0.3021)
Mestizo[b]	-0.7511 **	0.1784	-0.0115
	(0.3002)	(0.1830)	(0.3256)
Indigenous[b]	0.0527		-0.1268
	(0.5641)		(0.3519)
Afro-descendent[b]	-1.4579 ***		0.8114
	(0.4561)		(0.6651)
Other Minority[c]	-0.1461	1.3136 ***	
	(0.5458)	(0.4637)	
Race	-0.3164	0.7062	-0.9704
	(0.6049)	(0.5802)	(0.8297)
Mestizo*Race[d]	0.3027	-0.7387	0.6778
	(0.7106)	(0.6473)	(0.9819)
Indigenous*Race			1.0264
			(1.0207)
N	970	1466	1294
R-squared	0.0797	0.0187	0.0366

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. Models include a constant and the usual controls. Coefficients not reported to economize space, but consistent with those in Table 4.2.

[a] Interactions between Afro-descendent and other minority identifications and prejudice not included because intersections contained less than 30 respondents.

[b] *Mestizos*, indigenous, and Afro-descendents are classified into a single category in Wave 4 due to item limitations.

[c] Other minority identification not included in Wave 5 because category contained less than 30 respondents; these respondents are included in the base category.

[d] Interaction between indigenous identification and prejudice not included in Wave 3 because intersection contained less than 30 respondents.

Table 4.6 presents the estimates for models of support for redistribution measured by the INEQUALITY item from the LAPOP surveys in both countries. In addition to the covariates from the base specification model, these models include ethnic identification and prejudice as covariates. As noted in the table, the coefficients reported for indigenous identification in Argentina correspond to respondents that identify as indigenous or Afro-descendent. Also as noted, the prejudice measures are only available for Peru in 2010.

Again, the results for Argentina are not consistent with hypothesis 4.2.1 regarding the effect of being a minority. The effect of self-identification as indigenous or Afro-descendent (the coefficient reported for the indigenous category in the table) is in the expected positive direction but not significant in 2008 (Model 1), and negative and significant in 2010 (Model 2). In that year, the indigenous and Afro-descendents are, on average, 1.62 points less supportive of redistribution than whites.[33] While no hypothesis was laid out pertaining to *mestizos*, results are in line with what one might expect: their level of support is in between that of the indigenous and Afro-descendents and that of whites.

In contrast, results for Peru provide some support for expectations. While not statistically significant, estimated effects are consistent with hypotheses 4.2.4 and 4.2.5 in 2008. In that year, the indigenous, Afro-descendents, and *mestizos* are all more supportive of redistribution than whites. The magnitude of the effects is also in line with

[33] The reader should remember that the EQUALITY item measures support for redistribution on a seven-point scale.

Table 4.6
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru,
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice
(INEQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables[a]	ARGENTINA		PERU		
	2008	2010	2008	2010	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.0553 ***	0.0052	-0.0606 **	-0.0348	-0.0395
	(0.0192)	(0.0292)	(0.0245)	(0.0235)	(0.0243)
Unemployed	-0.3555	-0.0106	0.0787	0.3306 *	0.3783 *
	(0.4197)	(0.1785)	(0.1930)	(0.1951)	(0.1934)
Unemployment Exp.	0.3985	0.6375 ***	0.0658	0.2263	0.2878 *
	(0.3323)	(0.1634)	(0.2506)	(0.1594)	(0.1644)
Self-Employed	-0.1884	-0.2151 *	-0.0428	-0.0272	-0.0043
	(0.1179)	(0.1295)	(0.1184)	(0.1077)	(0.1144)
Retired	-0.2517	-0.0480	-0.1681	-0.0622	-0.0391
	(0.2082)	(0.3245)	(0.2671)	(0.2689)	(0.2790)
Student	-0.5054 ***	-0.2639	-0.0100	-0.0639	-0.0949
	(0.1766)	(0.2258)	(0.1743)	(0.1797)	(0.1817)
Other Status	-0.2243	0.1801	0.0225	0.0655	0.0729
	(0.1566)	(0.1871)	(0.1438)	(0.1398)	(0.1476)
Union[b]	0.3014 ***		0.0381		
	(0.1156)		(0.1402)		
POUM[c]		0.3932 ***		0.1101	0.1642 *
		(0.1063)		(0.0868)	(0.0883)
FODM[c]		-0.6318 ***		-0.0178	-0.0448
		(0.1533)		(0.1478)	(0.1507)
Mestizo	0.0987	-0.3613 ***	0.0395	0.2688 **	0.2642 **
	(0.0973)	(0.1226)	(0.1234)	(0.1246)	(0.1314)
Indigenous[d]	0.2155	-1.6239 ***	0.2157	0.6434 **	0.5934 **
	(0.2510)	(0.3866)	(0.1915)	(0.2539)	(0.2581)
Afro-descendent[d]			0.1583	-0.0075	0.0259
			(0.2704)	(0.2211)	(0.2284)
Prejudice1				-0.2089 ***	
				(0.0325)	
Prejudice2					-0.0945 ***
					(0.0248)
N	966	906	1225	1112	1107
R-squared	0.0480	0.1251	0.0122	0.0827	0.0463

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. Models include a constant and the usual controls; coefficients are not reported to economize space, but are consistent with those in Table 4.3.

[a] Other minority identification dummy not included because category contained less than 30 respondents for all country-years. These respondents are included in the base category.

[b] Item used to construct union membership dummy was only available in 2008 surveys.

[c] Item used to construct economic prospects dummies was only available in 2010 surveys.

[d] Afro-descendent respondents dummy not included for Argentina models because category contained less than 30 respondents. These respondents are included in indigenous category.

expectations—the indigenous are the most supportive, followed by Afro-descendents, and *mestizos*. In 2010, the effects of indigenous identification and *mestizo* identification are in line with expectations and statistically significant, but the level of support for redistribution among Afro-descendents is not significantly different from that among whites.

With regard to prejudice, as shown in Model 4 and Model 5, both measures have negative and significant effects in line with hypothesis 4.2.6. The more prejudiced an individual, the less he supports redistribution. It is also worth noting that the prejudice measure reflecting attitudes about racial mixing has a stronger effect than that capturing attitude towards the indigenous. Models whose results are not reported here for the sake of space included interactions between identification and prejudice to allow the effects of the latter to vary across ethnic groups. Results indicated that this was not the case, however.

Discussion

Altogether, these results indicate that theories emphasizing social identity do not travel well to Argentina and Peru. The results fail to provide any support for hypotheses 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 pertaining the effects of ethnic identification and racial prejudice in Argentina. While not statistically significant, one could interpret the consistently negative effect of prejudice against immigrants in Table 4.4 as tentative support for hypothesis 4.2.3. In the case of Peru, support for hypotheses 4.2.4, 4.2.5, and 4.2.6 is mixed. Estimates based on data from the WVS provide no support for these hypotheses, while those based on the LAPOP data generally conform to expectations.

The difference between these findings might be due to changes that occurred between the time the WVS were conducted and the time the LAPOP surveys were conducted. It might be that an awakening of ingroup interests among non-whites occurred during this period. In that scenario, non-whites could support redistributive policies from which they should expect to benefit. In the face of such an awakening there could have been a reaction among some against outgroups which would result in lower levels of support among prejudiced individuals. This interpretation is compatible with recent developments in Peruvian politics, such as the increasing ethnic-based mobilization against extractive industries and especially the political ascent of ethno-populist leader Ollanta Humala (Madrid 2012).

Given Argentina's homogeneous population, it is not surprising that explanations based on social identity are not relevant in that country. But it is somewhat surprising that these explanations not more powerful in Peru. After all, Peru is even more ethnically heterogeneous than the U.S., the context in which these explanations thrive.

Again, limited coverage of social protection systems is one of the likely culprits. Given that the indigenous, Afro-descendents, and *mestizos* are relatively worse-off than whites, they are also likely to have less access to social protection. As discussed earlier, this implies that individuals also have limited access to material and information resources that could in turn make them more aware of their group interests and create support for such programs. The introduction of a conditional cash transfer program directly targeted at the rural poor—who are mainly indigenous—in 2005, and its

expansion since then, constitute a major departure from this exclusionary pattern.[34] This development might explain the possible awakening of ingroup interests among non-whites in the late 2000s discussed above. Support for redistribution might be growing among direct beneficiaries who are predominantly indigenous. Additionally, this development might also be spurring stigmatization of beneficiaries and thus fostering a backlash against redistribution among those with prejudiced attitudes toward the indigenous.[35]

The relative weakness of social movements and organizations advancing the interests of ethnic groups provides another explanation. The Peruvian indigenous movement is fragmented into a plethora of organizations with very specific platforms (Madrid 2012, 114-117). Moreover, few of these organizations explicitly assume an ethnic identity and even fewer incorporate demands for public policies aimed at providing concrete material benefits or greater opportunities for the indigenous population as a whole. Attempts to organize a politically important indigenous-based movement or organization have been generally unsuccessful. These include the efforts of the country's latest military government (1968-1980) to transform the "indigenous" into "peasants," and thus free them from the stigma associated with that label, and incorporate

[34] The Juntos (Together) National Program of Direct Support for the Poor is the first and only conditional cash transfer program existing in Peru. The program was originally implemented in 70 districts, but up until December of 2010 it had expanded to 646 districts. During the same period, coverage expanded from 22,550 to almost 500,000 poor or extremely poor households (Juntos 2012a; Juntos 2012b).

[35] For example, a recent study of six districts in which the program operates identified that three myths (or stigmas) about the beneficiaries are prevalent among the rest of the population (Huber and Zárate 2009). These myths are: beneficiaries "do not want to work anymore" and "become lazy;" women get pregnant to qualify for the program or to remain enrolled; and beneficiaries do not use the transfers appropriately and usually spend them buying alcohol.

this new class into its progressive political project.[36] Among Afro-descendents the situation is no different. In a context in which Afro-descendent identity is very weak and constituted only by race—i.e., skin color—, existing organizations have few members and are distant from the population they claim to represent (Valdivia et al. 2007).

A final explanation relates to *mestizaje* or extensive racial intermixing. By blurring the lines that separate groups, *mestizaje* has reduced polarization and fostered generally harmonious relations (Madrid 2012, 120). This does not mean that exclusion, discrimination, and racism against the indigenous and Afro-descendents are not widespread in Peru. As discussed above, these practices are indeed prevalent, but *mestizaje* has contributed to keeping them in the shadows. Most importantly, extensive intermixing has made it more difficult for strong ethnic identities to develop. In short, *mestizaje* has made it difficult for Peruvians of indigenous or African descent to develop the sense of linked fate that has made African-American attitudes, for example, toward welfare policies so cohesive.

Conclusion

Theories centered on individuals' position along structural cleavages are not very useful to explain variation in support for redistribution within Argentina and Peru. With the exception of income, none of the considerations emphasized by interest-based explanations consistently shape support according to expectations. This is because

[36] As argued by McClintock (1981), this newly created "peasantry" failed to coalesce in a way that was compatible with the corporatist political project of the military government. Peasants remained alienated from and skeptical towards the national government and its attempts to control the agricultural cooperatives that replaced haciendas. Moreover, while solidarity between peasants increased within cooperatives, this was not the case of peasant class solidarity, which was undermined by economic competition and political uncertainty.

economic volatility and greater structural complexity make it difficult for individuals to develop attitudes in line with their constantly changing economic interests. The relatively weak social and political organizations of these counties further deprive individuals of opportunities and resources to become cognizant of their economic interests as they relate to redistributive policies. Finally, limited and targeted coverage of social protection systems has similar consequences while also contributing to the fragmentation of potential pockets of support for social policies.

Considerations emphasized by accounts based on social identity do not fare much better. Ethnic identification and prejudice do not play a role in shaping support for redistribution in relatively homogenous Argentina. Evidence from ethnically diverse Peru is mixed at best, indicating that group identification and prejudice are not as powerful predictors of redistributive attitudes as the literature informed by the U.S. experience would suggest. Again, limited social protection coverage as well as weak ethnic-based organizations partly explain this result. By blurring the lines that separate ethnic groups and weakening ethnic identities, *mestizaje* is the other factor that likely plays a role.

Overall, while theoretically sound, interest-based and group identity-based accounts need to be overhauled to consider the role played by economic, political, and social contexts. The structural cleavages these theories emphasize do not have the same consequences in Argentina and Peru, and in the developing world more generally, as they do in advanced industrial democracies. Depending on the specific cleavage, context can make them less salient—and sometimes even irrelevant—or cut across the citizenry in different ways and thus lead to different interests vis-à-vis the issue of redistribution. A

number of economic-structural differences across developed and developing contexts make the one-size-fits-all expectations of interest-based theories rather uninformative in the latter context. Accounts emphasizing group identity might prove to be informative in developing countries in which ethnic divisions constitute important political cleavages.

Chapter 5
Social Beliefs and Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru

This chapter goes beyond structural explanations and examines the belief-based account of redistributive attitudes that focuses on inequality frames. As discussed in Chapter 2, inequality frames are simplified mental models of reality comprised of a collection of cognitions about the causes of inequality and poverty. By allowing individuals to assign blame for the distributive status quo, these social beliefs inform attitudes about redistributive policies.

According to the redistributive frame, effort is not necessarily rewarded with success, economic standing is mostly caused by factors over which individuals have no control, and social structure is rigid. Individuals who conceptualize the issue of inequality in this way will tend to attribute the distributive status quo to societal shortcomings and to support redistributive policies. In contrast, according to the self-reliance frame, effort generally pays off, individuals are responsible for their (mis)fortunes, and society is open to personal advancement. Individuals who hold these beliefs will tend to believe that all individuals—rich or poor—get what they deserve. From this standpoint, it follows that the solution to inequality and poverty is for the worse-off to "pull themselves up by their bootstraps." Thus, individuals who hold beliefs in line with this frame will tend to oppose redistributive policies.

The analysis below shows that social beliefs shape support for redistribution in line with expectations. Interestingly, social beliefs seem to be more salient in Peru than in

Argentina. Thus, while structural considerations (save income) do not explain individual-level variation in support for redistribution, social beliefs do. The analysis also shows that individuals' social beliefs are not independent of each other, forming relatively coherent conceptual frames on the issue of inequality. The chapter then examines how the individual-level results help account for divergence in support across Argentina and Peru. It argues that differences in the aggregate composition and salience of social beliefs can help explain the divergence in levels of support across the two countries under study. It also shows that income cannot account for this divergence.

This chapter is organized in six sections. The second section lays out a number of hypotheses about the effects of inequality frames on redistributive attitudes. The third section provides details about the empirical strategy and data used to examine these hypotheses. The fourth and fifth sections present and discuss the results of the individual-level, within-country analyses. The sixth section explores the extent to which individuals' beliefs are interdependent. The seventh section builds upon these findings and those of the previous chapter to provide an explanation for diverging levels of support for redistribution across Argentina and Peru. The final section presents some concluding remarks.

Hypotheses

Individuals who hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame should be more supportive of welfare policies than those who hold beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame. The former believe that income and economic standing, more generally, are products of factors over which individuals have no control, like birth, connections, and

luck. They believe that those living in poverty are not responsible for their misfortune; instead, the poor are the victims of societal shortcomings like lack of opportunities, unfairness, and exploitation. Moreover, they believe that the stock of wealth is rather finite and wealth accumulation resembles a zero-sum game in which one's wins are another's losses.

In contrast, individuals who hold beliefs in with the self-reliance frame see economic standing as a product of personal abilities and effort. In a world in which individuals can get ahead by trying hard enough, the poor themselves—their traits and behaviors—are to blame for their misfortune. In turn, in such a world, everybody has opportunities to get ahead, and wealth is not finite. Individuals who see the world through the lens of this self-reliance frame consider inequality to be fair and thus oppose redistributive policies.

As argued in Chapter 2, the redistributive and self-reliance frames are ideal-type constructs. Most individuals likely hold views that are in between these two extremes. The hypotheses below focus on three types of social beliefs: beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, and beliefs about the causes of poverty. The focus on views about these specific issues is driven by data availability. That said, these three types of beliefs are a good representation of the range of cognitions that populate inequality frames. The following hypotheses formalize expectations about the relationship between these three types of beliefs and support for redistribution.

Hypothesis 5.1 *Individuals who believe that wealth accumulation is a zero-sum game should be more supportive of redistribution than those who believe that wealth accumulation is a positive-sum game.*

Hypothesis 5.2 *Individuals who believe that income is a product of factors over which individuals have no control, such as birth, connections, and luck, should be more supportive of redistribution than those who believe that income is a product of factors that individuals can control, such as effort and hard work.*

Hypothesis 5.3 *Individuals who believe that societal shortcomings cause poverty and that the poor do not have a chance to escape poverty should be more supportive of redistribution than those who believe that poverty is caused by individuals' traits and behaviors and that the poor have a fair chance at getting ahead.*

Methods and Data

The hypotheses laid out above are explored by adding the *i*-th individual's social beliefs to the general model of support for redistribution ($SUPPORT_i$) presented in Equation 4.1 in the previous chapter. The new model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} SUPPORT_i = {} & \beta_0 + \beta_1 INCOME_i + \beta_2 UNION_i + \beta_3 POUM_i \\ & + \beta_4 FODM_i + \beta_5 UNEMPLOYED_i + \beta_6 MANAGER_i \\ & + \beta_7 WORKER_i + \beta_8 INFORMAL_i + \beta_9 MINORITY_i \\ & + \beta_{10} PREJUDICE_i + \beta_{11} MINORITY_i * PREJUDICE_i \\ & + \phi_1 WEALTH_i + \phi_2 OUTCOMES_i + \phi_3 POVERTY_i + \boldsymbol{\omega Z_i} + u_i \end{aligned} \quad (5.1)$$

where the new terms $WEALTH_i$, $OUTCOMES_i$, and $POVERTY_i$ represent the i-th individual's beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, the causes of economic outcomes, and the causes of poverty, respectively. These variables indicate the location of the i-th individual's beliefs in continua that go from beliefs that are consistent with the self-reliance frame on one end to beliefs that are consistent with the redistributive frame on the other. The ensuing analyses assess the hypotheses laid out above by estimating the parameters in Equation 5.1. Given hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, one should expect all of the coefficients associated with social beliefs to be positive (ϕ_1, ϕ_2, and ϕ_3).

The data used come from the WVS. The items used to measure social beliefs are only available in the third and fourth waves, so the analyses below are limited to these country-years. Support for redistribution is measured using the EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY items used in Chapter 4. As a reminder, both of these variables are measured on 10-point scales where higher values correspond to more support for redistribution.[37] The following discussion details the measurement for the main independent variables of interest in the analyses reported below—i.e., individuals' beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, the causes of economic outcomes, and the causes of poverty. All other independent variables remain as introduced in Chapter 4.

Beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation are measured using an item that asks respondents to indicate their level of agreement with the following opposing statements: "Wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone" and "People can only get rich at the expense of others." Responses are recorded using a 10-point scale; a response

[37] Full wording for these items is provided in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3.

of one represents total agreement with the former statement while a response of 10 represents total agreement with the latter. A similar item—and response scale—is used to measure beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes. In this item, the first statement is "In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life," and the second is "Hard work doesn't generally bring success—it's more a matter of luck and connections." The ensuing analyses treat the variables constructed using responses to these items ($WEALTH_i$ and $OUTCOMES_i$, respectively) as continuous. Their effects are expected to be positive as higher values indicate beliefs that are more consistent with the redistributive frame.

Beliefs about poverty are measured using two items available in Wave 3. The first one asks respondents for their opinions on why there are people living in need. Two response options are provided: "They are poor because of laziness and lack of will power" and "They are poor because society treats them unfairly." The second item explores respondents' views about individuals' chances to escape from poverty. Response options are "They have a chance" and "There is very little chance." These items are cross tabulated to classify respondents into four categories. Three dichotomous variables ($POVERTY1_i$, $POVERTY2_i$, $POVERTY3_i$) are created to identify the four resulting categories as shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1
Coding Scheme for Beliefs About Poverty

Causes of poverty	Chance to escape poverty	
	There is chance	There is very little chance
Individuals' laziness and lack of will power	Base category	$POVERTY2_i$=1
Society treats individuals unfairly	$POVERTY1_i$=1	$POVERTY3_i$=1

The coefficients associated with these three variables should be positive given that the beliefs corresponding to the base category are the most consistent with the self-reliance frame. Most importantly, the coefficient associated with $POVERTY3_i$ should be greater than those associated with the other two variables, as believing that the cause of poverty is society's unfairness and that the poor have very little chance to get ahead are characteristic of the redistributive frame.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables are provided in tables A1.1, A1.3, and A1.4 in Appendix 1.

Results

As in Chapter 4, all the models reported below are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). In the interest of space, only the results corresponding to models of support for redistribution as measured by the EQUALITY item are discussed here. Results corresponding to the RESPONSIBILITY item are consistent with the ones presented below and are reported in tables A1.11 and A1.12 in Appendix 1.

Table 5.2 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Argentina. In addition to social beliefs, which are the variables of main interest in the ensuing analyses, these models include the independent variables included in the base specification introduced in the previous chapter.[38] Beliefs are included in separate models because, as one would expect, they are highly correlated with each other. Model 1 and Model 4 estimate the effect of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation in Wave 3 and Wave 5, respectively. Model 2 and Model 5 estimate the effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes in the two waves. Model 3 estimates the effects of beliefs about poverty in Wave 3.

Overall, the results for Argentina are mixed. The estimated effects of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation are in line with hypothesis 5.1 in both waves (Model 1 and Model 4), although these effects are not significant. The effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes is in the hypothesized positive direction (hypothesis 5.2), but is not significant in Wave 3 (Model 2), and is contrary to expectations and significant in Wave 5 (Model 5). In Wave 5, individuals who believe that effort does not always lead to success are less supportive of redistribution than those who believed that hard work usually brings a better life in the long run. Potential explanations for this finding are considered in the discussion later in this chapter.

[38] Models including class status, ethnic identification, and prejudice are also estimated. Results are consistent with those presented here and in the previous chapter and thus are not reported.

Table 5.2
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina,
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty
(EQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3			Wave 5	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.1343 ***	-0.1240 ***	-0.0904 *	-0.0207	0.0080
	(0.0455)	(0.0454)	(0.0492)	(0.2698)	(0.2635)
Union	-0.0664	0.0779	0.1386	-0.3644	-0.4823
	(0.3986)	(0.4044)	(0.4211)	(0.3758)	(0.3687)
Unemployed	-0.1823	-0.1907	-0.0497	0.4258	0.4250
	(0.3751)	(0.3724)	(0.3977)	(0.4569)	(0.4517)
Self-Employed	0.0372	0.1334	0.4625	-0.2885	-0.2770
	(0.3249)	(0.3278)	(0.3457)	(0.3480)	(0.3384)
Retired	0.5871	0.5517	0.7900	0.2385	0.1239
	(0.4410)	(0.4433)	(0.4799)	(0.5023)	(0.4995)
Student	0.1702	0.2002	0.4412	0.1084	-0.0160
	(0.4982)	(0.4957)	(0.5417)	(0.4695)	(0.4632)
Other Status	0.1001	0.1547	0.3641	0.0326	0.1351
	(0.3463)	(0.3443)	(0.3636)	(0.3496)	(0.3399)
Wealth	0.0307			0.0273	
	(0.0408)			(0.0380)	
Outcomes		0.0331			-0.0673 *
		(0.0376)			(0.0354)
Poverty1			0.2365		
			(0.4618)		
Poverty2			0.6028		
			(0.4626)		
Poverty3			1.0816 ***		
			(0.3530)		
Female	0.2213	0.2091	0.0663	-0.2278	-0.1888
	(0.2345)	(0.2337)	(0.2490)	(0.2670)	(0.2632)
Age	-0.0008	-0.0133	-0.0306	-0.0424	-0.0474
	(0.0415)	(0.0407)	(0.0429)	(0.0400)	(0.0392)
Age*Age	-0.0003	-0.0001	0.0001	0.0002	0.0003
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Primary School	0.1426	0.1949	0.5702	-0.8455	-0.7613
	(0.3949)	(0.3914)	(0.4447)	(0.5773)	(0.5505)
Secondary School	-0.3040	-0.2408	0.0595	-1.4414	-1.4881
	(0.4143)	(0.4112)	(0.4692)	(0.9255)	(0.8945)
College	0.6205	0.5185	0.9564	-1.0588	-1.2463
	(0.5375)	(0.5370)	(0.5941)	(1.5294)	(1.4936)
Constant	6.0340 ***	6.0840 ***	5.2416 ***	8.0697 ***	8.5250 ***
	(0.9864)	(0.9652)	(1.0670)	(1.3805)	(1.3292)
N	839	857	721	911	949
R-squared	0.0321	0.0290	0.0458	0.0298	0.0372

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01.

The effects of beliefs about poverty are in line with hypothesis 5.3 (Model 3). Results indicate that those individuals who think that poverty is caused by an unfair society and that the poor have little chance to escape poverty ($POVERTY3_i$=1) are more supportive of redistribution than those who hold the opposing beliefs—i.e., those in the base category who blame poverty on laziness and lack of will power among the needy and who think that the poor have a chance to escape poverty. At 1.08 points, this effect is both substantively and statistically significant. The effects for the other two variables are also in the hypothesized, positive direction, but they are not statistically significant. For example, individuals who believe that society is to blame for poverty but that those in need have a chance to escape it ($POVERTY1_i$=1) are also more supportive of redistribution compared to the base category, but this difference is not statistically significant. Likewise, individuals who believe that laziness and lack of will power are to blame for poverty but that there is very little chance to escape poverty ($POVERTY2_i$=1) are more supportive of redistribution compared to the base category, but, again, this difference is not statistically significant.

Table 5.3 reports estimates for models of support for redistribution in Peru. Like for the case of Argentina, Model 1 and Model 4 estimate the effect of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation in Wave 3 and Wave 5, respectively. Model 2 and Model 5 estimate the effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes in the two waves. Model 3 estimates the effects of beliefs about poverty in Wave 3.

Table 5.3
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru,
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty
(EQUALITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3			Wave 5	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.1882 ***	-0.1889 ***	-0.1442 ***	-0.2182 ***	-0.2154 ***
	(0.0569)	(0.0555)	(0.0604)	(0.0501)	(0.0510)
Union	0.6156 **	0.6490 **	0.6283 **	-0.2689	-0.3798
	(0.2657)	(0.2714)	(0.2783)	(0.2815)	(0.2750)
Unemployed	0.6674	0.4830	0.4531	-0.4328	-0.4029
	(0.4816)	(0.4703)	(0.5233)	(0.4134)	(0.4179)
Self-Employed	-0.1373	-0.0013	-0.0302	-0.1568	-0.1119
	(0.2967)	(0.2990)	(0.3136)	(0.2238)	(0.2255)
Retired	0.8665	0.8911	0.8540	-0.2671	-0.2052
	(0.6438)	(0.6294)	(0.6647)	(0.4492)	(0.4503)
Student	-0.0384	-0.0740	0.1203	-0.4377	-0.2903
	(0.3647)	(0.3551)	(0.3844)	(0.3256)	(0.3297)
Other Status	0.0117	0.1751	0.2633	0.0817	0.1869
	(0.3085)	(0.3074)	(0.3315)	(0.2946)	(0.2972)
Wealth	0.1674 ***			0.1674 ***	
	(0.0389)			(0.0357)	
Outcomes		0.0834 **			-0.0174
		(0.0386)			(0.0286)
Poverty1			0.5705 *		
			(0.2953)		
Poverty2			0.2804		
			(0.3528)		
Poverty3			0.8472 ***		
			(0.2632)		
Female	0.0385	-0.0849	-0.1025	-0.1289	-0.2062
	(0.2226)	(0.2218)	(0.2391)	(0.1721)	(0.1736)
Age	0.0637	0.0613	0.0727	-0.0498	-0.0366
	(0.0527)	(0.0516)	(0.0543)	(0.0340)	(0.0333)
Age*Age	-0.0009	-0.0009	-0.0010	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Primary School	-0.6501	-0.7653 *	-0.5137	-0.3672	0.1055
	(0.4596)	(0.4407)	(0.4592)	(0.3158)	(0.3146)
Secondary School	-1.3393 ***	-1.4169 ***	-1.3246 ***	-0.5347 *	-0.0925
	(0.4443)	(0.4268)	(0.4409)	(0.3129)	(0.3113)
College	-2.0798 ***	-2.1690 ***	-2.1198 ***	-0.3283	0.1013
	(0.4878)	(0.4761)	(0.4883)	(0.3849)	(0.3872)
Constant	4.1658 ***	4.7151 ***	3.9330 ***	5.3920 ***	5.3497 ***
	(1.1263)	(1.0766)	(1.1680)	(0.7876)	(0.7690)
N	931	961	868	1286	1317
R-squared	0.0857	0.0744	0.0784	0.0538	0.0275

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01.

Overall, these results are consistent with hypotheses 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. The effect of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation is positive as expected and is statistically significant in both waves (Model 1 and Model 4). The effect is also quite substantively significant in both waves. Those who completely agree with the idea that wealth is finite and wealth accumulation is a zero-sum game are, on average, 1.51 points more supportive of redistribution than those who completely agree with the idea that wealth can grow so there is enough for everyone. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is comparable to estimated effect of current income presented in Chapter 4.

The effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes is in line with hypothesis 5.2 in Wave 3 (Model 2). Individuals who completely agree with the idea that hard work eventually leads to a better life are, on average, 0.75 points less supportive of redistribution than those who believe that hard work does not generally bring success. In Wave 5 (Model 5), the effect of these beliefs is negative and thus contrary to expectations, but not statistically significant.

Beliefs about poverty have the hypothesized effects on support for redistribution. As in Argentina, believing that poverty is caused by an unfair society and there is little chance to escape poverty ($POVERTY3_i$=1) is associated with higher levels of support for redistribution than those holding opposite beliefs (the base category). At 0.85 points, the effect is smaller than in the case of Argentina, but still substantial. Individuals who believe that society is to blame for poverty but that it can be escaped ($POVERTY1_i$=1) are also more supportive of redistribution than those in the base category. In contrast to the results for Argentina, this difference is statistically significant. Individuals who believe

that laziness and lack of will power are to blame for economic misfortune but that poverty cannot be escaped ($POVERTY2_i$=1) are also more supportive compared to the base category, but this difference is not statistically significant.

Discussion

Not every hypothesis is consistently supported by the results presented in the preceding section. Taken together, however, these results support the overarching argument that social beliefs matter and help explain individual-level variation in support for redistribution. This section discusses the results in more depth and tries to make sense of results that are contrary to expectations.

The evidence presented thus far suggests that the effect of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation on redistributive attitudes differs between Argentina and Peru. Those who believe that wealth accumulation is zero-sum are more supportive of redistribution in Peru. The effect is in this hypothesized, positive direction in Argentina as well, but it is not statistically significant. Thus, the evidence provides strong support for hypothesis 5.1 in Peru, but only tentative support in the case of Argentina.

In Argentina, individuals who believe that wealth is rather finite and wealth accumulation amounts to a zero-sum game are not more supportive of redistribution than those who believe that wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone. In Peru those that believe the former are substantially more supportive than those who believe the latter.

The evidence regarding the effect of beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes is mixed. In Peru, the effect of these beliefs is positive as expected and is

statistically significant in Wave 3. In Wave 5, however, it is in the opposite direction, but not statistically significant. In Argentina, the effect is in the expected direction but not statistically significant in Wave 3 and is actually contrary to expectations—i.e., negative and significant—in Wave 5. These mixed findings are likely a product of item wording.[39] The question used to construct the measure might not only tap into individuals' beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, but also into their pessimistic or optimistic orientations. Again, the item in question asks individuals to state their level of agreement with one of two opposing statements using a ten-point scale. The statements are "In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life" and "Hard work doesn't generally bring success—it's more a matter of luck and connections." If one does not focus on the qualifying phrase in the second statement, as respondents to a survey might very well do, the items could be interpreted to be more about individuals' orientations than on their beliefs about the causes of income and economic outcomes.[40]

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[39] Besides the explanation discussed below, another plausible one is that individuals might adjust their beliefs in response to their own economic (mis)fortunes and thus justify these in a way that exonerates them for negative outcomes but claims responsibility for positive ones (Bradley 1978; Miller and Ross 1975). Thus those that are worse-off should be more likely to believe that luck and connections, rather than hard work, explain economic success and the opposite should be true for those that are well-off. Interests, in turn, would explain the attitudes of these groups towards redistribution. Available evidence does not support this explanation, however, as the results reported in Table 5.2 already control for income. Moreover, this explanation cannot account for why the effects vary from positive to negative from one wave to the next in the two countries under study.

[40] It is worth noting that studies that do find that beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes have the hypothesized effect on preferences use items that do not suffer from this shortcoming. For example, Corneo and Grüner (2002) use two items with the following prompts: "How important is hard work for getting ahead in life?" and "How important is coming from a wealthy family for getting ahead?" Response options are "essential," "very important," "fairly important," "not very important," and "not important at all." Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) use the following item: "Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?" Respondents could choose from these two options or indicate that both factors were equally important.

If responses to this item reflect both individuals' orientations and beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, estimated effects would depend on which one of these considerations is more salient at a given time. Beliefs might have been more salient in the Wave 3—and thus explain the positive effects in line with expectations—, while orientations could have been more salient in the other wave. As discussed in the previous chapter, individuals with pessimistic orientations tend to be less politically efficacious and attempt to avoid conflict (Miller 1958, 249). This might in turn explain why pessimists might be less inclined to demand equality and support redistribution, leading to the negative effect observed.

Political circumstances provide a plausible explanation for why beliefs might have been more salient in Wave 3 than in Wave 5. In the mid-1990s, market reforms and state retrenchment were in full swing in both Argentina and Peru. These reforms were supported by a discourse that emphasized individual initiative and achievement as the route to collective progress. This type of discourse likely reinforced beliefs, minimizing the salience of individuals' orientations. In contrast, this type of discourse had subsided by the mid-2000s. Thus, individuals' orientations could have taken precedence over beliefs in informing answers to the item in question for Wave 5.

Finally, results corresponding to beliefs about poverty are consistent with hypothesis 5.3. Those who believe that poverty is caused by an unfair society and that disadvantaged individuals have very little chance to escape this condition are more supportive of redistribution than those who believe the opposite—i.e., that poverty is caused by individuals' laziness and lack of will power and that there is a chance to escape

poverty. The effects of beliefs that lie in between these extremes are in the expected, positive direction, but are not generally statistically significant.

Overall, the evidence presented thus far is consistent with the idea that inequality frames shape support for redistribution. Individuals who hold beliefs that are closer to the redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution than those whose views are closer to the self-reliance frame.

Social Beliefs and Inequality Frames

Thus far, it has been assumed that social beliefs populate conceptual frames about the issue of inequality. This section explores if this is in fact the case. More specifically, it analyzes the extent to which individuals' beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes, and beliefs about poverty are interrelated and form relatively coherent inequality frames. Since the latter type of beliefs is only included in Wave 3 of the WVS, the analysis below is limited to that wave.

Table 5.4 presents correlations between these three types of beliefs. Beliefs about wealth accumulation ($WEALTH_i$) and beliefs about the causes of economic outcomes ($OUTCOMES_i$) are defined in the same way as in the previous analyses. In the case of beliefs about poverty, the two original items included in the WVS are considered. As stated previously, one item asks respondents why they think people are living in need and provides the following response options: "They are poor because of laziness and lack of will power" ($CAUSES_i$=0) and "They are poor because society treats them unfairly" ($CAUSES_i$=1), The other item asks respondents about the poor's chance to escape from

poverty. Response options are "They have a chance" ($ESCAPE_i$=0) and "There is very little chance" ($ESCAPE_i$=0).

Table 5.4
Correlations of Social Beliefs in Argentina and Peru,
Wave 3 of the WVS

Country	Variables	Wealth	Outcomes	Causes
Argentina	Wealth	1.0000		
	Outcomes	0.1706 ***	1.0000	
	Causes	0.0813 **	0.1214 ***	1.0000
	Escape	0.1045 ***	0.0813 ***	0.3815 ***
Peru	Wealth	1.0000		
	Outcomes	0.2222 ***	1.0000	
	Causes	0.0394	0.0342	1.0000
	Escape	0.0700 **	0.1374 ***	0.2997 ***

* prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01.

As Table 5.4 shows, all pair-wise correlations are positive in both countries. With the exception of those between $WEALTH_i$ and $CAUSES_i$ and between $OUTCOMES_i$ and $CAUSES_i$ in Peru, all these correlations are also statistically significant at the 5% level. In general, these results suggest that individuals hold social beliefs that are relatively aligned with each other, which is in turn consistent with the claim that these beliefs populate larger conceptual frames about the issue of inequality. The results also reveal that individuals' views about the causes of poverty ($CAUSES_i$) seem to be a more closely

related to the other beliefs in Argentina than in Peru. This could be taken to indicate that this specific belief does not populate individuals' inequality frames in the latter country. Overall, however, the positive and significant correlations indicate that beliefs are interrelated.

Factor analysis is used below to explore whether or not individuals' social beliefs are the reflection of underlying inequality frames. Table 5.5 summarizes the results of the analyses. Only those corresponding to the first factor extracted are reported.

Table 5.5
Factor Analyses of Social Beliefs in Argentina and Peru,
Wave 3 of the WVS

Country	Obs.	Eigenvalue	Variance Explained	Variables	Factor Loadings
Argentina	833	0.6433	1.6611	Wealth	0.2403
				Outcomes	0.2715
				Causes	0.5072
				Escape	0.5045
Peru	983	0.5029	1.5504	Wealth	0.2622
				Outcomes	0.3238
				Causes	0.3666
				Escape	0.4414

The table shows that the latent variable that accounts for most of the common variance—i.e., the first factor extracted—is positively correlated with each one of the

four beliefs in Argentina and Peru. Remarkably, the correlations are relatively similar across the two countries, the only substantial difference being in the one corresponding to beliefs about the causes of poverty ($CAUSES_i$). Uncovering such latent variables suggests that the social beliefs analyzed here are part of larger conceptual frames about the issue of inequality and that these frames lay in a continuum that goes from the self-reliance frame to the redistributive frame.

In sum, altogether, these analyses indicate that individuals' social beliefs are interrelated and populate larger inequality frames. Individuals who think that acquiring wealth entails stripping others from it are also be more likely to consider that economic success is a product of factors like luck and connections. These individuals are also more likely to believe that poverty is caused by an unfair society and that the poor have very little chance to escape poverty. In turn, those who think that wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone are also inclined to believe that economic success is a product of effort and hard work, that poverty is the product of individuals' laziness and lack of will power, and that poor have a chance to escape poverty.

Differences in Support for Redistribution across Argentina and Peru

The present chapter and the preceding one have shown that current income and social beliefs are the main considerations shaping support for redistribution in Argentina and Peru. As documented in Chapter 3, Argentines are more supportive of redistributive policies than Peruvians. This section examines how compositional and salience differences in income and beliefs help account for the divergence in support for redistribution across the two countries.

Compositional differences are differences in the distribution of a given individual-level covariate between the countries. These differences are assessed by comparing measures of central tendencies—e.g., means and modes. Salience differences are differences in the effects of a given individual-level covariate between the countries. These differences are assessed by comparing the magnitude of coefficients estimated in the models above. To help illustrate these differences, the discussion below relies on an examination of changes in the conditional mean of support for redistribution with respect to the covariates of interest—i.e., predicted levels of support based on the models estimated above. Current income is examined first, followed by beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation and beliefs about poverty.

Current Income

Figure 5.1 presents the conditional mean of support for redistribution with respect to this consideration in Argentina and Peru. The plot reflects the estimates from Model 1 in tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Similar results are obtained using estimates from other models. The conditional mean is calculated by setting the values of all other covariates to those corresponding to a hypothetical "average" respondent.[41] By plotting the results assuming the same values in the two countries, the conditional means in the figure below control for any differences between the countries due to other covariates—e.g.,

[41] This individual is constructed by fixing the values of the covariates at their average across the two countries. Values of dichotomous variables are set to represent the most frequent category. Averages and frequencies are calculated for the respondents included in the models whose estimates are used to plot the conditional means. In this case, the average respondent is either a homemaker or not working and not looking for work ($OTHER\ STATUS_i$=1), does not belong to a union ($UNION_i$=0), has middle-of-the-road beliefs about the nature of wealth ($WEALTH_i$=4.26), is a man ($FEMALE_i$=0), is approaching middle adulthood (AGE_i=38.79), and has completed high school ($HIGH\ SCHOOL_i$=1).

differences in aggregate levels of education, aggregate social beliefs, etc. This allows an examination of income's influence on support for redistribution independent of these other factors.

Figure 5.1
Conditional Mean of Support for Redistribution
with respect to Income



The figure provides a number of insights about the divergence in support for redistribution across the two countries. First, the different intercepts indicate that an individual with the characteristics of the average respondent would be more supportive of redistribution in Argentina than in Peru, regardless of his income level. Second, the plot shows that the gap in support increases as income increases. In other words, the higher the income of the hypothetical individual, the larger the divergence in support across the two countries. This salience difference is characterized by greater magnitude in the effect—i.e., the slope in the figure above—of income in Peru than in Argentina.

While interesting, this salience difference does not help explain the divergence in support for redistribution for two reasons. First, as can be seen in Figure 5.1, the difference in the slopes is not very big (-0.13 in Argentina; -0.19 in Peru). Second, this salience difference could only help explain divergence in support for redistribution if Peruvians were, on average, richer than Argentines. But this is not the case as the following discussion about the compositional differences shows.

The average income value in Argentina is 4.59 and 3.29 in Peru. The corresponding conditional means of support for redistribution for these average income levels are 4.82 and 3.81, respectively (a difference of 1.01). The divergence in support between the two countries would be even greater if they had the same average income levels. Indeed, if the average income observed in Argentina (4.59) were also observed in Peru, divergence would increase from 1.01 (4.82 minus 3.81) to 1.25 (4.82 minus 3.57). Similarly, if the average income observed in Peru (3.29) were also observed in Argentina, divergence would increase to 1.18 (4.99 minus 3.81). In other words, closing the gap in the average income between the two countries would actually increase the divergence in support for redistribution. Altogether, this discussion indicates that neither salience nor compositional differences regarding current income can account for the observed divergence in levels of support across Argentina and Peru.

Beliefs about the Nature of Wealth Accumulation

Figure 5.2 depicts the conditional means of support for redistribution with respect to beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation. Again, the plot reflects the estimates from Model 1 in tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, and the conditional mean is calculated

after setting the values of all other covariates to those of a hypothetical average respondent.[42] As in the case of income, the different intercepts indicate that this average respondent would be much more supportive of redistribution in Argentina than in Peru, even after accounting for beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation.

Figure 5.2
Conditional Mean of Support for Redistribution
with respect to Beliefs about Wealth Accumulation



In contrast to the case of income, differences in beliefs about wealth accumulation can help explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. As will be shown below in detail, individuals in Argentina tend to hold beliefs that are closer to the redistributive frame, while those in Peru tend to hold beliefs that are closer to the self-reliance frame. This compositional difference plays a key role in explaining differences in support. Additionally, as the slopes in Figure 5.3 indicate, beliefs are much

[42] In this case, the average respondent has an intermediate level of income ($INCOME_i$=3.94). All other imputed values remain the same as in the case of the previous figure, except for those corresponding to beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation ($WEALTH_i$), of course (see fn. 41).

more salient in Peru than in Argentina. This salience difference, too, is important for understanding differences across the two countries.

The average respondent of each country holds beliefs that lie toward the middle of the scale, 4.49 in Argentina and 4.03 in Peru. The conditional means of support for redistribution corresponding to these beliefs are 4.91 and 3.65, respectively. This amounts to a divergence of 1.26 in support. This divergence would decrease if Peruvians held beliefs more aligned with Argentines' beliefs. If the average respondent in Peru held the beliefs of the average Argentine respondent, divergence would decrease to 1.18 (4.91 minus 3.73). At 6.2%, this decrease is not very impressive, but it likely underestimates the potential explanatory power of differences in beliefs about wealth accumulation. As discussed below, this small decrease is probably related to the political context surrounding the Wave 3 surveys in both countries. Indeed, a glance at conditional means using Wave 5 data suggests a larger decrease.

As mentioned earlier, the implementation of market reforms was an important economic, political, and social development in both countries during the mid-1990s. Given the dominant neoliberal rhetoric of the time, it is not surprising that beliefs about wealth accumulation differ the least in Wave 3 (4.49 vs. 4.03, differing by 0.46). In the following decade, as the countries experienced disparate developments, beliefs became less similar. Indeed, in Wave 5 (mid-2000s), the average levels of beliefs are 4.51 in Argentina and 3.63 in Peru, amounting to a difference of 0.88. The divergence in mean conditional support corresponding to these Wave 5 beliefs amounts to 1.32 (4.91 minus 3.59). If the average respondent in Peru held the beliefs of the average Argentine

respondent in Wave 5, the divergence would decrease to 1.18 (4.91 minus 3.73), a reduction of 10.6%.[43]

Beliefs about Poverty

Finally, Figure 5.3 depicts the conditional mean of support with respect to beliefs about poverty. The plot reflects the estimates from Model 3 in tables 5.1 and 5.2, respectively, and as in the previous figures, the mean is calculated after setting the values of all other covariates to those of the average hypothetical respondent.[44] Beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame—i.e., believing that laziness and lack of will power are to blame for poverty and that the poor have a chance to get ahead—constitute the base category. Views in line with the redistributive frame—i.e., thinking that those in need are poor because society treats them unfairly and that there is very little chance to escape poverty—are at the other extreme ($POVERTY3_i$=1). The other combinations of beliefs ($POVERTY1_i$=1 and $POVERTY2_i$=1) are in between these two extremes.

[43] Note that the effects of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation estimated for waves three and five (models one and four in Tables 5.1 and 5.2) are very similar. Thus, the divergences in conditional means would be comparable if the effects corresponding to the latter wave were used for the calculations.

[44] In this case, the average respondent has an intermediate level of income ($INCOME_i$=3.91), is either a homemaker or not working, is a woman ($FEMALE_i$=1), is approaching middle adulthood (AGE_i=38.88), and has completed high school ($HIGH\ SCHOOL_i$=1).

Figure 5.3
Conditional Mean of Support for Redistribution
with respect to Beliefs about Poverty



Like in the case of beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, compositional and salience differences in beliefs about poverty help explain part of the divergence in support for redistribution across Argentina and Peru. Indeed, there are important compositional differences in beliefs about poverty across the two countries. In Argentina, 62.00% of respondents hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame ($POVERTY3_i$=1); 11.93% believe that poverty is due to individuals' laziness and lack of will power, but that the poor have little chance to escape poverty ($POVERTY2_i$=1); 11.23% believe that poverty is due to societal shortcomings, but that the poor have a chance of getting ahead ($POVERTY1_i$=1); and, 14.84% hold beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame (base category). To facilitate the following discussion, imagine that the average Argentine holds each of these beliefs in proportion to their distribution among all respondents. In other words, 62.00% of this person's beliefs are consistent with the redistributive frame,

14.84% are consistent with the self-reliance frame, and so forth. The predicted level of support for redistribution for this hypothetical person—who is average in all other respects[45]— is 4.89.

In Peru 36.18% of respondents hold beliefs in line with the redistributive frame ($POVERTY3_i$=1); 11.29% believe that poverty is due to individuals' laziness and lack of will power, but that the poor have a little chance to escape poverty ($POVERTY2_i$=1); 24.66% believe that poverty is due to societal shortcomings, but that the poor have a chance of getting ahead ($POVERTY1_i$=1); and, 27.88% hold beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame (base category). Using the same strategy described above, the average Peruvian's predicted level of support for redistribution would be 3.79.

If this average Peruvian held beliefs about poverty consistent with the proportions of the average Argentine described above, her predicted level of support would increase to 3.94. Thus, if these compositional differences did not exist, divergence in support for redistribution across Argentina and Peru would decrease from 1.10 points (4.89 minus 3.79) to 0.95 points (4.89 minus 3.79). In other words, compositional and salience differences in beliefs about poverty close the gap in support for redistribution by 13.64%.

To sum up, the discussion thus far suggests that the belief-based account can help explain why support for redistribution is higher in Argentina than in Peru. If there were no compositional or salience differences in beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation and views about poverty, the levels of support for redistribution across the

[45] See the previous footnote for details about this average individual.

two countries would diverge to a lesser extent. When it comes to compositional and salience differences in income, this is not the case.

This section also indicates that a significant portion of cross-country variation remains unexplained after controlling for individual-level differences. Indeed, as shown in the analyses of mean conditional support above, there were important differences in support across the two countries regardless of the levels of the three covariates examined and after controlling for differences in additional covariates. The concluding chapter of the dissertation speculates about how inequality frames could explain these population-wide differences and how this could be an interesting avenue for future research.

Additional Descriptive Analysis of Beliefs

Given that part of the divergence in support for redistribution across the two countries stems from compositional differences in these beliefs, it is worth examining these differences in more detail. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed characterization of social beliefs in Argentina and Peru. The analysis describes the distribution of views about the nature of wealth accumulation and beliefs about poverty as documented by the WVS. It also examines other beliefs hypothesized to populate inequality frames as documented by data from additional surveys.

Figure 5.4 plots the relative frequencies of responses to the item measuring beliefs about wealth accumulation. The first pattern that stands out is the relative stability of these beliefs across the two survey waves in each country. This is similar to what was reported in the case of redistributive attitudes in Chapter 3. The plot also shows clustering

patterns that are quite different across the two countries. In Argentina, responses cluster at both ends of the scale, at "3" and at "6." In Peru, they cluster at "1," "3," and "6."

Figure 5.4
Beliefs about the Nature of Wealth Accumulation in Argentina and Peru,
Wave 3 and Wave 5 of the WVS



Moving on to measures of central tendency, mean responses are 4.40 in Wave 3 and 4.60 in Wave 5 in Argentina, and 4.09 and 3.64 in Wave 3 and Wave 5, respectively, in Peru. The median response in the former country is "4" in both waves; in the latter, "3" in both waves. Thus, beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation are more proximate to the redistributive frame in Argentina than in Peru.

Earlier, the fact that the difference in mean beliefs is smaller in Wave 3 was attributed to a political environment in which market reforms and neoliberal discourse were quite dominant. As pointed out in the discussion of Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3, differences in support for redistribution as measured by both the EQUALITY and RESPONSIBILITY items are also smaller during this wave. These parallels between the

distributions of beliefs and support for redistribution provide yet another indication of the link between the two constructs.

Table 5.6 presents the cross-tabulation of the two items measuring beliefs about poverty. It shows that respondents' views about this issue are closer to the redistributive frame in Argentina than in Peru. Indeed, 62.20% of respondents in the former country believe that a society that treats individuals unfairly is the main cause of poverty and that there is very little chance to escape poverty. In Peru, only 37.49% of respondents hold these views. The proportion of respondents that holds the opposite beliefs in Peru (26.81%) is almost double the proportion in Argentina (13.80%). It is also worth noting that views about the causes of poverty and about the poor's chances to escape poverty seem to be more closely associated in Argentina than in Peru. In Argentina, combinations of beliefs that are off the diagonal amount to 24.01% (12.09% plus 11.92%), while in Peru they amount to 35.70% (24.34% plus 11.36%).

Table 5.6
Beliefs About Poverty in Argentina and Peru,
Wave 3 of the WVS

Causes of poverty	Chance to escape poverty			
	There is chance		There is very little chance	
	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru
Individuals' laziness and lack of will power	13.80%	26.81%	11.92%	11.36%
Society treats individuals unfairly	12.09%	24.34%	62.20%	37.49%

Finally, Table 5.7 summarizes responses to a set of items gauging social beliefs that are taken from various editions of the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the Latinobarómetro surveys. Items one and two measure beliefs about the factors determining success. A slight majority of Argentines completely or mostly agrees with the statement that forces outside individuals' control mostly explain achievement (51.8% in 2002 and 52.5% in 2007). In contrast, there is not a majority opinion in Peru about this issue. A slight plurality of respondents agrees that forces outside individuals' control are essential in 2002 (45.0% vs. 42.4%), while a slight plurality disagrees with this assertion in 2007 (42.5% vs. 43.4%).

Item 3 also captures beliefs about the causes of success but provides respondents with two options, "society's failures" and "individual failures." Surprisingly, Argentines blame individuals slightly more often than society (44.5% vs. 41.7%). Interestingly, however, a large proportion (13.9%) offer "don't know" responses or do not answer this question at all, indicating some ambivalence on this issue—and more than double the amount of ambivalence in Peru (6.2%). In Peru, a comfortable majority of respondents blames individual failures (64.6%).

Item 4 captures beliefs about the causes of poverty. Responses are pretty much in line with those from the WVS. A majority of respondents blames circumstances over lack of effort in both countries, but the majority is overwhelming only in Argentina. Indeed, more than three-quarters of respondents blame circumstances in Argentina (76.8%) while only a slight majority do so in Peru (54.0%)

Table 5.7
Social Beliefs in Argentina and Peru in the 2000s,
from Additional Surveys

No.	Year	Sample	Item	Options	Argentina (%)	Peru (%)
1	2002	National	Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control?	Completely agree	21.0	14.1
				Mostly agree	30.8	30.9
				Mosty disagree	20.3	26.5
				Completely disagree	16.5	15.9
				DK/NA	11.4	12.6
2	2007	National	Success in life is pretty much determined by forces outside our control?	Completely agree	16.3	10.2
				Mostly agree	36.2	32.3
				Mosty disagree	22.8	32.1
				Completely disagree	15.5	11.3
				DK/NA	9.2	14.1
3	2002	National	Why people do not succeed? Which of the following comes closer to you point of view?	Society's failures	41.7	29.3
				Individual failures	44.5	64.6
				DK/NA	13.9	6.2
4	2000	Other[a]	Which of the following comes closer to your point of view about the causes of poverty in (country)?	Lack of effort	19.6	43.2
				Due to circumstances	76.8	54.0
				DK/NA	3.6	2.8
5	2006	National	Do you believe that in (country) it is possible that a person that is born poor and works hard becomes rich?	It is possible	38.3	73.7
				It is not possible	57.3	23.2
				DK/NA	4.4	3.2

Source: Global Attitudes Project (2002; 2007); Latinobarómetro (2000; 2006).
[a] Surveys are representative of 75% and 52% of the population in Argentina and Peru, respectively.

Item 5 measures beliefs about the extent to which society provides equal opportunities and allows for upward mobility. The difference in responses is quite remarkable. By a ratio of more than two to one, Argentines are more likely to believe that it is not possible for a person to move from "rags to riches" by working hard. The situation is quite different in Peru; by a ratio of more than three to one, individuals in this country are more likely to believe that it is possible for a person to move from "rags to riches." This is perhaps the most important piece of evidence included in the table as it

clearly shows that Argentines' views about equality of opportunity and social mobility are closer to the redistributive frame than those of Peruvians.

Overall, this discussion shows that the redistributive frame is relatively dominant in Argentina, while the self-reliance frame is more prominent in Peru. This has been the case at least since the 1990s. Available evidence also suggests that divergence in social beliefs across the two countries has become more pronounced starting in the 2000s, after the neoliberal era came to an end in Argentina.

Conclusion

Inequality frames play an important role in shaping support for redistribution. Results from both Argentina and Peru show that individuals who believe that poverty is the product of societal shortcomings and that the needy have a chance to escape poverty are more supportive of redistribution than those who believe otherwise. In addition, evidence from Peru indicates that individuals who think that wealth is rather finite are more supportive of redistribution than those who believe that wealth can grow so that there is enough for everyone.

Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, this chapter has shown that inequality frames can partly account for why support is higher in Argentina than in Peru. Individuals in the former country tend to hold beliefs that are closer to the redistributive frame, while those in the latter are more inclined to hold views consistent with the self-reliance frame. If beliefs were less divergent, aggregate levels of support for redistribution in these countries would be more similar. Thus, unlike theories focused on

interests and group identity, the belief-based explanation is very useful to understand variation in redistributive attitudes both within and across Argentina and Peru.

Chapter 6
The Political Origins of Inequality Frames in Argentina and Peru

The previous chapter established that inequality frames account for an important part of the difference in redistributive attitudes observed across Argentina and Peru. In Argentina, individuals are more likely to hold social beliefs in line with the redistributive frame and thus tend to be more supportive of redistributive policies. In Peru, less favorable attitudes towards these policies are grounded in beliefs that are closer to the self-reliance frame. Given the importance of inequality frames in shaping attitudes toward redistribution, this chapter digs deeper into the "funnel of causality" (Campbell et al. 1960, 24-25) to explore the origins of these frames.

What explains the relative dominance of the redistributive frame in Argentina and the relative dominance of the self-reliance frame in Peru? As argued in Chapter 2, the historical evolution of mass beliefs about inequality can be understood using a critical juncture framework. Specifically, mass inequality frames are expected to be relatively stable during times of normal politics, but malleable during important periods, or critical junctures, produced by events like mass political incorporation and economic crises. During such times, individuals are particularly receptive to elite cues and messages that are provided not only through rhetoric but also through public policies. This chapter traces the origins and evolution of mass inequality frames by analyzing redistributive politics in Argentina and Peru since the early twentieth century.

In Argentina, the dominance of the redistributive frame is attributed to President Juan Perón's use of anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric and ability to implement extensive, progressive social policies during his first government (1946-1955). This combination had a lasting impact on mass beliefs because it coincided with the political incorporation of the popular and working classes. As this chapter will show, the new critical juncture spurred by the political and economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s undermined the dominance of the redistributive frame. This weakness was a contributing factor to the passage of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s by a Peronist president. However, the prominence of redistributive views was ultimately restored by the economic crisis of the early-2000s and the return to power of the progressive wing of Peronism.

In Peru, an analysis of the role that the populist Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA) played during the critical juncture of the 1930s and 1940s shows that populist rhetoric alone cannot produce lasting changes in mass beliefs, while a discussion of the progressive Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (GRFA) (1968-1980) suggests that the combination of redistributive rhetoric and policies can succeed only under certain circumstances that make the public receptive to new frames. Finally, the chapter argues that the ultimate "triumph" of the self-reliance frame after the 1980s critical juncture should be attributed to the public's reaction to exclusionary social policies.

Before advancing this politico-historical explanation, this chapter first discusses a set of potential competing explanations of the origins of inequality frames. It shows that arguments linking the development of frames to social mobility experiences, land

abundance, and religious views fail to account for the patterns of social beliefs—and support for redistribution—observed in Argentina and Peru. It also argues that immigration from Europe to Argentina should be considered as an antecedent condition to the rise of Perón to power rather than as an immediate cause of redistributive frame dominance in that country.

The ensuing analysis employs process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) to identify critical junctures and the immediate causes of inequality frame dominance as well as to rule out alternative explanations. The analysis draws mostly on secondary sources that document Argentine and Peruvian political development. Historical public opinion data documenting social beliefs and attitudes toward redistribution—gathered from primary or secondary sources—are included whenever possible. The earliest period for which data are available for Argentina is the 1960s and for Peru, the 1970s. Most of the data available, however, is concentrated in the 1990s for both countries.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in four sections. The first one considers alternative explanations of the origins of inequality frames. The second and third sections synthesize the political trajectories of Argentina and Peru since the early 1900s using the theoretical insights developed in Chapter 2. The final section summarizes the main findings and discusses their broader implications.

Alternative Explanations

Scholars analyzing redistributive attitudes in advanced industrial democracies have argued that social beliefs diverged across Europe and the U.S. because of differences in social mobility, arable land endowments, and religious creeds. Noting that

the U.S. and Europe have similar current mobility rates, Piketty (1995) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005) speculate that differences in past mobility experiences could help explain differences in present beliefs. In Europe, class rigidity severely restrained opportunities for mobility before the twentieth century, while at that same time the U.S. was characterized as a "land of opportunity," where those who tried hard enough could make it. Benabou and Tirole (2006) argue that land abundance might have shaped initial views about mobility and opportunity in the U.S. and that the early Europeans settlers in the U.S. might have had more "effort-promoting" beliefs because of their Protestant religious background.

Alesina and Glaeser (2004) have questioned these accounts as explanations of differences in beliefs between Europe and the U.S. First, with regard to past mobility experiences, the authors concede that at their very beginning, the British colonies in the present day U.S. could have been considered classless societies. They argue, however, that during most of the colonial era and the nineteenth century, social structure in the present day U.S. resembled that of aristocratic Europe to a significant extent (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 191-196). Second, they contend that the idea of the U.S. being a land of opportunity was a product of propaganda aimed at promoting immigration to a country eager for labor. This propaganda planted a seed that was reinforced by rhetoric from the political right since the time of the revolution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 198-199). Instead, they contend that the size of the country, rather than land availability *per se*, is important to explain diverging beliefs. They argue that the U.S.'s size hindered the labor movement's ability to organize and strike and prevented the emergence of a strong

socialist party (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 219-221). Finally, with regard to Protestant religious beliefs, the authors show that there is no relationship between Protestantism and the belief that income is the result of luck. Thus, they conclude that religious belief alone cannot account for diverging social beliefs across the Atlantic (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 196-197).

Historical mobility and land availability, on the one hand, and religion, on the other, are also unsatisfactory explanations—and perhaps more clearly so—when it comes to differences between Argentina and Peru. First, if either of the two countries were to be regarded as a "land of opportunity" at some point in time it would be Argentina. Like the U.S., Argentina was endowed with vast, scarcely populated plains rich in arable land and pasture—the Pampas (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000). Due to a number of reasons, including the Spanish Crown's restrictions on foreign trade and European immigration, and focus on precious metal extraction, this territory remained mostly unsettled during the colonial era. After independence, this changed dramatically as a series of military campaigns that ended in the 1880s successively expanded the country's "frontier" and decimated the indigenous population. By the end of this so-called Conquest of the Desert, the Argentine state had expanded its control of the Pampas from the area immediately to the west and south of Buenos Aires towards the Andes and Patagonia (Perry 1980).

What followed was a period of unprecedented economic progress and massive immigration from Europe, especially from Italy and Spain. Between the 1880s and 1920s, the Argentine economy grew significantly as beef, wool, and grain exports soared. By the 1910s, the country became one of the wealthiest in the world, along with those of

Western Europe, the U.S., and other "settler economies" like Australia and Canada (Taylor 1992). At the same time, the Argentine government, acting at the behest of the local landed elite, promoted massive European immigration to provide much needed labor for the export complex. The successful efforts included contracting recruiting agents, paying ocean passages, and showcasing the country as one in which newcomers could easily acquire cheap land (Solberg 1982, 135). The combination of land abundance, scarce labor, and economic prosperity imprinted the idea of a land of opportunity and richness in the minds of immigrants and their descendents, who would eventually become the majority of the population (Llach and Gerchunoff 2004).

In contrast to Argentina, the territory that is now present-day Peru was densely populated at the arrival of the Spaniards. Arable land was relatively scarce, but the area was rich in mineral resources. As the center of Spanish power in South America, Peru had a closed, pyramidal social structure. Working in the colonial administration or enjoying the rents produced by land or mines, Spaniards and creoles (Americans of Spanish-descent) lived quite comfortably. At the other end, and while *de jure* free, a large share of the indigenous population was *de facto* tied to the elites through semi-feudal relationships in large estates or subject to forced labor in mines (Cotler 1978, 21-65). This social structure remained for the most part unchanged after independence—except for the departure of the colonial administrators—and well into the twentieth century. In this context, social status and prestige remained tied to land and natural resource ownership rather than to industriousness (Burga y Flores Galindo 1979, 95-99).

Unlike Argentina, Peru did not experience sustained prosperity as it consolidated as an independent country. Its economic history at the time is one of boom and bust cycles spurred by the discovery of natural resources that were in high demand by the international market (Yepes 1972; Thorp and Bertram 1985). Guano, nitrate, and rubber were exploited intensively until supplies were exhausted, war cut off access to supplies, and foreign competitors prevailed, respectively. At the same time, relatively modern enclave economies controlled by the domestic elite or foreign capital developed around mining in the central highlands, and sugar and cotton growing in the northern and central coastal valleys. However, these enclaves were not enough to sustain major economic growth or large-scale modernization. The combination of labor surplus—and low wages—, land scarcity, and limited economic growth are likely to blame for the successive failures of government initiatives to promote European immigration from the mid-nineteenth century until the 1920s.[46]

In sum, when it comes to historical mobility experiences and land availability, Argentina is more similar to the U.S. than Peru is. However, when it comes to social beliefs, Peru is more similar to the U.S. than Argentina is. It is also important to point out that available evidence suggests that current mobility levels in Argentina and Peru are comparable, and thus cannot account for diverging beliefs. When it comes to educational

[46] During this time, Peru only received substantial immigration inflows from another labor surplus country, China. These immigrants were brought to work as agricultural laborers in the coastal valleys.

mobility, for example, the two are among Latin America's most mobile countries, along with Chile and Uruguay (Andersen 2001).[47]

Second, with regard to religious beliefs, Argentina and Peru both have deep-rooted Catholic traditions that can be traced back to colonial times. In Argentina, the influence of Catholicism in society survived the liberal reforms of the last decades of the nineteenth century and remained an important social and political force throughout the modernization period that preceded Perón's rise to power (Plotkin 1994, 30-33). Mass immigration did not threaten its predominance because the vast majority of newcomers were Catholic (Halperín Donghi 1975, 769-770). In Peru, liberals also attempted to pass secularizing reforms, but the Catholic Church, backed by conservative elites, was able to forestall them until the first decades of the twentieth century (Klaiber 1996).

Catholic traditions and the Catholic Church have remained strong after the major political and social changes that the two countries underwent throughout the twentieth century. Today about 80% of their respective populations declares to be Catholic,[48] and the Church is one of the most trusted institutions in both countries, although it is more

[47] Comparable studies of social mobility in Argentina and Peru are scarce because of data availability. Andersen (2001, 7) argues that given that education is highly correlated with income one could reasonably expect income mobility trends to resemble those of educational mobility and also avoid the pitfalls associated with measuring income. Available comparative studies of income mobility include Peru, but, unfortunately, not Argentina. See Azevedo and Bouillon (2009) for a review of studies analyzing social mobility in Latin America.

[48] Argentina's censuses have not asked questions about religion since the 1960s. According to the First Survey about Religious Beliefs and Attitudes in Argentina (CEIL/CONICET 2008), 76.5% of those older than 18 and that reside in urban areas are Catholic. In Peru, according to the 2007 census, 81.3% of those older than 12 are Catholic (INEI 2008, 138).

trusted in Peru.[49] Beyond these similarities, there is one main difference in present day religious attitudes across the two countries: opinions about the Catholic Church are more polarized in Argentina than in Peru. However, this difference should not be seen as a potential cause of divergence in social beliefs. As will be argued in the next section, political events during the Peronist government of 1946-1955 are the likely cause of both religious polarization and redistributive frame dominance. In conclusion, the hypothesis that links diverging social beliefs to religious differences is unsatisfactory in the case of Argentina and Peru.

A final alternative explanation to consider in the case of the two countries under study is related to the beliefs of the immigrants that arrived in Argentina at the turn of the twentieth century. Given that the vast majority of that country's population is comprised of these immigrants' descendents, it is possible that the current dominance of the redistributive frame is explained by the newcomers' beliefs. On the one hand, Europeans might have brought with them views amenable to redistribution. On the other hand, immigrants might have developed them after arriving in Argentina and prior to the ascent of Perón. Available evidence on the character of immigrants and on their organizational and political experiences as they integrated into society suggests that these hypotheses are implausible.

The "diffusion hypothesis" is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, Italy and Spain, the sources of most of the population influx, were among the most traditional

[49] According to LAPOP, the average trust on the Catholic Church in Argentina in 2010 was 43.3 points (in a 100-point scale) and it was the second most trusted institution after the media (53.6) (LAPOP 2010a, 131). In Peru, with 62.3 points, the Church was the most trusted institution in 2010 (LAPOP 2010b, 154).

countries in Europe at the time. Having barely industrialized, and thus with relatively small working classes, socialist ideas were far from being widespread in these countries. Second, most of the newcomers were illiterate, of rural origin, and, as previously mentioned, Catholic (Halperín Donghi 1975, 769-770). Moreover, they generally aspired to live as small capitalists in the cities or small landowners in the country, and to get rich rather quickly (Miguens 1983, 158; Solberg 1982, 150). These hopes and socioeconomic characteristics suggest that immigrants were in fact not fond of redistributive ideas. Finally, one could argue that, if anything, immigrants were probably bearers of self-reliance beliefs as they were "by definition taking their destiny in their own hands" (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, 220). While immigration certainly brought some anarcho-syndicalists and socialists to Argentina that would later become labor organizers, it would be a stretch to argue that the immigrant mass constituted some sort of socialist vanguard in light of the preceding arguments.

Could immigrants have developed pro-redistributive views upon arrival? Consider first the case of those who settled in rural areas. Once in Argentina, those lured by promises of cheap land quickly realized that the local elite already owned most of the Pampas and had to become renters or sharecroppers (Germani 1978, 136-137; Solberg 1978, 136-139). Immigrants were generally content with these arrangements, but the situation changed as crop prices started to fluctuate in the 1910s. Price drops sparked periods of social unrest, with rent strikes being the preferred mode of contention. Protest was usually short-lived, however; they waned as crop prices improved, and were aimed at

lowering rents and obtaining favorable contract conditions like longer terms and credits for farm improvements, rather than at expropriation (Solberg 1971).[50]

Rural worker unions also developed during this period. Although their contention repertoire included violent strikes, these unions also sought moderate concessions, such as twelve-hour shifts, wage increases, and more favorable working conditions (Solberg 1971, 41-43). It is also worth noting that most renters and *braceros* were not naturalized and thus could not participate in politics. This helps explain not only their limited success at having their demands met by the political system but also their strategy to focus on narrow claims in the first place—rather than on more ambitious efforts aimed at social change. Overall, while immigrants in rural areas faced difficulties that fuelled discontent and mobilization, it would be hard to make the case that their very specific, interest-driven demands were manifestations of wider concerns about inequality or poverty.

The same conclusion applies to the larger share of immigrants who settled in urban areas. During the first decades of the twentieth century, population influx was the main factor driving the expansion of the urban working class. This growth came along with the social problems inherent to rapid urbanization and nascent industrialization. Workers faced poor working and living conditions, and had no access to social services. In this context, workers channeled their discontent into unionization and protest. While anarcho-syndicalism was strong within the labor movement in the 1910s, socialism and later communism challenged this leadership. In the process, the three tendencies were

[50] Other issues of concern for renters were credit access, pest control, and input price reduction. Their most radical proposals entailed introducing a land tax to force the division and sell of large estates and passing homestead laws like the ones passed in the U.S. so that the settlers of frontier territories could become owners (Solberg 1971, 33-39).

weakened within the movement, although socialists finally managed to take control of the movement by the 1930s (Collier and Collier 2002, 155). Nevertheless, unions remained almost strictly concerned with labor issues until the Perón years (Germani 1978, 143; Halperín Donghi 1975, 771-773; Plotkin 2007, 31-32).[51] Like in the case of their rural counterparts, the prevalence of non-naturalized immigrants in the urban worker unions is probably a contributing factor to this state of affairs.

Immigrants also joined the ranks of the urban middle class. Some arrived with skills and abilities that allowed them to become professionals and clerical workers as well as small businessmen. Numerous others worked their way up from the working class (Solberg 1969, 216-218). Indeed, upward social mobility into the middle classes served as an escape valve that defused social unrest and deterred the development of a working-class subculture (Germani 1978, 144-145). Aspiring to become or to consolidate their position as small capitalists, the main concern of these immigrants was avoiding falling (back) into the working class (Halperín Dongui 1975, 771). This is hardly the case of a middle class that is empathetic with the disadvantaged and amenable to redistributive rhetoric.

In sum, it seems highly unlikely that immigrants brought with them socialist, redistributive beliefs to Argentina or that they spontaneously developed them in reaction to their experiences upon arrival. Instead, social unrest among immigrants, and the working and popular classes, more generally, should be viewed as antecedent conditions

[51] According to Ranis (1992, 18) workers "were more concerned with immediate personal economic gain and tended to express their social consciousness in an awareness of being "poor" rather than membership in a class." He mentions that almost 90% of the 113 strikes that took place in 1942 aimed at obtaining salary improvements and readjustments.

to Perón's rise to power in 1946. It is this controversial leader's combination of anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric and pro-labor and pro-poor social policies that imprinted the redistributive frame in the minds of the majority of Argentina's public.

Argentina: From Peronism to Neoliberalism and Back Again

This dissertation argues that beliefs in line with the redistributive frame become dominant wherever political actors using populist rhetoric to advance comprehensive welfare policies attain power and implement their platforms at critical political junctures. In Argentina, the period during which the popular and working classes were incorporated into politics constitutes the first juncture. Roughly lasting from the mid-1940s until 1955, this time was brought about by population growth and urbanization, as well as by the growth of the export complex and nascent industrialization. The combination of anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric and redistributive policies that characterized the Perón government (1946-1955) created the mass beliefs that would continue to shape the politics of redistribution in that country until the present day.

Antecedents to the First Critical Juncture

Before the irruption of the popular and working classes into politics, the Radical Civic Union (UCR) had posed the first challenge to a closed and elitist political system (Germani 1978, 142-143; Kirkpatrick 1971, 22-25). Representing the growing urban middle sectors, and featuring some discontented members of the elite among its most prominent members, the UCR was the first mass party in Argentine politics. Its demands for political inclusion and free and fair elections led to the passage of a universal suffrage

law in 1912, which made the vote secret and obligatory for all males. The UCR won the presidency in the ensuing 1916 elections, the first clean and truly competitive elections in the country's history. The party would go on to govern for the next fourteen years, winning the 1922 and 1928 presidential elections, until being ousted by a military coup in 1930.

While the UCR challenged elite dominance of the political system, this opening was short of producing a fully democratic system. Given the stringent naturalization laws of the time, the bulk of immigrant popular and working classes remained disenfranchised. In terms of policy, the UCR did not represent a major departure from the liberal, minimal state paradigm that had guided policy-making since the previous century (Plotkin 1994, 19). With the state's failure to address the "social question"—that is, how to deal with the socio-economic consequences of development among the working and popular sectors (Collier and Collier 2002, 59)—during this period, the tensions produced by modernization in rural areas and especially in the growing cities continued to mount. This failure is at least in part the product of the disenfranchisement of the popular and working classes, as well as of the conservative elite's ability to retain control of the legislature during these years. Overall, however, the state expanded during these years, becoming a source of employment for the middle class (Collier and Collier 2002, 141) and providing social protection for the most powerful labor sectors, such as railroad, public utility, and bank workers (Mesa-Lago 1978, 168).

The hit of the Great Depression and the increased social turmoil of the time provided the backdrop for the 1930 military coup. The coup marked the beginning of a

new political era, the Infamous Decade, that lasted until another military coup in 1943. Governments during these years promoted import substitution industrialization (ISI) as a response to the major international trade disruptions of the time, while remaining committed to preserving the interests of the traditional landed elites. Nascent industrialization, along with an internal migration process spurred by the economic downturn and the decline of the agricultural exports, contributed to rapid urbanization and boosted the growth of the working and popular classes. But the political incorporation of these classes was delayed during this period because of electoral fraud and the repression of opposition parties and labor. The period was also characterized by allegations of corruption, betrayal of national interests, and a continued disregard for the social question (Collier and Collier 2002, 154-155).

During this era, the liberal, minimal state paradigm was severely undermined. The shift from export-led development into ISI was accompanied by a growth of nationalism among the most important political actors of the time. At the same time, several actors fearing revolutionary ideas started to view the state as the only institution capable of putting an end to the unrelenting social turmoil (Waisman 1987). While there was no consensus about the means to accomplish this, one view that started to develop was that the state should arbitrate labor disputes and enact policies to improve the well-being of the popular sectors (Plotkin 1994, 27-30). Among some, corporatist and fascist models were particularly appealing as a way to channel social mobilization (Collier and Collier 2002, 331-332). These ideas were present to various degrees in the group of officers that conducted the 1943 coup, which included then Colonel Juan Domingo Perón.

By the time Perón made his entrance into politics, the popular and working classes were mobilized, but mostly estranged from partisan politics. The major parties and factions of the time had failed to incorporate these classes into their political projects, and stringent naturalization laws and electoral fraud had disenfranchised large sectors of the population. As mentioned earlier, the labor movement had remained mostly concerned with union issues and its leadership was divided into various factions. In addition, the employed population that had recently migrated to Buenos Aires and other large cities lacked a union tradition (Germani 1978, 187-188). In this context, vast sectors of the working and popular classes were likely devoid of political predispositions. The Perón years would have a lasting effect on this public's political attitudes and beliefs.

Redistributive Rhetoric and Policies during the Peronist Era

During his years in government, first as Director of the Department of Labor (1943) and Secretary of Labor and Social Protection (1943-1945), and then as president (1946-1955), Perón sought to control organized labor and popular mobilization through a corporatist model. His platform had three main goals: economic independence, political sovereignty, and social justice. Later on he would develop *justicialismo*, a "third way" between capitalism and communism whose main aim was to advance the "happiness of the people" through progressive government policies and channel popular discontent with capitalism away from revolutionary tendencies (Ranis 1992, 23; Plotkin 1994, 47).

Populist rhetoric was one of Perón's most powerful tools in building popular support for his political project. He created a collective identity for the popular and working classes, whom he referred to as "the people" (*el pueblo*); he also used

descamisados ("those without shirts) and "the humble" to refer to the urban poor. This identity was based not only on self-affirmation but also, and perhaps more importantly, in opposition to an antagonistic group, "the oligarchy" (Germani 1968, 334-335). Perón blamed the "unjustified egoism" and the "stingy interests" of this "*vendepatria*" ("country-selling") oligarchy for the social problems of the time and demanded that this group share its profits with the workers (Kirkpatrick 1971, 35-37; Plotkin 1994, 49; Plotkin 2007, 44). In this way, he shifted responsibility for poverty away from the poor and questioned the status of the wealthy, while building solidarity across the popular and working classes.

Perón relied on mass rallies to communicate with his followers. These rallies drew large crowds and reached even more people through the media. In fact, the first public television broadcast in the history of Argentina was the 1951 celebration of the Day of Peronist Loyalty during which Perón and his wife Eva gave speeches at a crowded Plaza de Mayo (Varela 2007, 85).[52] Eva Perón reinforced the populist message in her own public appearances and would go on to become a powerful Peronist symbol upon her premature death in 1952. His communication strategy also made use of town hall meetings (*cabildos abiertos*) and letter writing campaigns (Elena 2005).

With regard to actual policies, Perón implemented a wide range of measures aimed at improving the living and working conditions for the lower classes, as well as at redistributing income to these sectors. As Director of the Department of Labor and

[52] The Loyalty Day was the yearly commemoration of the popular protest held on October 17, 1945 calling for Perón to be liberated from prison—he had been arrested a few days earlier by the conservative faction of the military government in fear of Perón's growing control over the labor movement. That day, Perón addressed a large crowd that had assembled at the Plaza de Mayo.

Secretary of Labor and Social Protection, Perón enforced the eight-hour workday law, and introduced regulations regarding job-related accidents, overtime pay, and sanitary conditions at the workplace. He also passed the Law of Professional Associations, which officially recognized union's representational rights and stipulated that only one union could represent workers in a given industry or sector (Ranis 1992, 19). Perón used this law as part of a larger strategy to control labor by rewarding collaborative factions and punishing dissenting voices within the movement (Collier and Collier 2002, 338-340).

As president, Perón laid the foundations for a comprehensive social security system, expanding pension coverage to most of the labor force and introducing health coverage for some sectors (Mesa-Lago 1978, 168). Again, social policy was strategically used to consolidate control of the labor movement. Moreover, he increased wages, expanded workers' benefits and union rights, such as collective bargaining and the right to strike, and started public housing and slum clearance projects. He also continued the price controls favorable to his urban base that had been introduced in 1944 (Kirkpatrick 1971, 37-44), and imposed taxes on export sectors to fund these programs and foster industrialization (Collier and Collier 2002, 332-333). Overall, while redistributive in aim, Perón's policies did not seek expropriation or a major change in the economic system.

These policies achieved some of their intended effects, at least during the first years of Perón's presidency. For example, the share of the national wealth going to workers increased from 38% in the early 1940s to 46% in 1948 (Turner 1983a, 4) and wages increased by 24% between 1946 and 1948 (Wynia 1983, 36). While there is still

much debate about the long-term effects of Peron's measures,[53] more important here is whether these policies left a positive imprint on the memory of large shares of the population. There is a scholarly consensus around the view that they in fact did (Collier and Collier 2002, 349-350).

Thus, for example, Ranis (1992, 88) argues that workers continued to share "to one degree or another an inheritance of solid social benefits and protection dating from the Peronist era. Whether […] [workers] personally experienced the "golden days" under Perón or not, there remained a kind of class memory of the rights of labor." In a similar vein, Gino Germani, one of Peronism's most prominent critics, concedes that the benefits accrued by the popular classes during this period contributed to keep alive the memory of the regime and the figure of Perón beyond what would have normally happened (Germani 1978, 178-179).

By the time Perón was ousted from power by the military, his combination of controversial anti-oligarchic, populist rhetoric and redistributive policies had significantly polarized Argentine politics and society. His repression of the opposition further contributed to the split and so did his overt confrontation with the Catholic Church in the last years of his second term—this last confrontation also helps explain why attitudes toward the Church remain polarized up until the present day.[54] Peronists sought to preserve what they believed were "genuine social accomplishments of greater equality

[53] In a moderate assessment of Perón's record, Turner (1983a, 4) recognizes the regime's undeniable commitment to egalitarianism and redistribution, but argues that the policies enacted to reflect this commitment ultimately undermined economic growth prospects. In the long run, this hurt the living standards of the popular and working classes and reverted the improvements they experienced during the first years of Perón's government. For another balanced assessments see Kirkpatrick (1971, 36-38, 43-44).
[54] On the relationship between the Church and Perón, as well as its aftermath, see Domini (1983).

and the political integration of urban workers and provincial poor," while the opposition "denounced the man they deemed the tyrant and his accomplices who [they thought] had […] ruined Argentina" (Epstein 1992, 9).

Peronism divided the population mostly along class lines (Kirkpatrick 1971, 79-115; Miguens 1983, 160-166). The popular and working classes were mostly Peronist and some sectors of the middle class were also sympathetic towards the movement. The opposing side was comprised of the upper and the upper-middle classes for the most part. With regards to societal actors, the party held tight control of labor while the most powerful faction within the military was anti-Peronist—as the 1955 coup and subsequent military veto to the party and its leader demonstrate.

Ideologically, the Peronist camp included various tendencies. Under an umbrella of support for the leader and broad commitment to the basic principles of *justicialismo*, extreme leftist and rightist tendencies along with other orientations in between eventually coexisted in the movement. Likewise, the anti-Peronist block was divided among minor socialist and communist parties, the centrist UCR, and an economically liberal, but politically and socially conservative right.

Evidence showing Argentines' social beliefs and attitudes towards redistribution during the Perón era and its immediate aftermath is very limited. As mentioned in the introduction, public opinion data are only available starting in the 1960s and are relatively scarce. Before presenting and discussing available survey evidence, Figure 6.1 presents the share of votes obtained by Peronism in national elections from 1946 until 1973. This share is a reasonable estimate of the proportion of the voting population

holding views closer to the redistributive frame, especially in those contests in which the movement was allowed to fully participate in electoral contests.

Figure 6.1
Peronist Vote Share in National Elections,
1946-1973



Note: Figures for 1957, 1958, 1960 and 1963 include blank votes only; figures for 1962 and 1965 include votes for neo-Peronist parties. Source: Figures for 1957-1965 elections taken from Kirkpatrick (1965, 64); all others taken from Ministerio del Interior (2008).

Results from the 1946, 1951, and September 1973 presidential elections—those in which Perón was allowed to compete—show that Peronism enjoyed the support of a majority of the population. The movement fell just short of a majority in the March 1973 election, the only other presidential contest in this period in which it was allowed to put forth a candidate of its own (although Perón was not allowed to run). Results from the 1954 elections to fill the vacant vice-presidency show that the movement was still very popular by the end of its second term in government.

While more modest, Peronism's electoral fate in the second half of the 1950s and the following decade is still remarkable given the restrictions it faced at the time and considering that its leader remained in exile throughout these years.[55] Indeed, depending on the given election year, the movement was either not allowed to compete (1957, 1958, 1960, and 1963) or forced to compete through neo-Peronist parties that could not be named after one of the Peróns or invoke them in campaign literature (1962 and 1965) (Kirkpatrick 1971, 66-75). With the exception of the 1963 presidential contest, the option endorsed by Perón—be it casting blank votes, supporting another party, or casting votes for neo-Peronist parties—obtained a plurality in the restricted election years.[56]

Moving on to survey evidence, a first indicator suggestive of redistributive frame dominance is the approval rate of the Peronist movement's actions during its golden era. As argued earlier, a positive collective memory of the actions and policies during the Perón presidency is one of the factors that made this dominance possible. This indicator is available in a national survey carried out by Instituto IPSA in 1972: 56.7% of respondents approved of what Peronism had done for the country while only 20.6% disapproved of it—the remainder 22.7% did not know or refused to answer (Instituto

[55] Perón went into exile following the 1955 coup. He returned to Argentina in June 1973 following the Peronist victory in the March 1973 elections and subsequent call for a new electoral contest for September of that year in which Perón was allowed to run for the presidency.

[56] In the constituent assembly elections of 1957 and congressional elections of 1960, Peronists were instructed to vote blank. The proportion of blank votes was 24.9% in both contests. In the 1958 presidential election, they were directed to support Arturo Frondizi, the candidate of the Intransigent Radical Civic Union (UCRI), one of the two parties in which the original UCR split following the ban of Peronism. The popular vote for the UCRI increased from 21.7% in the 1957 election to 41.8%. Neo-Peronist parties obtained 31.9% and 29.9% in the 1962 and 1965 congressional elections, respectively. Following the 1962 contest, the military forced President Frondizi to step down and his successor to annul the elections. In that contest, Peronists had also won 11 of 14 provincial governorships, including that of Buenos Aires province. The 1965 election was followed by a coup the following year. That military stayed in power until 1973.

IPSA 1972).[57] This confirms that a majority of Argentines had a positive recollection of the Perón government almost twenty years after it had ended.

Tables 6.1 and 6.2 present responses to survey items capturing Argentines' views on distributive issues and selected public policies, respectively. As Table 6.1 shows, Argentines were displeased with the distributive status quo in 1965 and 1971. Overwhelming majorities of respondents thought that their fellow countrymen were getting less than their fair share of the good things in life and that wealth was distributed unjustly.

It is worth noting that the respondents answering "less than fair share" were asked a follow-up question about whether or not basic social and economic reforms were needed to see that most people get their fare share. The bulk of respondents (86%) thought reforms were needed. This widespread perception of distributive injustice—and corresponding demands for policy changes—is indicative of redistributive frame dominance.

[57] The specific wording of item is: "In general, do you approve or disapprove of what Peronism has done in the country between 45 [*sic*] and 55, that is when it was [in] government?"

Table 6.1
Views about the Distribution of Wealth in Argentina,
1965 and 1971

Year	Sample	Item	Options	%
1965	Buenos Aires	Argentines are getting their fair share or less than their fair share of the good things in life?	Fair share	18.9
			Less than fair share	71.0
			No answer	10.1
1971	Other[a]	Thinking in a general sense, how would you say wealth is distributed in Argentina?	Very acceptably (or justly)	0.8
			Quite acceptably (or justly)	7.5
			Somewhat unequally (or unjustly)	14.8
			Fairly unequally (or unjustly)	34.3
			Very unequally (or unjustly)	38.3
			DK/NA	4.3

Wording has been slightly modified to ease presentation. Source: USIA (1965); Turner (1971).
[a] Ad hoc sample composed of 120 businessman, 199 urban blue-collar workers, 298 middle class adults, 100 rural workers, 100 landowners, and 73 retired military.

Table 6.2 reveals that Argentines had very positive attitudes toward redistributive policies, even those involving expropriation, in 1961 and 1965. High levels of support for price controls and wage indexation also reveal pro-poor and pro-labor attitudes among the general public. If one is willing to assume that social beliefs and redistributive attitudes were linked back then as they have been since the 1990s, this evidence is suggestive of redistributive frame dominance.

Table 6.2
Policy Attitudes in Argentina the 1960s

Year	Sample	Item	Options	%
1961	National	Would you favor or oppose land reform that would divide large agricultural properties and distribute the land among agricultural workers?	Favor Oppose No answer	64.1 18.9 17.0
1965	National	Would favor a candidate that believes in the expropriation of private lands for redistribution to landless farmers	Favor Other responses[a]	63 37
1965	National	Would favor a candidate that favors reforming the tax system to provide for higher taxes on large incomes and business profits	Favor Other responses[a]	65 35
1965	National	Would favor a candidate that supports strong price controls on basic items that affect most people's cost of living	Favor Other responses[a]	85 15
1965	National	Would favor a candidate that believes wages should be raised to match increases in the cost of living	Favor Other responses[a]	85 15

Wording has been slightly modified to ease presentation. Sources: 1961 item is taken from USIA (1961); all others taken from Kirkpatrick (1971, 183).

[a] Kirkpatrick (1971) only reports the proportion of respondents who would favor a given policy. Figures for other responses are simply the complements to the reported proportions and likely include "would not favor" as well as DK/NA responses.

To sum up, the Peronist era fundamentally reshaped Argentine politics. Perón's populist rhetoric and redistributive policies appealed to vast sectors of the population who had remained disenfranchised and awaiting incorporation. This included women, who were granted the right to vote in 1947 and voted for the first time in the 1951 election. By shifting responsibility for social maladies away from the poor and toward the wealthy and enacting concrete policies that addressed those issues, Perón imprinted beliefs in line with the redistributive frame among the public and linked them to support for redistributive policies. While ideologically diverse, this base would remain committed to

its leader and his concern for the social question. The coup against Perón and the subsequent proscription of Peronism, together with sluggish economic performance and political and social turmoil of the ensuing years, would contribute to consolidate a mythical image of Perón and of the social achievements during his presidency.

The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism and the Return of Peronism

The 1970s and 1980s were a period of great uncertainty produced by political violence, defeat in war, and economic crises. These changes helped the UCR win the presidency in the transitional election of 1983, defeating a Peronist candidate for the first time. Later, continued economic underperformance, including a major crisis at the end of the 1980s, created an opening for the implementation of neoliberal reforms under a Peronist government. While a number of changes in Argentine attitudes suggest that the dominance of the redistributive frame weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, growing dissatisfaction with market reforms and the major economic crisis of 2001-2002, restored its dominance and placed the progressive wing of Peronism back in power in 2003.

After 18 years of political polarization, with Perón in exile and vetoed by the military, the then aging leader returned to the country and successfully ran for the presidency in 1973. At the time, political violence was mounting and involved revolutionary outfits and reactionary paramilitary groups, both from within and outside Peronism, as well as the military. Perón's decision to expel an extreme left-wing faction from the party upon his return and the government's turn to repression after the leader's death the following year further exacerbated violence. In this context, the military stepped into power once more after staging a coup against Isabel Perón in 1976.

The National Reorganization Process (1976-1983) would prove disastrous on many fronts: it ended political violence by committing massive human rights abuses against guerrilla members and left-wing militants and sympathizers; it was unable to spare the country from serious economic downturn in the midst of the Debt Crisis; and it led the country into an undeclared war with Britain over the Falkland Islands in an effort to bolster its popularity—a maneuver that backfired in the face of defeat. This last event ultimately forced military leaders to relinquish power and allow for a quick transition to democracy (Cavarozzi 1986; Turner 1983b, 237-241).

By the time democracy was restored, Argentines' beliefs and attitudes had shifted away from statist, corporatist, and redistributive stances. These changes were the consequence of the uncertainty produced by economic crisis and the failure of the corporatist model, but also of the major structural changes that had taken place since the 1950s. The growth of the service sector and particularly that of self-employment undermined the structural bases of Peronist support and redistributive beliefs. For example, unionization levels, industrial employment shares, and social security coverage rates had significantly declined since the Perón era (Mora y Araujo 1991).

A growing share of the population had adopted a middle-class culture, in which individuals' roles as consumers rather than as workers or producers were more important in shaping their attitudes. Accordingly, a majority of the population supported utility privatization, economic deregulation, and international trade openness; disapproved of unions and labor leaders; and favored concentrating efforts in increasing production rather than on redistributing wealth (Mora y Araujo 1991, 60-82). Even among workers,

support for privatization and openness to foreign investment ran high at the time (Ranis 1992, 228). In the midst of continued economic troubles, this shift away from the attitudes and beliefs that had been dominant since the Perón era would continue throughout the 1980s and provide the opportunity for market reform implementation.

A weakened and still divided Peronist movement and the shift in mass beliefs provided an opening for the UCR to defeat the Peronist movement's party, the Justicialist Party (PJ), in the 1983 elections. After failed attempts at heterodox economic stabilization, the economy would slip into deep recession in 1988-1989 and hyperinflation in 1989-1990 (Weyland 2002, 81-91). In a context of growing discontent with the politicians and political parties, Carlos Saúl Menem, the governor of La Rioja province, would win the presidency in 1989 campaigning as an outsider within the PJ and making use of populist rhetoric (Weyland 2002, 100-103).

The new government implemented radical market reforms. The measures included fixing the exchange rate, privatizing public firms, liberalizing markets and international trade, and lifting restrictions on foreign investment. The reform package also included a major overhaul of the pension system with the introduction of a private individual capitalization system to complement the existing public, pay-as-you-go scheme. These reforms were initially successful. Inflation dropped to single digits by 1993 and the economy grew every year since 1991 until 1998 with the exception of 1995. Despite the recession, Menem was reelected in 1995 by a wide margin.

Public enthusiasm for reforms, however, had started to steadily decline soon after the implementation of the 1991 Convertibility Plan (Weyland 2002, 126-127). This

frustration—which also eroded the president's approval rate—was fueled by concerns about growing unemployment and anxiety over the reforms' long-term social consequences. The public was particularly skeptical about neoliberal policies' ability to produce inclusive growth and improve the distribution of wealth. It also became progressively less willing to sacrifice social benefits in exchange for economic stability. The evolution of the public's views on these issues is shown in Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3.

As shown in Figure 6.2, in 1991, those who believed that Argentina was en route to becoming a more equal country slightly outnumbered those who thought the opposite. Views started to become more pessimistic shortly afterwards, however. As early as 1995, those who thought the country was headed into a path of more inequality more than doubled those with a more optimistic outlook. Opinions seemed to stabilize by the middle of the decade, with more than 70% of Argentines believing the country would have greater inequality and less than 20% believing it would have greater equality.

Figure 6.2
Expectations about the Distribution of Wealth in Argentina, 1991-1996



Items ask respondents whether Argentina was en route to becoming "a country in which the rich will be richer and the poor will be poorer" ("Greater inequality") or "a country in which the majority of the people will improve their living standards" ("Greater equality"). Figures for 10/1995 taken from a national survey; all others taken from surveys of Buenos Aires residents. Source: Estudio Graciela Römer y Asociados (1991; 1993; 1995b; 1995c; 1996a; 1996b).

Argentines' views about social spending during the same period follow a similar pattern. As Figure 6.3 shows, in 1992, almost 50% of respondents were willing to sacrifice spending on social assistance in exchange for economic stability, while 38% thought that increasing spending on social assistance was necessary despite its potential detrimental effects on inflation and public finances. In 1994, the latter outnumbered the former by a slight margin. By 1996, increasing social spending was preferred to decreasing it by almost three to one. As distributive issues and unemployment became a source of concern, public opinion moved toward preserving much-needed social services.

Figure 6.3
Views about Social Spending in Argentina,
1992-1996



Items ask respondents whether it was best for the country to reduce social spending to control fiscal deficit and inflation or increase social spending even if deficit and inflation also increase. Figures for 1992 taken from a survey of residents of Greater Buenos Aires and other six cities; figures for 1994 taken from a national survey; all others taken from surveys of Greater Buenos Aires residents. Source: Estudio Graciela Römer y Asociados (1992; 1994; 1995a; 1996b).

Together, this evidence is consistent with earlier claim about redistributive beliefs weakening in light of the structural and attitudinal changes documented by Mora y Araujo (1991) and the major crisis of the late 1980s. Indeed, the figures show that concerns about distributive justice and social spending were sidelined in the early 1990s. If earlier data were available, one would probably see that this was also the case—and perhaps more so—in the 1980s. This provided an opening for Menem to implement neoliberal reforms, but as soon as the public decided that his policies would be unable to deliver inclusive growth, redistributive beliefs progressively made a comeback.

Toward the end of the 1990s public support for the president and the reforms was at its lowest, as unemployment levels continued to rise and the economy slipped into recession. Menem attempted a second re-election bid, but Congress refused to pass a law that would allow him to do so. With a PJ weakened by Menem's reelection attempt, the alliance between the UCR and the Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO) would go on to win the presidency in the 1999 election (Corrales 2002, 33-34). The new government was unable to stop the recession, and the economy hit rock bottom in 2001 and 2002, when the GDP contracted by 4.41% and 10.89%, respectively. In the latter year the poverty rate reached a staggering 54.3% of the urban population, more than double the rate before the recession started. The president resigned in December of 2001, amidst a new round of generalized popular protest and rioting, this time channeling widespread discontent with the political system and rejection of neoliberal reforms.

Congress appointed a caretaker president that served for only seven days and then a second one who served until 2003. Both appointees were Peronists. By the time growth resumed, the fixed exchange rate had been abandoned, the banking system was recovering from near ruin, and the country had defaulted on its debt. The two major contenders in the 2003 presidential election, ex-president Menem and Néstor Kirchner, the governor of Santa Cruz province, represented the two major opposing factions within Peronism; Menem represented the pro-market, center-right, and Kirchner represented the progressive, center-left (Sanchez 2005, 461-463). While Menem was the leading candidate in the first round by a narrow margin, he resigned from participating in the runoff to avoid suffering the catastrophic loss predicted by the polls.

Kirchner's government followed the programmatic lines of orthodox Peronism to a significant extent. Among its most prominent measures were the nationalization of some privatized businesses, the return of relatively wide-ranging price controls, and the expansion of social spending. Politically, unions played a more prominent role and recovered some of the prominence they lost in the past two decades (Etchemendy and Collier 2007). Kirchner's successor and wife, Cristina Fernández, has continued most of these policies. One of her major reforms has been the elimination of the mixed pension system established in the 1990s and a return to the single pay-as-you-go public system, which included confiscating funds held in private capitalization accounts and transferring them to the public treasury.

Overall, after a period of great change in mass beliefs that created the opportunity for market reforms, the redistributive frame has returned and is quite strong in Argentina. As shown in the previous chapter, Argentines tend to believe that wealth accumulation is zero-sum, that hard work does not generally produce success, that poverty is caused by a society that treats individuals unfairly, and that the poor do not have a chance to escape poverty. Statist orientations have also made a comeback; Argentines demand greater involvement of the state in regulating the economy, owning businesses, providing social protection, and fighting unemployment (Mora y Araujo 2003).

Peru: Elite-Controlled Incorporation and the Failure of Progressives

This section traces the origins of mass social beliefs in Peru. It shows that beliefs in line with the redistributive frame failed to become dominant because no political actor was able to combine redistributive rhetoric and policies at a critical juncture. The 1930s

and 1940s, the years during which the urban popular and working classes were initially incorporated into politics, constitute the first juncture. APRA used populist rhetoric, but was unable to attain power. As a result, it did not implement its progressive platform and only a minor fraction of the public developed beliefs aligned with the redistributive frame. Peruvian politics during this period shows that rhetoric without accompanying policy shifts cannot produce substantial changes in mass beliefs.

The country experienced a period of progressive transformations starting in 1968, when the military staged a coup against a reform-oriented government. At least during its first phase of power (until about 1975), the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (GRFA) (1968-1980), embraced reformist rhetoric and enacted various policies that not only improved the well-being of the lower classes in the short term but also redistributed land and industrial property. Mass beliefs failed to tilt toward the redistributive frame at this time, however, because these developments took place during a time of normal politics in which the public was not receptive to the military government's initiatives. Finally, the 1980s witnessed a new critical juncture caused by economic, political, and social factors. In a context of great uncertainty, the public's reaction to an exclusionary system of social protection is what ultimately led to dominance of the self-reliance frame starting in the 1990s.

Antecedents to the First Critical Juncture

Like in Argentina, the incorporation period of the popular and working classes was preceded by a time of increasing challenge to the conservative order. In Peru, however, the challenge did not come from a new party representing excluded sectors of

the population. Instead, by courting the labor movement and the lower classes with reformist agendas, members of the elite distanced themselves from the dominant Civilista Party, which governed almost uncontested from 1899 until 1919. The first major split within the party occurred during Augusto Leguía Salcedo's first government (1908-1912), as a result of the passing of legislation protecting the indigenous population from forced labor and workers from job-related accidents. These changes to the policy status quo divided the Civilistas into a conservative faction comprising mostly landowners and a reformist faction of more modern capitalists, which respectively opposed and supported the president's platform (Cotler 1978, 168-171).

This split created the opportunity for a party outsider, Guillermo Billinghurst Angulo, to win the presidency in 1912 with direct support from the urban popular sectors. Despite being a member of the economic elite, Billinghurst pushed forward a reformist agenda that included employment programs, wage increases, housing project construction, and worker-friendly labor legislation. Because of opposition from the Civilista-dominated Congress, the president was ultimately able to pass only a fraction of his initiatives.[58] This short-lived reformist period ended when the Civilistas secured a military intervention on their behalf in 1914 (Cotler 1978, 171-176).

Politics as usual resumed until 1919, when ex-president Leguía returned to the country from exile and rallied the political actors and social groups excluded by the Civilistas to support him in the election of that year. Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, a

[58] Only dispositions regulating strikes and introducing state arbitrage of labor disputes were passed during this time. Billinghurst's platform also included a call for major electoral reform, which included expanding the franchise to the lower classes—at the time only male, literate, taxpayers could vote. However, he only succeeded in getting Congress to grant the Supreme Court the power to oversee elections.

student leader who later founded APRA, was among his supporters (Collier and Collier 2002, 136-137; Cotler 1978, 177-183). Leguía won the election, but he was only able to assume the presidency after the military intervened to stop the Civilista attempt to disregard the election results. After approving a new constitution that reinforced the executive and expanded the scope of state power in 1920, he would win uncontested elections in 1924 and 1929, to be finally ousted by a military uprising in 1930.

Politically, Leguía's "Patria Nueva" stripped the traditional Civilista landed elite of most of its political power and replaced it with a modern, bourgeois elite allied with the military. While the president initially courted labor and the student movement, he soon turned to repression and alienated these actors from his coalition. He also failed to expand the suffrage to the lower classes; the new constitution did not eliminate the restriction of suffrage to literate male taxpayers. In terms of policy, legislation expanding industrial safety regulation and workmen's compensation and establishing basic assistance for the poor was passed during these years (Mesa-Lago 1978, 115). Legislation protecting the rights of the indigenous was also approved, but other laws such as the one establishing conscription for road-building significantly burdened this population. In the end, Leguía's cooptation project proved insufficient to address demands for political inclusion and the social question more generally, leading to the first critical juncture.

APRA and the Critical Juncture in the 1930s-1940s

The "Patria Nueva" provided a unique context for APRA to gain ascendance over the labor movement and build a wide coalition behind a reformist platform. Since his days as leader of the student protests of 1919 and throughout the early-1920s, Haya and

his collaborators cultivated a strong relationship with workers, especially among those in the sugar industry of the northern coast, the mining centers of the central highlands, and the textile factories of the capital (Klarén 1976; North 1975).[59] Following his exile in 1924, Haya founded the Popular Revolutionary Alliance for the Americas in Mexico City. The alliance's original platform included five points: action against Yankee imperialism; political unity of Latin America; nationalization of land and industry; internationalization of the Panama Canal; and solidarity with all people and oppressed classes (Kantor 1966, 10-11). Distancing himself from Marxism, Haya intended the movement to have a multi-class base. He argued that its objectives were only attainable if all the working classes, the proletariat, the peasantry, the intellectuals, and the middle class, united against economic domination (Burga and Flores Galindo 1979, 186-188).

While the Popular Revolutionary Alliance for the Americas aimed at having a strong presence throughout Latin America, only its Peruvian chapter, the Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA), would have a lasting life. APRA was officially founded in 1930 to allow Haya to run for the presidency in the elections that the provisional government had scheduled for the following year. That government also passed a new electoral law that expanded suffrage to all literate males, made voting obligatory, and established the secret ballot. In a context of democratic enthusiasm, APRA quickly developed into an important

[59] In the first year of the Patria Nueva, unions supported students' demands for university reform and the latter sided with the former in calling for legislation enacting the eight-hour workday. Haya further strengthened this collaborative relationship by setting up a system of popular universities for workers along with other students who later became figures within Aprismo in 1921 (Klaiber 1975). The worker and student movements protested together again in opposition to the consecration of the country to the Heart of Jesus in 1923 and, as a result, Leguía toughened repression of both. Finally, the government arrested and deported Haya that year and closed the popular universities and exiled their leaders the following one.

mass party during the campaign, showcasing a strong apparatus built upon its relationship with labor, the student movement, and other social organizations (Collier and Collier 2002, 150-151). Besides its labor and popular sector base, the party also gained a strong following among white-collar workers as well as small traders and entrepreneurs in urban areas (Graham 1992, 26-33).

During the campaign, the party called for promoting economic independence and fighting against the oligarchic order as well as the semi-feudal system that organized society in the highlands. These goals would be accomplished by developing a strong state that would promote growth, own large-scale industry, and channel foreign capital to key sectors; by giving land ownership to those who worked it—the party adopted the "land and freedom" motto at this early stage; and by promoting cooperative and domestic private ownership of businesses (Burga y Flores Galindo 1979, 186-188). The party also called for the "economic emancipation of all working classes, striving to abolish, as allowed by the circumstances and gradually, the exploitation of men by men" (Cotler 1978, 214). The qualifying clause in the quote reflects APRA's early attempts to convince foreign capitalists and governments, the domestic elite, and the military establishment that the party was reformist rather than revolutionary.

While efforts to assuage fears of revolutionary intentions were successful among the foreign actors, they were futile among the domestic ones. Fearful of APRA's "revolutionary" platform, the military and the elite supported the conservative candidacy of Army Commander Luis Sánchez Cerro, the leader of the military uprising against Leguía. A large share of the non-unionized urban middle and lower classes also backed

the officer following a media campaign that portrayed APRA as communist, antipatriotic, and anticlerical (Cotler 1978, 244-246). As a result, Sánchez Cerro beat Haya by a wide margin, 51% versus 35% of the popular vote.

Next, APRA contested the election results and opposed the new government. At the same time, several insurrection attempts took place, the most notable one being the Trujillo Revolution of 1932. That year the party was finally declared illegal. In 1933, an Aprista militant murdered the president, and the congress designated Army General Oscar Benavides to serve the remainder of Sánchez Cerro's term. The new president would continue to repress APRA, and it was not allowed to participate in the 1936 election. These were the first events in a long confrontation of the military and the economic elite against APRA and the popular sectors that would define Peruvian politics until 1968.

In the years following 1933, two parallel processes took place. First, Benavides and his successor in the presidency, Manuel Prado, incrementally but substantially expanded the social security system, extending coverage to most blue-collar workers, including the self-employed with low wages (Mesa-Lago 1978, 116-117). This was complemented with substantial investment in housing projects, healthcare facilities, and "popular restaurants" (*restaurantes populares*) that served the growing urban working class, but excluded workers in rural areas and the indigenous peasantry (Drinot 2011). These policy initiatives reduced the space available for subsequent governments to introduce relatively uncontroversial pro-worker and pro-poor policies.

Second, APRA progressively moderated its discourse and platform. Perhaps the most significant gesture was Haya's statement about wealth redistribution in his first public discourse after the party was temporarily legalized in 1945. He argued that the party "would not take wealth from those who had it, but would create it for those who did not have it" (Collier and Collier 2002, 321). In terms of policy, by the 1940s, the party had abandoned its anti-imperialistic and pro-expropriation stances. It continued to propose a state-led form of capitalism, but accepted the need for foreign capital and called for targeted nationalization of industries that would be accomplished by buying businesses from their owners and not by forced expropriation (Kantor 1966, 76-79).

In the ensuing years, the party would continue shifting towards the center-right, embracing capitalism as the road to development, proposing moderate agrarian reform that left modern agricultural estates undisturbed, and containing mobilization and extremism within organized labor (Collier and Collier 2002, 477-478). Together, the two processes help explain why APRA was not able or willing to carry out substantial social reforms when it was part of various governing coalitions at different points between 1945 and 1968.

Given the lack of survey data during this first critical juncture and its immediate aftermath, APRA's share of the vote is used to provide insight into how much of the voting population held views closer to the redistributive frame. Figure 6.4 presents this vote share information for the three presidential contests (1931, 1936, and 1945). In the 1931 elections, Haya obtained about a third of the vote, suggesting that about this much

of the voting population supported his rhetoric and policy positions that were in line with the redistributive frame.

Figure 6.4
APRA's Vote Share in Presidential Elections,
1931-1945



Source: Tuesta Soldevilla (1998a; 1998b; 1998c).

In the 1936 elections, Luis Eguiguren Escudero, the candidate informally backed by a proscribed APRA, got 37% of the vote, again suggesting this much of the population held views in line with the redistributive frame. The overwhelming victory of the APRA-backed candidate in 1945 was not reflective of a surge in APRA's base within the electorate – nor should it be interpreted as indicative of the proportion of the population holding views in line with the redistributive frame. The increase in APRA's vote share reflects the massive support for a broad political coalition as well as APRA's own initial moderation (Collier and Collier 2002, 708-709). Together, these figures suggest that

APRA and the redistributive frame did not hold sway over a majority of the population at this time.

What would have happened to mass beliefs had APRA had a chance to govern in the 1930s or early-1940s? Even though the party's base was short of being a majority within the electorate, it seems highly likely that Haya would have won the presidency had there not been a military ban on the party. After all, according to the electoral rules of the time, a candidate could win the election with a plurality of at least a third of the valid popular vote. If that had been the case, the redistributive frame would have had a greater chance to become dominant for at least two reasons.

First, APRA would have been able to implement a number of redistributive policies and use state resources to continue spreading its populist rhetoric. The economic recovery after the Great Depression and the export boom during World War II would have provided an Aprista administration with the resources needed to deliver on its promises, improve the well-being of the growing working class and urban popular sectors. In other words, APRA would have been able to implement the social policies set in place by Benavides and Prado, while presenting them as a triumph of the people over the oligarchy and imperialism. This would have likely produced a change in beliefs like the one that took place in Perón's Argentina.

Second, an APRA government would have probably made strides toward incorporating the large indigenous peasantry.[60] While this group had organized localized

[60] There are no exact figures on the size of the indigenous peasantry at the time. The following figures provide some information about the potential size of the group that was excluded from the electorate, most

revolts prior to the critical juncture, as a whole, it remained unorganized and marginalized from politics. Moreover, it remained disenfranchised by a literacy requirement that would be eliminated only in the 1979 Constitution. Had APRA implemented its platform of sweeping land reform in the highlands and education targeted at the indigenous peasantry (Kantor 1966, 84-86), this population would have become an important social base for the party and the redistributive frame.

The GRFA as a New Progressive Offensive

The military officers leading the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (GRFA) (1968-1980) believed that the social turmoil that had grown common in Peru at the time was the warning sign of growing social pressures that threatened the continuity of traditional social structures (Einaudi 1973, 73). Indeed, during the 1960s, the country experienced unprecedented peasant and worker mobilization and guerrilla activity. Convinced that political parties—especially APRA—would be unable to carry out the reforms needed to finally address the social and indigenous questions, this group of mostly middle-class officers took matters into their own hands. At least in its first phase that lasted until 1975, the military government sought to implement wide-ranging economic and social reforms and to institute a state corporatist system in which all social

of which were peasants. According to the 1940 Census, 57,6% of the population 15 years and over was illiterate (INEI 2012b) and 64.6% lived in rural areas (INEI 2012c). Another interesting figure is the growth rate in the electorate between the 1963 general election, the last one before the GRFA, and the transitional election of 1980, when the illiterate were allowed to vote for the first time. The electorate grew by almost 212.5% (from 2,070,718 to 6,471,101 voters) (Tuesta Soldevilla 2001, 194, 218), while the general population only grew by 70.5% between the censuses of 1961 and 1981 (from 10,420,357 to 17,762,231) (INEI 2012d).

classes would harmoniously work towards the national common good (Stepan 1978; Huber Stephens 1983).

While the government sought to avoid class warfare, it nevertheless made extensive use of revolutionary, nationalistic, and populist elements in its rhetoric (Dore and Weeks 1976). For example, the manifesto issued the day of the coup in 1968 argued that "powerful domestic and international economic groups, in complicity with some unworthy Peruvians," [referring to politicians] had continuously "frustrated the people's hopes for basic structural reforms" and "preserved an unjust social and economic order which places the usufruct of the national wealth only within the reach of a privileged few, while the majorities suffer the consequences of a marginalization that is injurious to human dignity" (Revolutionary Junta 1968). The declaration called for "the people" (*el pueblo*) to join the Armed Forces in a fight for social justice and national development. Another example of this rhetoric is the now famous "peasant, the lord will no longer eat from your poverty!" proclaimed by Army General Juan Velasco Alvarado, the president appointed by the military junta, in his speech decreeing agrarian reform.

Agrarian and industrial reforms were the military's boldest initiatives. The former transferred ownership of traditional haciendas and modern agroindustrial complexes to peasant and rural worker cooperatives. The more innovative industrial reform involved a scheme requiring businesses to use a portion of their profits to increase their equity and transfer the new shares to workers. As an "industrial community," workers participated in management and profit sharing, and would acquire up to 50% ownership of businesses, making labor and capital equal partners. The government also nationalized businesses,

created public monopolies in several strategic economic sectors and public services, increased wages, and controlled prices.

Overall, the combination of populist rhetoric and pro-worker and pro-poor policies under the GRFA failed to produce redistributive frame dominance. While mass beliefs changed substantially during this period, bringing important sectors of the population closer to the left and to the redistributive frame, especially among labor and some sectors of the urban poor, the changes were not enough to produce redistributive frame dominance. For example, among Lima's poor, traditional attitudes such as acceptance of social hierarchy and low horizontal solidarity weakened, but remained quite dominant in the mid-1980s (Stokes 1991; Stokes 1995). Among the peasantry, while agrarian reform undermined traditional clientelistic and paternalistic attitudes, peasant class-consciousness did not develop and communities remained relatively self-centered and skeptical of the state (McClintock 1981, 259-286). These attitudes are not those one would expect of individuals that have embraced beliefs in line with the redistributive frame.

Dietz (2000, 304-307) provides the only direct evidence about the evolution of social beliefs during the GRFA and its immediate aftermath. The author included a question about the causes of poverty ("What do you think is the main cause of poverty?"[61]) in surveys carried out in 1970 and 1982 in six Lima slums. Table 6.3 presents the responses to these items. Responses blaming poverty on structural factors should not be interpreted as indicative of redistributive frame dominance because they are

[61] Translated by the author of this dissertation.

passive factual statements, rather than active attributions of blame. As argued by the author, "these responses would have to be severely distorted before they can be interpreted as conscious and radical criticisms of the Peruvian socioeconomic system" (Dietz 2000, 306). Most important here is to highlight the very few responses (2.6%) indicative of more radical or class-conscious orientations among poor *limeños*.

Table 6.3
Views about the Causes of Poverty among Lima's Poor,
1971 and 1982

Options	1971	1982
Structural (lack of employment, lack of education, cost of living)	57.4%	55.5%
Personal/fatalistic (lack of talent; laziness; bad luck)	13.7%	11.0%
Radical/class-concious (class differences, failed governments)	2.6%	5.2%
Other	2.5%	10.2%

Source: Dietz (2000, 304-307).

Overall, the experiences during the GRFA failed to produce redistributive frame dominance because they did not satisfy the expectations of the population. The policies carried out during these years did not produce lasting welfare improvements. While agrarian and industrial reforms had immediate positive effects on peasants and workers by transferring asset ownership and providing additional income, productivity losses and decapitalization soon became a problem. In addition, peasant and rural workers were also harmed by the government's pro-urban price controls and import tariff policies. More generally, macroeconomic imbalances produced inflation and meager economic growth,

forcing the government to cut social expenditures (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 235-237). These cuts placed a particularly high toll on the urban lower classes.

The reforms also had a number of unintended consequences that deterred peasants and workers from identifying with the military project. In agricultural cooperatives, government-appointed administrators became a source of discontent that created conflict similar to that between peasant and landlords and between rural workers and estate managers that preceded reforms. Agrarian reform also caused divisions within the peasant and rural worker movements as cooperatives had to compete with one another in an increasingly difficult economic environment (McClintock 1981). Contrary to reformers' intentions, the industrial community reform led to a substantial increase in unionization rates and more frequent clashes between labor and capital. This context provided fertile grounds for radical currents within labor to develop (Huber Stephens 1983). While this probably contributed to redistributive frame dominance among workers, greater polarization likely estranged the general population from radicalism. Finally, the military's attempts to control social mobilization further estranged workers, peasants, and the urban poor.[62] Fearing a state takeover—and dissatisfied with the

[62] Similar to Perón, the government offered incentives to collaborative unions while it punished defiant organizations with deactivation or restructuring (Stepan 1978, 74). At the same time, the government tried to create new peak labor and peasant organizations to replace existing autonomous federations. In addition, to control the growing population that settled in shantytowns on the outskirts of Lima and other major cities, the government created offices in charge of channeling citizens' demands for property titles and public works. Finally, the GRFA created the National System for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS) to coordinate these initiatives as well as to serve as a vehicle to link the government with the populace and build support for the military's project. McClintock (1981), Huber and Stephens (1983), and Dietz (1986) provide extensive overviews of the fate of peasant, labor, and urban poor mobilization during the GRFA, respectively. For a general overview of the military attempt at establishing a state corporatist system see Stepan (1978).

government's inability to deliver—, social organizations further distanced themselves from the military.

Beyond these immediate causes, what arguably explains the lack of redistributive frame dominance is that the GRFA's efforts took place at the wrong time. This was a period of normal politics. By the late-1960s, the bulk of the population was already politically engaged. Much of the working, peasant, and urban popular sectors had allegiances with political parties and movements like APRA, the reform-oriented Popular Action Party (AP), and a growing political left. The military's radical policies and attempts to control social mobilization created further polarization and provided opportunities for the opposition, both from the left and right, to thrive and unite in a struggle for democracy. In such a highly polarized context where the redistributive frame was not dominant, the working and popular sectors were divided in their political allegiances, and the public had high expectations of reforms (of any kind) due to years of postponement, the military's policies were bound to disappoint the bulk of the population. Thus, the GRFA's efforts had little chance of leaving a lasting impression on mass beliefs.

Furthermore, the military was arguably pushed down a path of radical, polarizing reforms because of the constraints established by previous governments' policies. Sweeping agrarian reform was somehow unavoidable given the failure of the moderate attempt during the prior AP government (1963-1968). It is possible that the GRFA's route of controversial industrial reform could have been avoided had other alternatives to benefit urban workers been available. But by the 1960s, social protection had been

extended to almost all sectors and the only reform that the military could implement in this area was unification of the various sub-system—a reform that was met with significant worker resistance (Segura-Ubiergo 1997, 232; Mesa-Lago 1978: 120-124). In sum, had the GRFA experiment taken place at an earlier stage of the country's political development, it probably would have had a greater chance to produce realigning change in mass beliefs toward the redistributive frame.

The 1980s Critical Juncture and the Ascent of Neoliberalism

Growing disenchantment with reforms, the sluggish economy, and the lack of democracy would lead to major social protest in 1977 and ultimately force the military to negotiate an orderly transition to democracy. A constituent assembly that had been freely elected in 1978 passed a new constitution the following year, and transitional elections took place in 1980. This was the first election in which all adults were allowed to vote.

The decade of 1980s was characterized by great uncertainty produced by economic crises and political violence. During the first half of the decade, the government's adjustment program failed to stop inflation and economic underperformance, and an abnormally strong El Niño current contributed to a major recession in 1983. At the same time, political violence between state forces and the Maoist Shining Path (SL) guerrillas reached critical levels in the highlands.

APRA finally won the presidency in 1985. Led by its young candidate, Alan García Pérez, the campaign signaled the party's return to some of its original nationalistic and populist stances. The APRA government implemented a heterodox economic program that included wage increases, price freezes, tax cuts, and government spending

expansion. These initiatives initially resulted in significant growth and moderate inflation, but the boom was short-lived. Spiraling inflation reached hyperinflation levels, and the economy went into a deep recession in 1988-1990. At the same time, political violence continued to grow, with SL increasingly turning to sabotage and terrorist activities to make its presence felt in Lima and other major cities.

Despite this context, the decade was characterized by a rather stable party system with a strong leftist coalition, the United Left (IU), APRA in the center, and AP and the Popular Christian Party (PPC) to the right. The left was particularly strong during these years, achieving important electoral victories at the local level, including the mayoralty of Lima and the populous districts on the outskirts of the city. On average, each political current had the support of roughly a third of the electorate. Relative political stability, along with very visible labor and popular mobilization, masked a major transformation that was taking place within the public.

The internal migration process that started in the 1950s had transformed Peru from a mostly rural into a predominantly urban country by the 1980s. This new urban population overwhelmed existing social structures and led to a surge in the informal economy and to the development of an alternative migrant culture in the cities (De Soto 1987; Matos Mar 1986). Tied to traditional social organizations that were increasingly less representative of the lower classes, political parties were unable to incorporate the demands of the new urban population into their projects. The major economic crisis at the end of the decade contributed to this process by pushing even more people into the informal economy and increasing overall discontent with political parties, social

organizations, and the political system as a whole. Together, these changes led to the demise of the party system and the rise of political outsiders (Cameron 1994; Tanaka 1998).

Similar to Menem in Argentina, the eventual winner of the 1990 elections, Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, campaigned with a vague policy platform and a strong message against the political establishment. He promised to control inflation and restore growth with gradual adjustment. However, once elected to office, Fujimori implemented sweeping neoliberal reforms that tamed inflation and brought about economic growth. These accomplishments brought the president great popular support and provided him with political capital needed to close the congress in 1992. Under international pressure, the president called elections for a constituent assembly that took place later that year. The assembly drafted a constitution that consolidated market reforms and allowed the president to run for a second term.

The new constitution was approved by a referendum in 1993 and Fujimori was reelected in 1995. To assure these victories, Fujimori's government made extensive use of clientelistic social spending (Graham and Kane 1998; Schady 2000). At the same time that the pension system was being privatized and other work-related social benefits reduced, poverty relief expenditures as well as health and education spending saw substantial increases (Segura-Ubiergo 2007, 247-256). Also critical in explaining support for Fujimori's regime was the capture of the most important leaders of SL and the near defeat of the guerilla organization (Kelly 2003; see Weyland 2000 for a different assessment).

A confluence of factors played a role in consolidating self-reliance beliefs among the public during the 1990s. The collapse of the social structures, general dissatisfaction with the state, and dissatisfaction with the political and social establishments—who were blamed for the general debacle of the 1980s—not only contained the growth of radicalism within the lower classes, but also convinced vast sectors of the population that the state was not going to provide a solution to their problems. This expectation was fulfilled by the state retrenchment policies implemented in the 1990s. Moreover, the increased access to social services that the lower classes experienced during Fujimori's government was not framed as an achievement en route to greater social equality or justice. Instead, they were used to promote Fujimori's popularity and demonstrate his efficiency while his rhetoric reminded the public of the perils of big government and the ineptitude of the political establishment.

As shown in the previous chapter, beliefs in line with the self-reliance frame have been dominant in Peru since Fujimori came to power in the 1990s. Figure 6.5 provides additional evidence to this effect. The figure shows that a majority of Peruvians has consistently thought that increasing production and productivity is more important for the country than improving the distribution of wealth. The majority was quite sizable in the first half of the 1990s, when economic reforms were being implemented and Fujimori's neoliberal rhetoric was in full force.

Figure 6.5
Productive vs. Distributive Orientations in Peru,
1992-2006



Items ask respondents whether "increasing the production and the productivity" or "improving the distribution of wealth" was more important for the country. Figures for 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2006 taken from national surveys; all others taken from surveys of Lima residents. Source: Apoyo S.A. (1992; 1993; 1994); Ipsos Apoyo Opinión y Mercado (2009a).

Despite shrinking over time, this majority proved to be resilient through tough economic times like the recession of 1998 and the stagnation of the early 2000s. It has also proven resilient through major political developments like the fall of Fujimori, the revelation of widespread corruption during his government, and the anti-neoliberal threat of presidential hopeful Ollanta Humala Tasso in the 2006 elections. While Humala was elected president in 2011, this was a product of his moderation during the campaign rather than of a change in the mass beliefs and attitudes. Thus fa during his presidency, Humala has had to moderate even further in an effort to gain and later preserve the public's approval.

In sum, the dominance of the self-reliance frame established after the 1980s critical juncture should be attributed to the public's realization that the state would be unable to provide a solution to the social question. This is especially true among the new urban population comprised of migrants that left the countryside in search of opportunity and social inclusion. Barring a major economic crisis or a critical political development, this dominance should remain strong.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that a critical juncture framework is useful in understanding changes in mass beliefs and attitudes regarding inequality within Argentina and Peru. These mass beliefs are stable or change only incrementally during times of normal politics, but are highly malleable at certain points in time. Major political developments, like the expansion of the franchise and the advent of mass politics, as well as economic, political, or social crises, make the public particularly receptive to new ideas. Gradual structural change also plays a role in bringing about changes in mass beliefs but only in combination with major events. Most importantly, the chapter has shown that the choices of political actors at these critical junctures largely shape mass beliefs. Indeed, only the confluence of populist rhetoric and successful redistributive policies at such times can produce redistributive frame dominance.

In Argentina, redistributive frame dominance developed because a political actor was able to implement relatively successful equity-enhancing policies while using populist rhetoric early in the country's experience with mass politics. The crises of the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the major structural changes that took place since the Perón

era undermined the dominance of the redistributive frame. However, the economic underperformance of the 1990s and ultimate major crisis of 2001-2002 reversed this trajectory and brought the progressive wing of Peronism back to power. This resulted in the consolidation of redistributive frame dominance. In Peru, in contrast, APRA was not able to produce redistributive frame dominance because it was prevented from governing by the military throughout the first critical juncture. Later, the GRFA failed because it attempted radical change at a time of normal politics, when the public was not receptive to its initiatives and discourse. Realizing that the state could not provide a solution to the social question, the public embraced self-reliance beliefs after the 1980s critical juncture. Finally, the dominance of this frame became consolidated as a product of President Fujimori's rhetoric and policies.

Chapter 7
Conclusion

This dissertation has analyzed existing theories of redistributive attitudes based on interests and group identity in Argentina and Peru. It has also developed and examined a belief-based account of support for redistribution. In contrast to extant accounts emphasizing individuals' position with regard to structural cleavages, this theory focuses on social beliefs, cognitions about the causes of poverty and inequality that inform judgments about the fairness of the distributive status quo and the moral worthiness of helping those in need. This study is one of the first attempts at systematically assessing these three types of explanations in developing democracies.

The preceding analyses have shown that interest-based and group identity-based accounts are not very useful in explaining variation in redistributive attitudes in Argentina and Peru. Of all the considerations suggested by these theories, only income consistently shapes attitudes as expected. In an examination of patterns in the effects and non-effects of the other considerations, it was argued that context plays a key role in the extent to which they are salient. By doing so, this dissertation has moved scholarship in the direction of generating a general theory of support for redistribution. Such a theory will need to specify the factors that make particular structural cleavages more or less salient in informing support to be able to account for variation in contexts as different as those found in advanced industrial and developing democracies.

As argued in Chapter 4, cleavages arising from employment status, class status, and occupation sectors are not very relevant in the developing world because of greater economic volatility and structural complexity. Together, these factors make it challenging for individuals to become cognizant of their constantly changing economic interests. The relative weakness of social and political organizations that promote these types of interests makes this even more difficult. Limited and targeted coverage of social protection systems further contributes to this state of affairs and also leads to the fragmentation of groups that could potentially become strong constituencies supporting specific social policies.

Ethnic cleavages are not very relevant either. This finding is not surprising in the case of relatively homogenous Argentina, but it is surprising in ethnically diverse Peru. Despite having higher levels of fragmentation than the U.S., group identification and prejudice are not powerful predictors of redistributive attitudes in Peru. Limited social protection coverage as well as weak ethnic-based organizations again play a role in explaining this result. In addition, extensive *mestizaje* helps explain this finding, as it has produced porous ethnic lines and very fluid ethnic identities.

Overall, social beliefs shape redistributive attitudes as expected. Within each country, individuals whose views are closer to the redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, social beliefs can account for some of the divergence in support across the two countries. Indeed, while Argentines tend to hold beliefs about the nature of wealth accumulation, about the causes of poverty, and about equality of opportunities and social mobility that are closer to the

redistributive frame, Peruvians' views on these issues are more aligned with the self-reliance frame. As documented in Chapter 5, if social beliefs were more similar across the two countries, the divergence in levels of support for redistribution would be less pronounced.

Finally, the dissertation explored the origins of inequality frame dominance. It proposes a critical juncture framework to understand the evolution of mass social beliefs. Chapter 6 demonstrated how the redistributive frame can become dominant when, at critical junctures, progressive political actors are able to implement comprehensive social policies while relying on populist, egalitarian, or class warfare rhetoric to justify their policy choices. This was the case in Argentina where mass incorporation coincided with the rise of populist president, Juan Perón. The chapter also showed how the redistributive frame failed to become dominant in Peru where this combination of factors never occurred during a critical juncture. Eventually, in the wake of Fujimori's government and neoliberal reforms, the self-reliance frame's dominance was consolidated.

In sum, this dissertation has developed a belief-based explanation of support for redistribution that helps explain variation within and across the developing countries of Argentina and Peru. It has also assessed existing explanations based on interests and group identity and developed insights about how economic, policy, and social factors mediate the effects of the considerations emphasized by these theories. Finally, it has provided a politico-historical account for understanding the origins of social beliefs in Argentina and Peru. The remainder of this chapter discusses the theoretical and

substantive implications of these findings as well as new research questions that emerge from the study.

Theoretical and Substantive Implications

To date, public opinion scholars have been mostly concerned with examining the extent to which redistributive attitudes reflect individual-level considerations such as interests, ethnic identity, values, and personality traits. Accordingly, their research has mostly centered on analyzing within-country variation. Cross-national differences in attitudes, which are arguably as or more important given that they can account for disparate political developments, have received much less attention. Furthermore, most scholarship concerned with this cross-national variation tends to assume that attitudes are shaped by constructs such as culture or institutions, and thus focus on studying these constructs, losing sight of attitudes and individuals (Wildavsky 1987).

As a result, public opinion scholarship has identified a plethora of considerations that explain individual-level variation in policy attitudes, but most often examines them in isolation without any consistent efforts at theoretical synthesis. As a consequence, scholars know that a lot of considerations can shape a given attitude, but know very little about why certain considerations matter in some contexts, but not in others, or about what explains their relative importance. Even less is known about the role that these considerations play in explaining cross-national variation in opinion. In turn, studies analyzing opinion at the aggregate-level have identified various system-level factors explaining variation, but do not specify the causal mechanisms through which these factors shape individuals' opinions.

This dissertation moves public opinion scholarship forward by addressing these weaknesses. First, rather than attempting to demonstrate the importance of a single consideration to the detriment of others, this study has sought to integrate a relatively novel explanation with existing accounts that are theoretically sound. This was achieved by identifying the contextual factors that mediate the salience of specific considerations. Second, by considering contextual differences across countries as well as compositional and salience differences that originate at the individual level, the dissertation has provided a framework to examine the individual-level foundations of cross-national variation in attitudes. In this way, this study constitutes a step toward the type of general theorizing that is currently lacking in comparative public opinion scholarship. It is worth noting that other recent research has moved in this direction by using multi-level modeling to examine increasingly available cross-national survey data. The empirical strategy employed in this dissertation provides a framework to conduct a similarly rigorous analysis whenever data limitations preclude multi-level statistical analysis or when a case-oriented approach is preferred.

This study also has important implications for existing theories of welfare state development. These theories focus on structural explanations that assume that public policies are a reflection of the dominant economic interests in society. According to power resource theory (Huber and Stephens 2001; Korpi 1983; Stephens 1979), generous welfare states develop wherever labor enjoys significant political strength and is capable of building stable left-wing government coalitions. In Varieties of Capitalism scholarship (Iversen 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2001; Mares 2003; Mares 2005), generous welfare

states develop wherever coalitions of employers and employees in sectors that want to socialize the costs of market risks are strengthened by patterns of specialization in the global economy. Earlier theories focusing on the social disruptions brought about by industrialization and economic growth also assume welfare states to be automatic responses to the emergence of new vulnerable populations (Wilensky 1975).

This dissertation has two interrelated implications for these theories. First, the study shows that social beliefs are an important consideration shaping attitudes about redistribution. Social beliefs did not play a central role in the initial implementation of welfare states in Argentina and Peru where mass inequality frames first developed after the political incorporation of the working and popular classes and as a consequence of the social policies that were implemented at this time. Social beliefs could, however, be central in explaining policy outcomes wherever the advent of mass politics preceded welfare state formation or expansion.

One could argue, for example, that the dominance of the self-reliance frame in the U.S. might have constrained the options available to politicians and policy-makers in the aftermath of the Great Depression, leading them to implement temporary workfare programs. Even in current times, social beliefs can pose important constrains on policy-makers trying to enact reforms in response to financial pressures. Theories of welfare state development should be overhauled to consider the role played by social beliefs not only during initial policy implementation, but also during consolidation and reform periods.

Second, according to existing theories, policy outcomes reflect the preferences of dominant social groups. This is likely accurate in advanced industrial democracies, where the state has been historically weak vis-à-vis societal actors. However, as the analysis of the Argentine experience during the Perón era shows, welfare state development can follow a substantially distinct path in which individual political actors that capture an autonomous state are central. Theories should be revised to incorporate this alternative state-centered path of welfare state development. A move in this direction should be particularly useful to understanding the welfare states of developing countries, where the state has often been a powerful, relatively autonomous actor, often enabling particular leaders to advance their platforms without major societal opposition.

Finally, this dissertation sheds light on the role of public opinion in policy-making and democratic politics, more generally. According to established theoretical frameworks, citizen preferences and policy positions are the fundamental inputs to the political system. Political elites respond to constituent demands or so the story goes. Various studies have indeed shown that policies are responsive to public opinion in various policy domains (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1983; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Brooks and Manza 2006). In these models, citizens' positions are taken as a given and thus remain under-theorized. This dissertation's theory about the origins of social beliefs and redistributive attitudes offers a number of insights about the process by which preferences and policy positions are formed and how they subsequently constrain subsequent policy developments. Thus this study follows Pierson's (1993; 1996)

suggestions to consider public opinion as both a consequence of and a cause of welfare state development and public policies, more generally.

This account sheds light on how public opinion develops when an issue first enters the public sphere—e.g., when the modern welfare state was first introduced—or when large sectors of the population are first allowed to engage in debates about a given issue—e.g., when the working and popular classes were first incorporated into politics. Relatively devoid of predispositions, at this stage, the public is relatively receptive to political elite cues and messages transmitted not only via rhetoric but also via the implementation of public policies. While elite actions are fundamental to explain the public opinion patterns that first emerge on a given issue, their role later becomes reactive or constrained by the opinions of the public. Indeed, as politics on a given issue become normalized, public opinion becomes quite resistant to elite attempts at influencing it, effectively constraining the range of policies that can be enacted or the reforms that can be attempted.

During periods of normal politics, we should observe high levels of correspondence between policies and the public's positions on a given issue. This normal politics stage is also the time during which current dominant theories of public opinion formation are more informative. Indeed, memory-based theories that focus on political elite messages or the role of the media are relatively accurate in explaining the incremental change in attitudes observed at this stage (e.g., Zaller 1992; Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Theories that focus on gradual transformation due to generational or cohort

effects and socialization are similarly informative (e.g., Cutler and Kaufman 1975; Mannheim 1952; Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 1976).

However, these theories and insights cannot explain the radical changes in public opinion that create opportunities for similarly radical institutional reforms. In contrast, the politico-historical theory of the origins of mass beliefs can account for these developments. As argued in this dissertation, crises make the public open to new ideas, providing political elites with leeway to implement major policy overhauls. This argument is in line with other research that highlights the role of crises in triggering public demand for institutional change (Weyland 2002; Weyland 2008).

It is important to mention that crises can only make the public open to policy reforms, but cannot guarantee that reforms will be accepted in the long-term. This ultimately depends on reforms' capacity to improve the well-being of the public. As shown by the case of Argentina in the 1990s, hyperinflation and a deep recession made the citizenry open to neoliberal reforms. However, the public started to question reforms as soon as unemployment and the regressive distributional effects of reforms became a source of concern. And the new major economic crisis of the early-2000s completed the swing back to redistributive social beliefs and policy positions that had characterized Argentine public opinion before the 1980s.

This way of understanding the role of public opinion in the social policy-making process has important substantive implications. First, it suggests that politicians and policy-makers should be particularly attentive to public opinion and social beliefs during times of normal politics. During these times, they will face particularly high barriers to

reform the policy status quo in directions that go against the dominant inequality frame. In contrast, incremental change that moves the policy status quo in the other direction—i.e., closer to the dominant frame—should be relatively easy to enact.

Recent developments in Argentina and Peru illustrate this point. In the 2000s, conditional cash transfer programs were introduced in both countries. In Argentina, programs were introduced in 2002 as a response to the massive increase in poverty brought about by the 2001-2002 economic crisis. In line with what one would expect given the dominance of redistributive beliefs, these programs were criticized because they were targeted rather than universal, because they involved a workfare component, and because of their inability to create conditions for beneficiaries to overcome their economic troubles in the short term (see, for example, Campos, Faur, and Pautassi 2007; CELS 2003). In other words, these programs were criticized as being not progressive enough. Since then, these programs have been overhauled to make access more universal and promote human capital accumulation by replacing workfare components with conditions related to children's education and healthcare. Public opinion has not been an obstacle to these reforms. While a 2007 national survey shows that Argentines were quick to point out the limitations of cash transfer programs, it also shows that only a minority of respondents (28%) was willing to eliminate programs without replacing them (Cruces and Rovner 2008, 64-66).

In Peru, conditional cash transfers were timidly introduced in 2005 and mostly in response to prompts from international organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. A survey of Lima inhabitants carried out in March of

2005 reveals that a sizable majority (61%) of those who had heard about the initiative opposed it because "creating employment rather than giving away money" was a better alternative (Ipsos Apoyo Opinión y Mercado 2009b). Furthermore, the survey also shows that 86% of respondents thought that this program would create incentives for the poor to become complacent with their situation (Ipsos Apoyo Opinión y Mercado 2009c). Given this opposition, the program has been expanded incrementally in the subsequent years despite its success at alleviating extreme poverty. More recently, the current government's initiative to introduce universal, non-contributory pensions for the elderly was met with skepticism by the public. To assuage the fears of critics, it was finally implemented as a pilot, means-tested program targeting the extreme poor.

This framework for understanding the relationship between public opinion and public policy also suggests that opportunities to introduce major reforms are a scarce commodity for politicians and policy-makers. After initial implementation and once mass politics has fully developed, the immediate aftermaths of economic crises—when uncertainty undermines individuals' predispositions—are likely the only periods during which major reforms can be enacted. The ultimate survival of drastic reforms implemented during these periods hinges, at least in part, on the generation of wide-ranging support among the public. The major pension system reforms introduced in the aftermath of the hyperinflationary crises underwent by both countries in 1989-1990 and the subsequent policy changes are illustrative cases of these points.

In Argentina, a mixed system was introduced to replace the public pay-as-you-go system in 1993. This system consisted of having workers continue to contribute to the

public system, which guaranteed a minimum pension upon retirement, and to a private individual capitalization system for additional benefits. After the return of the progressive wing of Peronism to power, all funds in the private system were nationalized, and the single, state-run, pay-as-you-go system was reinstated in 2008. In a context of widespread disenchantment with neoliberal reforms, substantial policy reversal took place without any major public upheaval.

Similar reforms were implemented in Peru during the same period of economic crisis, but, in contrast to Argentina, these reforms have enjoyed relatively high and broad public support. In Peru, the reforms involved a new pension system in which individuals were given the option of choosing between a private individual capitalization system and the existing public pay-as-you-go system upon entering the labor force. The system has only been modified slightly since its implementation. Complete policy reversal as in the case of Argentina is unthinkable, as it would likely be confronted with great opposition from the public.

Finally, this dissertation offers somewhat grim predictions about the prospects of developing welfare state policies that are more progressive in Argentina and Peru as well as in other similar countries. Chapter 3 showed that while redistributive and universal in aim, welfare state spending in Argentina is neutral at best. While the citizenry as a whole would in principle support equity-enhancing reforms in these policies, organized labor would oppose them given that it is the social actor that has mostly benefited from the current state of affairs. Barring the occurrence of another major crisis, and given the importance of this actor in Argentine politics, equity-enhancing reforms should be very

difficult to enact. In this context, improvements could only arise from creating new programs or expanding coverage of existing ones among relatively worse-off individuals, a development that is unlikely given the financial constraints faced by governments in developing countries.

In Peru, major policy changes in the direction of equity are perhaps even more improbable, as aspiring reformers would have to convince public opinion of their convenience. In this case, expanding the coverage of existing programs would also be difficult and creating new ones would only be possible if proposed programs involved means testing and targeting. Despite the fact that this type of program is highly progressive, a move in this direction would take Peru farther away from the possibility of being able to implement a universal welfare state.

Avenues for Future Research

Existing studies suggest that social beliefs can account for variation in redistributive attitudes not only within the U.S. and Europe, but also across the two contexts (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos 2005; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Benabou and Tirole 2006). This dissertation has provided evidence indicating that this is also the case in Argentina and Peru. Moreover, and unlike in the case of advanced industrial democracies, it has shown that, other than income, considerations suggested by theories based on interests and group identity do not shape support for redistribution in these two countries. The dissertation also developed an account of the origins of inequality frames.

The natural next step to follow would be to explore whether these findings are generalizable to other countries in Latin America and the developing world. The

discussion in Chapter 4 suggests that the elements that make interest less salient in Argentina and Peru should also be present in other developing countries. Considerations suggested by theories based on group identity should be salient in countries were ethnicity has been an important social or political cleavage. Finally, social beliefs should inform support for redistribution regardless of context. Besides exploring whether these findings hold in other countries, future research should also examine the extent to which the politico-historical framework developed to understand the origins of mass social beliefs can be generalized to other policy domains.

This dissertation suggests at least three additional avenues for future research. The first one stems from the limitations of the items used to measure redistributive attitudes in this study. As discussed in Chapter 3, because of vagueness in the items' wording, some respondents might have answered them having a general idea of redistribution in mind, while others might have expresses attitudes toward specific policies. These specific policies could themselves vary from very general social policies like education and healthcare to more targeted programs such as old-age pensions and unemployment benefits. Future research could shed light on the role that the various factors explored here play in shaping redistributive attitudes as the level of abstractness of attitude objects varies from specific policies to the more abstract construct of redistribution.

A particularly interesting hypothesis worth exploring is whether material interests become more relevant as attitude objects become more specific. For example, one would expect retirees, students, and welfare payment recipients to be particularly concerned about pensions, education, and cash transfer programs, respectively. In contrast, more

abstract considerations like social beliefs should play a bigger role in informing more abstract opinions about inequality or redistributive policies as a whole. Inquiring about the policies that individuals have in mind when answering general questions about reducing inequality could provide additional insights about the role of social beliefs. For instance, two individuals might express similar levels of support for redistribution. Suppose one proposes general, opportunities-enhancing social policies while the other one suggests a measure involving expropriation. Social beliefs could help explain these preferences among potential policy solutions to address inequality.

The second avenue for further research is related to this dissertation's finding that the salience of individual-level factors in informing support for redistribution varies within countries over time.[63] For example, the analysis in Chapter 4 revealed that being self-employed or a student was associated with lower support for redistribution in Wave 4 of the WVS, but not in the other two waves in Argentina. In Chapter 5, the evidence indicated that believing that hard work does not always lead to success was associated with higher levels of support in Wave 3, but with lower levels of support in Wave 5 in both countries under study.

The discussion hypothesized that these and other instances of effect heterogeneity were the result of changing political circumstances related to the enactment of neoliberal

[63] To the best of the author's knowledge, this dissertation is the first study to document this type of effect heterogeneity. Existing studies of redistributive attitudes generally analyze a single cross section of surveys (e.g., Corneo and Grüner 2002; Cusack et al. 2006; Iversen 2005; Rehm 2005) or pool all available data and thus are not designed to document heterogeneity (e.g., Alesina and Giuliano 2009). Some studies analyze heterogeneity in the effects of class status across countries (Guillaud 2008; Isaksson and Lindskog 2007; Kumlin and Svallfors 2007), but none allows for the possibility of within-country across-time effect heterogeneity.

reforms in the 1990s. This is a plausible explanation for heterogeneity as observed in Argentina and Peru, but it remains to be seen if this explanation can withstand systematic assessment. This will only be possible as more data become available. Additional data will also make it possible to determine whether this heterogeneity is substantively important or simply unimportant, minor deviations from otherwise well-established patterns. While comparative surveys that include developing countries are becoming more and more commonplace, they are still relatively scarce. Given this limitation, future research on this front should probably begin by exploring effect heterogeneity in the context of advanced industrial democracies where there is more opportunity to examine this over an extended period of time.

Finally, this study has documented that substantial differences in levels of support for redistribution persist across the two countries under study even after controlling for individual-level factors. In other words, Argentines are less supportive of redistribution than Peruvians regardless of their individual characteristics. Given the research design of this study, it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions about the sources of these population-wide differences. Thus, this is a topic that future research should address—not only in the case of differences between Argentina and Peru, but also more general cross-national differences that cannot be explained by individual-level differences.

It would be particularly interesting to explore whether inequality frames could account for population-wide differences by having a direct effect on aggregate levels of support. As shown in Chapter 5, individuals who hold the redistributive frame are more supportive of redistribution than those who hold the self-reliance frame. That chapter also

showed that the former frame is more widespread among Argentines than among Peruvians. Accounting for these individual-level differences helps explain the divergence in redistributive attitudes across the two countries, but only partially. Could the relative dominance of the redistributive frame lead to an across the board increase in support? Conversely, could the relative dominance of the self-reliance frame lead to an across the board decrease in support? This could be the case if inequality frames constrained the levels of redistribution that all or a large majority of individuals within a given country deem acceptable.

Future research could explore the mechanisms through which this effect on aggregate support might occur. One avenue worth exploring is how dominant inequality frames are transmitted through political socialization involving the family, educational systems, and mass media. It would also be interesting to explore how dominant frames affect the nature of political competition, especially through the structure of political party systems, and how this in turn shapes aggregate support.

In conclusion, while this dissertation has made several contributions, it also opens the door to future research on many fronts. Future research should further test the arguments made here in other contexts. It should also explore the generalizability of the findings in policy domains beyond redistribution. Finally, it should explore what else—other than compositional and salience differences in social beliefs—can help explain the cross-national divergence in support for redistribution.

Appendix 1
Additional Tables

Table A1.1
Descriptive Statistics for Items Used to Measure Support for Redistribution

Item	Wave/Year	Observations		Mean		Standard Deviation		Min	Max
		Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru		
EQUALITY	Wave 3	1054	1158	5.01	4.38	3.22	3.20	1	10
	Wave 4	1240	1483	6.08	3.49	3.32	2.81	1	10
	Wave 5	974	1486	5.73	3.50	3.71	2.80	1	10
RESPONSIBILITY	Wave 3	1049	1136	5.77	5.46	3.21	3.18	1	10
	Wave 4	1239	1476	6.64	5.29	3.22	3.22	1	10
	Wave 5	964	1430	6.05	5.14	3.58	3.19	1	10
INEQUALITY	2008	1402	1454	6.17	5.75	1.33	1.45	1	7
	2010	1363	1470	5.90	5.56	1.57	1.43	1	7
WELL-BEING	2008	1411	1472	6.01	5.50	1.36	1.54	1	7
	2010	1365	1471	5.82	5.35	1.55	1.50	1	7

Table A1.2
Income Brackets and Nominal Marginal Tax Rates
in Argentina and Peru

Country	Income Bracket (US$)[a]	Marginal Tax Rate (%)
Argentina	0 - 2,386	9
	2,386 - 4,772	14
	4,772 - 7,158	19
	7,158 - 14,316	23
	1,4316 - 2,1475	27
	21,475 - 28,633	31
	28,633 and up	35
Peru	0 - 9,197	0
	9,197 - 44,672	15
	4,672 - 80,146	21
	80,146 and up	30

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011).

[a] Exchange rates: 0.2686 US$ per Argentinean Peso (Argentine Central Bank, 09/21/2011); 0.3650 US$ per Peruvian Nuevo Sol (Peruvian Central Bank, 09/21/2011)

Table A1.3
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables in Analyses Using WVS Data

Variable	Wave/Year	Observations		Mean		Standard Deviation		Min		Max	
		Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru
INCOME[a]	Wave 3	880	1017	4.57	3.26	2.74	1.86	1	1	10	10
	Wave 4	1280	1501	4.88	3.22	1.33	1.82	1.86	1	8.94	10
	Wave 5	1002	1389	5.06	2.81	1.45	1.68	1.75	1	8.90	10
UNION	Wave 3	1079	1210	0.57	0.17	0.23	0.37	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.03	0.04	0.16	0.21	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1496	0.10	0.06	0.30	0.24	0	0	1	1
UNEMPLOYED	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.12	0.06	0.32	0.24	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.11	0.12	0.32	0.32	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1495	0.07	0.04	0.33	0.21	0	0	1	1
SELF-EMPLOYED	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.15	0.17	0.35	0.38	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.16	0.16	0.37	0.36	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1495	0.12	0.43	0.33	0.50	0	0	1	1
RETIRED	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.14	0.04	0.35	0.20	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.13	0.04	0.33	0.19	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1495	0.12	0.03	0.33	0.18	0	0	1	1

(cont…)

(cont…)

STUDENT	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.06	0.14	0.24	0.35	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.07	0.15	0.25	0.35	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1495	0.06	0.11	0.24	0.31	0	0	1	1
OTHER STATUS	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.20	0.29	0.40	0.45	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.18	0.21	0.38	0.41	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1495	0.07	0.22	0.26	0.21	0	0	1	1
MANAGER	Wave 3	1079	1192	0.07	0.11	0.25	0.31	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1499	0.03	0.10	0.18	0.30	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	N/A	0.06	N/A	0.24	N/A	0	N/A	1	N/A
MANUAL	Wave 3	1079	1192	0.08	0.12	0.27	0.32	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1499	0.14	0.15	0.35	0.36	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	N/A	0.22	N/A	0.41	N/A	0	N/A	1	N/A
MINORITY	Wave 5	980	N/A	0.07	N/A	0.26	N/A	0	N/A	1	N/A
MESTIZO	Wave 3	N/A	1204	N/A	0.72	N/A	0.45	N/A	0	N/A	1
	Wave 4	N/A	1487	N/A	0.71	N/A	0.45	N/A	0	N/A	1
	Wave 5	N/A	1405	N/A	0.62	N/A	0.49	N/A	0	N/A	1
INDIGENOUS	Wave 3	N/A	1204	N/A	0.04	N/A	0.20	N/A	0	N/A	1
	Wave 5	N/A	1405	N/A	0.29	N/A	0.45	N/A	0	N/A	1

(cont…)

(cont…)

AFRO-DESCENDENT	Wave 3	N/A	1204	N/A	0.05	N/A	0.22	N/A	0	N/A	1
	Wave 5	N/A	1405	N/A	0.03	N/A	0.16	N/A	0	N/A	1
OTHER MINORITY	Wave 3	N/A	1204	N/A	0.06	N/A	0.24	N/A	0	N/A	1
	Wave 4	N/A	1487	N/A	0.04	N/A	0.21	N/A	0	N/A	1
	Wave 5	N/A	1405	N/A	0.01	N/A	0.12	N/A	0	N/A	1
RACE	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.05	0.12	0.21	0.32	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.05	0.11	0.21	0.32	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1500	0.02	0.06	0.14	0.24	0	0	1	1
IMMIGRANT	Wave 3	1079	N/A	0.05	N/A	0.23	N/A	0	N/A	1	N/A
	Wave 4	1280	N/A	0.06	N/A	0.24	N/A	0	N/A	1	N/A
	Wave 5	1002	N/A	0.03	N/A	0.17	N/A	0	N/A	1	N/A
WEALTH	Wave 3	1030	1117	4.41	4.10	2.93	2.82	1	1	10	10
	Wave 5	931	1398	4.51	3.63	3.19	2.49	1	1	10	10
OUTCOMES	Wave 3	1061	1161	5.05	3.60	3.14	2.82	1	1	10	10
	Wave 5	976	1431	4.99	4.61	3.32	3.02	1	1	10	10
POVERTY1	Wave 3	877	1056	0.12	0.24	0.32	0.43	0	0	1	1
POVERTY2	Wave 3	877	1056	0.12	0.11	0.32	0.32	0	0	1	1
POVERTY3	Wave 3	877	1056	0.62	0.38	0.49	0.48	0	0	1	1

(cont…)

(cont…)

FEMALE	Wave 3	1079	1211	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1501	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1500	0.53	0.51	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1
AGE	Wave 3	1079	1211	42.73	34.86	17.15	13.08	17	18	89	70
	Wave 4	1280	1501	42.03	35.50	17.42	12.96	18	18	90	65
	Wave 5	1002	1500	42.55	37.62	17.59	14.90	18	18	88	89
PRIMARY SCHOOL	Wave 3	1079	1209	0.45	0.31	0.50	0.46	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1497	0.52	0.26	0.50	0.44	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1500	0.52	0.29	0.50	0.46	0	0	1	1
SECONDARY SCHOOL	Wave 3	1079	1209	0.38	0.47	0.49	0.50	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1497	0.32	0.50	0.48	0.50	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1500	0.32	0.46	0.47	0.50	0	0	1	1
COLLEGE	Wave 3	1079	1209	0.07	0.14	0.25	0.34	0	0	1	1
	Wave 4	1280	1497	0.05	0.19	0.21	0.39	0	0	1	1
	Wave 5	1002	1500	0.05	0.12	0.21	0.32	0	0	1	1

Table A1.4
Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables in Analyses Using LAPOP Data

Variable	Wave/Year	Observations		Mean		Standard Deviation		Min		Max	
		Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru	Argentina	Peru
INCOME	2008	1107	1385	4.78	4.78	2.64	2.16	0	0	10	10
	2010	1132	1371	3.10	5.08	2.06	2.06	0	0	10	10
UNEMPLOYED	2008	1479	1500	0.04	0.04	0.20	0.21	0	0	1	1
	2010	1402	1499	0.10	0.04	0.30	0.21	0	0	1	1
UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE	2008	1461	1428	0.04	0.03	0.20	0.16	0	0	1	1
	2010	1361	1456	0.10	0.07	0.30	0.26	0	0	1	1
SELF-EMPLOYED	2008	1427	1499	0.17	0.30	0.38	0.46	0	0	1	1
	2010	1373	1494	0.27	0.30	0.44	0.46	0	0	1	1
RETIRED	2008	1479	1500	0.06	0.05	0.24	0.22	0	0	1	1
	2010	1402	1499	0.05	0.05	0.22	0.22	0	0	1	1
STUDENT	2008	1479	1500	0.13	0.09	0.33	0.28	0	0	1	1
	2010	1402	1499	0.10	0.09	0.30	0.29	0	0	1	1

(cont…)

(cont…)

OTHER STATUS	2008	1479	1500	0.12	0.26	0.32	0.44	0	0	1	1
	2010	1402	1499	0.10	0.25	0.30	0.43	0	0	1	1
UNION	2008	1474	1481	0.07	0.11	0.25	0.31	0	0	1	1
UPPER SERVICE	2008	1459	1499	0.08	0.04	0.28	0.21	0	0	1	1
	2010	N/A	1493	N/A	0.05	N/A	0.23	N/A	0	N/A	1
MANUAL	2008	1459	1499	0.06	0.06	0.23	0.24	0	0	1	1
	2010	N/A	1493	N/A	0.06	N/A	0.24	N/A	0	N/A	1
POUM	2010	1232	1312	0.34	0.42	0.47	0.49	0	0	1	1
FODM	2010	1232	1312	0.22	0.11	0.41	0.31	0	0	1	1
MESTIZO	2008	1424	1445	0.24	0.76	0.43	0.43	0	0	1	1
	2010	1361	1457	0.24	0.79	0.43	0.41	0	0	1	1
INDIGENOUS	2008	1424	1445	0.02	0.07	0.13	0.26	0	0	1	1
	2010	1361	1457	0.02	0.03	0.13	0.18	0	0	1	1
AFRO-DESCENDENT	2008	1424	1445	0.02	0.03	0.13	0.17	0	0	1	1
	2010	1361	1457	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.21	0	0	1	1

(cont…)

(cont…)

OTHER MINORITY	2008	1424	1445	0.01	0.02	0.10	0.12	0	0	1	1
	2010	1361	1457	0.01	0.01	0.08	0.07	0	0	1	1
PREJUDICE1	2010	N/A	1438	N/A	2.48	N/A	1.56	N/A	1	N/A	7
PREJUDICE2	2010	N/A	1437	N/A	2.89	N/A	1.77	N/A	1	N/A	7
FEMALE	2008	1486	1500	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1
	2010	1410	1500	0.51	0.50	0.50	0.50	0	0	1	1
AGE	2008	1477	1500	36.65	39.02	14.50	15.78	18	18	81	86
	2010	1408	1500	35.49	39.04	14.13	16.09	18	18	70	87
PRIMARY SCHOOL	2008	1482	1499	0.43	0.17	0.49	0.38	0	0	1	1
	2010	1409	1500	0.43	0.18	0.50	0.38	0	0	1	1
SECONDARY SCHOOL	2008	1482	1499	0.30	0.52	0.46	0.50	0	0	1	1
	2010	1409	1500	0.28	0.54	0.45	0.50	0	0	1	1
COLLEGE	2008	1482	1499	0.12	0.15	0.32	0.36	0	0	1	1
	2010	1409	1500	0.09	0.17	0.28	0.38	0	0	1	1
RURAL	2008	1486	150	0.11	0.25	0.31	0.43	0	0	1	1
	2010	1410	1500	0.10	0.23	0.30	0.42	0	0	1	1

Table A1.5
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina
(RESPONSIBILITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Income	-0.0353	-0.0321	-0.0150	0.0040	-0.0145	0.0036
	(0.0455)	(0.0456)	(0.0692)	(0.0709)	(0.0769)	(0.0835)
Union	0.0772	0.0999	0.1109	0.1648	-0.0237	-0.0247
	(0.4370)	(0.4365)	(0.5665)	(0.5663)	(0.3676)	(0.3687)
Unemployed	0.3627	0.5705	0.3979	0.5129	0.6717	0.5284
	(0.3710)	(0.4035)	(0.3184)	(0.3518)	(0.4595)	(0.5012)
Self-Employed	0.1436	0.3462	-0.2142	-0.1053	-0.0361	-0.1813
	(0.3087)	(0.3411)	(0.2715)	(0.3090)	(0.3414)	(0.3953)
Retired	0.2758	0.5045	0.3643	0.4901	0.0850	-0.0425
	(0.4228)	(0.4555)	(0.2981)	(0.3383)	(0.3582)	(0.4123)
Student	0.1250	0.2918	-0.5054	-0.4064	0.3716	0.2188
	(0.4629)	(0.4816)	(0.3450)	(0.3727)	(0.4364)	(0.4800)
Other Status	-0.7417 **	-0.5507	0.5676 **	0.6916 **	-0.4043	-0.5391
	(0.3363)	(0.3689)	(0.2695)	(0.3125)	(0.3175)	(0.3762)
Manager		0.5740		-0.3435		-0.5591
		(0.5257)		(0.5679)		(0.4398)
Worker		0.3743		0.3476		-0.1434
		(0.4439)		(0.3385)		(0.3420)
Female	0.1051	0.1483				
	(0.2274)	(0.2283)				
Age	0.0635 *	0.0618 *				
	(0.0368)	(0.0367)				
Age*Age	-0.0008 **	-0.0008 **				
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)				
Primary School	-0.4718	-0.4611				
	(0.3882)	(0.3877)				
Secondary School	-0.6124	-0.5634				
	(0.4169)	(0.4185)				
College	-0.6241	-0.5775				
	(0.5274)	(0.5306)				
Constant	5.4283 ***	5.2161 ***	6.6237 ***	6.4175 ***	6.1624 ***	6.2146 ***
	(0.8922)	(0.9127)	(0.3994)	(0.4563)	(0.4719)	(0.5525)
N	861	861	1238	1238	969	969
R-squared	0.0201	0.0222	0.0108	0.0124	0.0064	0.0077

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01.
Controls not included in waves four and five as they were used to predict—and thus are highly correlated with—the income variable, which is the one of substantive interest.

Table A1.6
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru
(RESPONSIBILITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.1038 *	-0.1070 *	0.0360	0.0279	-0.0036
	(0.0561)	(0.0567)	(0.0496)	(0.0499)	(0.0575)
Union	0.0638	0.1300	-0.3459	-0.3611	-0.1541
	(0.2731)	(0.2772)	(0.4201)	(0.4162)	(0.3522)
Unemployed	0.3469	0.0360	-0.2937	-0.4353	0.7489
	(0.4670)	(0.5870)	(0.3026)	(0.3927)	(0.4635)
Self-Employed	-0.3487	-0.6705	-0.0964	-0.2150	-0.1713
	(0.3159)	(0.4827)	(0.2562)	(0.3615)	(0.2609)
Retired	0.1139	-0.2383	-0.1331	-0.2130	-0.1573
	(0.6229)	(0.7341)	(0.5043)	(0.5737)	(0.5955)
Student	-0.2347	-0.5025	0.6294 **	0.4731	-0.3331
	(0.3808)	(0.5123)	(0.3052)	(0.3892)	(0.3579)
Other Status	-0.0811	-0.4182	0.0463	-0.0749	-0.2857
	(0.3104)	(0.4859)	(0.2818)	(0.3792)	(0.3272)
Manager		-0.6271		0.2661	
		(0.5263)		(0.4002)	
Worker		-0.2781		-0.4025	
		(0.5146)		(0.3641)	
Female	-0.0965	-0.0506	-0.2805	-0.3290 *	-0.0754
	(0.2288)	(0.2335)	(0.1928)	(0.1944)	(0.1981)
Age	0.1025 *	0.1115 **	0.0197	0.0114	-0.0344
	(0.0542)	(0.0544)	(0.0480)	(0.0484)	(0.0365)
Age*Age	-0.0012 *	-0.0013 *	-0.0004	-0.0003	0.0004
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0004)
Primary School	-0.4350	-0.5292	-0.3780	-0.3857	-0.1138
	(0.4397)	(0.4400)	(0.4445)	(0.4448)	(0.3240)
Secondary School	-0.6893	-0.7185 *	-0.4333	-0.4623	-0.3537
	(0.4284)	(0.4292)	(0.4401)	(0.4409)	(0.3270)
College	-1.2594 **	-1.2250 **	-0.5482	-0.7423	-0.2729
	(0.4958)	(0.5095)	(0.4786)	(0.4912)	(0.4059)
Constant	4.6698 ***	4.8148 ***	5.5145 ***	5.8940 ***	6.1525 ***
	(1.1105)	(1.1449)	(0.9979)	(1.0462)	(0.8246)
N	960	950	1472	1470	1321
R-squared	0.0229	0.0264	0.0119	0.0141	0.0085

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01.
Occupational category variable not included because item was not available in Wave 5.

Table A1.7
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru
(WELL-BEING Item)

Independent Variables	ARGENTINA				PERU				
	2008		2010		2008		2010		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Income	-0.0254	-0.0277	0.0371	0.0364	-0.0103	-0.0115	0.0039	0.0047	-0.0072
	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.0282)	(0.0289)	(0.0248)	(0.0247)	(0.0244)	(0.0245)	(0.0253)
Unemployed	-0.6729	-0.8014 **	-0.0474	-0.0594	0.3782 **	0.4083 **	0.5609 ***	0.6404 ***	0.6854 ***
	(0.4091)	(0.4070)	(0.1747)	(0.1883)	(0.1790)	(0.1927)	(0.1941)	(0.2089)	(0.1924)
Unemployment Exp.	0.4810	0.4714	0.5240 ***	0.6516 ***	0.0479	0.0629	0.2112	0.2056	0.1675
	(0.3583)	(0.3537)	(0.1436)	(0.1608)	(0.2482)	(0.2487)	(0.1589)	(0.1589)	(0.1715)
Self-Employed	-0.2008	-0.3408 ***	-0.1641	-0.1749	0.0640	0.0914	-0.0045	0.0792	-0.0327
	(0.1272)	(0.1310)	(0.1249)	(0.1300)	(0.1240)	(0.1438)	(0.1114)	(0.1340)	(0.1180)
Retired	-0.4398 **	-0.5722 ***	-0.2934	-0.3390	-0.3050	-0.2646	-0.0428	0.0440	-0.0399
	(0.2183)	(0.2195)	(0.2566)	(0.2882)	(0.2856)	(0.2973)	(0.2449)	(0.2567)	(0.2598)
Student	-0.1601	-0.2684 *	-0.3330	-0.3635 *	0.0684	0.0955	-0.0143	0.0700	0.0154
	(0.1577)	(0.1582)	(0.2156)	(0.2198)	(0.1898)	(0.2012)	(0.1766)	(0.1885)	(0.1798)
Other Status	-0.4273 ***	-0.5272 ***	-0.0024	0.0364	0.0847	0.1106	0.0781	0.1528	0.1082
	(0.1577)	(0.1584)	(0.1810)	(0.1938)	(0.1507)	(0.1639)	0.1403	(0.1542)	(0.1463)
Union[a]	-0.0364	-0.0036			0.0049	0.0025			
	(0.1538)	(0.1472)			(0.1382)	(0.1392)			
Upper Service[b]		-0.2788				0.2299		0.0807	
		(0.1740)				(0.2406)		(0.2184)	
Manual[b]		-0.5893 ***				0.0100		0.2058	
		(0.2132)				(0.2001)		(0.1891)	
POUM[c]				0.4112 ***					0.2218 **
				(0.1090)					(0.0928)
FODM[c]				-0.4968 ***					0.0317
				(0.1415)					(0.1523)

(cont…)

(cont…)

Independent Variables	ARGENTINA				PERU				
	2008		2010		2008		2010		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Female	0.0575	-0.0166	0.0677	0.0910	-0.1116	-0.1099	-0.1804 *	-0.1629 *	-0.2377 **
	(0.0907)	(0.0922)	(0.0977)	(0.1005)	(0.1023)	(0.1037)	(0.0953)	(0.0968)	(0.1006)
Age	-0.0221	-0.0222	-0.0087	-0.0136	0.0097	0.0100	0.0347 **	0.0360 **	0.0386 **
	(0.0200)	(0.0198)	(0.0225)	(0.0239)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0161)	(0.0162)	(0.0175)
Age*Age	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002	0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0004 **	-0.0004 **	-0.0004 **
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
Primary School	-0.2599 *	-0.2723 **	-0.1985	-0.1544	0.2494	0.2536	-0.1647	-0.1684	-0.2291
	(0.1366)	(0.1334)	(0.1389)	(0.1533)	(0.1624)	(0.1631)	(0.1834)	(0.1834)	(0.1980)
Secondary School	0.0186	-0.0218	0.1705	0.1673	-0.1681	-0.1645	0.1460	0.1508	0.1588
	(0.1006)	(0.1013)	(0.1144)	(0.1182)	(0.1175)	(0.1176)	(0.1259)	(0.1259)	(0.1358)
College	-0.0391	0.0586	-0.5673 ***	-0.5353 ***	0.0085	-0.0490	-0.0767	-0.0529	-0.0378
	(0.1432)	(0.1529)	(0.1950)	(0.1999)	(0.1424)	(0.1627)	(0.1213)	(0.1315)	(0.1265)
Rural	0.0841	0.1094	-0.0661	-0.0780	-0.1442	-0.1415	-0.2496 **	-0.2415 **	-0.2100 *
	(0.1453)	(0.1408)	(0.1656)	(0.1755)	(0.1088)	(0.1092)	(0.1114)	(0.1116)	(0.1176)
Constant	6.8374 ***	7.0188 ***	5.9582 ***	5.8550 ***	5.3407 ***	5.3096 ***	4.8725 ***	4.7531 ***	4.7625 ***
	(0.3944)	(0.3923)	(0.4150)	(0.4475)	(0.4499)	(0.4521)	(0.3941)	(0.4023)	(0.4250)
N	992	988	1045	932	1279	1278	1314	1311	1159
R-squared	0.0199	0.0305	0.0275	0.0780	0.0096	0.0103	0.0217	0.0230	0.0302

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. *<0.10; **<0.05; ***<0.01.

[a] Item used to construct union membership dummy was only available in 2008 surveys.

[b] Items used to construct occupational category dummies were only available for Argentina in 2008.

[c] Item used to construct economic prospects dummies was only available in 2010 surveys.

Table A1.8
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina,
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice
(RESPONSIBILITY Item)

Independent Variables[a]	Wave 3		Wave 4		Wave 5
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.0360	-0.0353	0.3267	0.3245	-0.0759
	(0.0455)	(0.0455)	(0.2204)	(0.2195)	(0.2585)
Union	0.0777	0.0782	0.1426	0.1492	-0.0459
	(0.4380)	(0.4374)	(0.5762)	(0.5824)	(0.3781)
Unemployed	0.3712	0.3644	0.3580	0.3613	0.6076
	(0.3714)	(0.3713)	(0.3207)	(0.3191)	(0.4681)
Self-Employed	0.1420	0.1439	-0.2334	-0.2113	-0.0908
	(0.3085)	(0.3088)	(0.2742)	(0.2750)	(0.3522)
Retired	0.2699	0.2738	-0.0314	-0.0083	-0.0190
	(0.4220)	(0.4239)	(0.3786)	(0.3794)	(0.4911)
Student	0.1208	0.1242	-0.5433	-0.5297	0.2574
	(0.4635)	(0.4637)	(0.3895)	(0.3902)	(0.4781)
Other Status	-0.7460 **	-0.7427 **	0.4361	0.4407	-0.3066
	(0.3362)	(0.3366)	(0.2948)	(0.2940)	(0.3444)
Minority[b]					0.8431 **
					(0.3980)
Race[c]	-0.1928		0.0559		
	(0.5007)		(0.4243)		
Immigrant		-0.0359		-0.5265	-0.6841
		(0.4699)		(0.4017)	(0.7178)
Female	0.1058	0.1052	0.2955	0.2741	-0.1145
	(0.2276)	(0.2275)	(0.2241)	(0.2235)	(0.2606)
Age	0.0633 *	0.0634 *	0.0012	0.0016	-0.0348
	(0.0368)	(0.0369)	(0.0322)	(0.0322)	(0.0388)
Age*Age	-0.0008 **	-0.0008 **	0.0002	0.0001	0.0004
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Primary School	-0.4736	-0.4704	-0.8623 **	-0.8671 **	0.7496
	(0.3875)	(0.3885)	(0.4219)	(0.4203)	(0.5505)
Secondary School	-0.6207	-0.6131	-1.0120	-1.0307	0.4387
	(0.4162)	(0.4174)	(0.7350)	(0.7327)	(0.8891)
College	-0.6310	-0.6233	-2.7016 **	-2.7308 **	1.0536
	(0.5269)	(0.5277)	(1.2500)	(1.2467)	(1.4587)
Constant	5.4448 ***	5.4312 ***	5.4241 ***	5.4696 ***	6.6436 ***
	(0.8938)	(0.8945)	(1.1020)	(1.0982)	(1.2908)
N	861	861	1238	1238	947
R-squared	0.0203	0.0201	0.0214	0.2290	0.0168

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; **<prob<0.05; ***prob<0.01.

[a] Interactions between minority identification and the two types of prejudice not included because intersections contained less than 30 respondents.

[b] Item used to construct ethnic identification dummy was only available in Wave 5.

[c] Dummy indicating prejudice toward racial outgroups not included in Wave 5 because category contained less than 30 respondents.

Table A1.9
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru,
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice
(RESPONSIBILITY Item)

Independent Variables[a]	Wave 3	Wave 4	Wave 5
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Income	-0.1201 **	0.0300	-0.0371
	(0.0563)	(0.0526)	(0.0599)
Union	0.0666	-0.3825	-0.0788
	(0.2793)	(0.4277)	(0.3575)
Unemployed	0.3298	-0.3317	0.4747
	(0.4771)	(0.3047)	(0.4678)
Self-Employed	-0.3055	-0.1175	-0.1896
	(0.3176)	(0.2587)	(0.2667)
Retired	0.1877	-0.1738	-0.1600
	(0.6217)	(0.5030)	(0.5902)
Student	-0.3053	0.5731 *	-0.2329
	(0.3829)	(0.3063)	(0.3636)
Other Status	-0.0575	-0.0060	-0.3521
	(0.3100)	(0.2835)	(0.3356)
Mestizo[b]	0.0856	0.0583	-0.8082 **
	(0.3038)	(0.2163)	(0.3656)
Indigenous[b]	-0.3168		-1.2586 ***
	(0.5762)		(0.3956)
Afro-descendent[b]	-0.2679		0.2500
	(0.5020)		(0.7066)
Other Minority[c]	0.3979	0.2220	
	(0.5340)	(0.4503)	
Race	1.2059 *	0.7794	-0.4175
	(0.6166)	(0.6455)	(1.2981)
Mestizo*Race[d]	-1.5117 **	-0.7265	1.4595
	(0.7354)	(0.7270)	(1.4124)
Indigenous*Race			1.6668
			(1.4502)
N	953	1459	1249
R-squared	0.0314	0.0133	0.0241

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. Models include a constant and the usual controls. Coefficients not reported to economize space, but consistent with those in Table A1.6.

[a] Interactions between Afro-descendent and other minority identifications and prejudice not included because intersections contained less than 30 respondents.

[b] *Mestizos*, indigenous, and Afro-descendents are classified into a single category in Wave 4 due to item limitations.

[c] Other minority identification not included in Wave 5 because category contained less than 30 respondents; these respondents are included in the base category.

[d] Interaction between indigenous identification and prejudice not included in Wave 3 because intersection contained less than 30 respondents.

Table A1.10
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina and Peru,
Including Ethnic Identification and Prejudice
(WELL-BEING Item)

Independent Variables[a]	ARGENTINA		PERU		
	2008	2010	2008	2010	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.0233	0.0341	-0.0117	-0.0188	-0.0252
	(0.0179)	(0.0294)	(0.0254)	(0.0247)	(0.0254)
Unemployed	-0.6237	-0.0951	0.3425 *	0.6582 ***	0.6806 ***
	(0.4521)	(0.1880)	(0.1874)	(0.1981)	(0.2078)
Unemployment Exp.	0.5103	0.6602 ***	0.0060	0.0950	0.0909
	(0.3799)	(0.1602)	(0.2472)	(0.1781)	(0.1814)
Self-Employed	-0.1831	-0.1775	0.0248	-0.0412	-0.0260
	(0.1299)	(0.1321)	(0.1243)	(0.1184)	(0.1217)
Retired	-0.4663 **	-0.3613	-0.3404	-0.0316	-0.0207
	(0.2316)	(0.2975)	(0.2880)	(0.2644)	(0.2633)
Student	-0.1617	-0.4320 *	0.0155	0.0610	0.0370
	(0.1599)	(0.2217)	(0.1914)	(0.1853)	(0.1854)
Other Status	-0.4641 ***	0.0766	0.0207	0.0879	0.1364
	(0.1599)	(0.2009)	(0.1508)	(0.1438)	(0.1493)
Union[b]	-0.0621		0.0422		
	(0.1569)		(0.1373)		
POUM[c]		0.4189 ***		0.1969 **	0.2544 ***
		(0.1111)		(0.0931)	(0.0938)
FODM[c]		-0.4378 ***		-0.0022	0.0115
		(0.1439)		(0.1541)	(0.1554)
Mestizo	0.0669	-0.4421 ***	0.1141	0.2290 *	0.2142
	(0.1019)	(0.1263)	(0.1357)	(0.1315)	(0.1352)
Indigenous[d]	0.1594	0.6327	0.1929	0.3811	0.3235
	(0.2718)	(0.4547)	(0.2117)	(0.2698)	(0.2798)
Afro-descendent[d]			-0.1570	-0.0150	-0.0016
			(0.3192)	(0.2461)	(0.2436)
Prejudice1				-0.2017 ***	
				(0.0333)	
Prejudice2					-0.1033 ***
					(0.0266)
N	962	905	1235	1113	1109
R-squared	0.0198	0.0968	0.0107	0.0794	0.0536

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01. Models include a constant and the usual controls; coefficients are not reported to economize space, but are consistent with those in Table A1.7.

[a] Other minority identification dummy not included because category contained less than 30 respondents for all country-years. These respondents are included in the base category.

[b] Item used to construct union membership dummy was only available in 2008 surveys.

[c] Item used to construct economic prospects dummies was only available in 2010 surveys.

[d] Afro-descendent respondents dummy not included for Argentina models because category contained less than 30 respondents. These respondents are included in indigenous category.

Table A1.11
Models of Support for Redistribution in Argentina,
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty
(RESPONSIBILITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3			Wave 5	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.0430	-0.0283	-0.0436	0.0622	0.0711
	(0.0461)	(0.0456)	(0.0505)	(0.2653)	(0.2579)
Union	0.0792	0.0298	0.0185	0.0426	0.0209
	(0.4423)	(0.4415)	(0.4616)	(0.3787)	(0.3740)
Unemployed	0.3673	0.3466	0.2902	0.7444	0.6159
	(0.3701)	(0.3688)	(0.4062)	(0.4818)	(0.4662)
Self-Employed	0.1432	0.1101	0.2918	0.1498	-0.0702
	(0.3121)	(0.3103)	(0.3342)	(0.3516)	(0.3524)
Retired	0.3101	0.2885	0.4460	0.0164	0.1818
	(0.4413)	(0.4283)	(0.4643)	(0.4991)	(0.4888)
Student	0.1296	0.1557	-0.0326	0.2369	0.1173
	(0.4695)	(0.4656)	(0.5121)	(0.4895)	(0.4858)
Other Status	-0.7219 **	-0.7781 **	-0.5666	-0.2615	-0.4328
	(0.3407)	(0.3411)	(0.3626)	(0.3545)	(0.3419)
Wealth	0.1129 ***			-0.0116	
	(0.0395)			(0.0382)	
Outcomes		0.0918 **			-0.0864 **
		(0.0377)			(0.0360)
Poverty1			0.8164 *		
			(0.4697)		
Poverty2			0.2139		
			(0.4570)		
Poverty3			1.1455 ***		
			(0.3525)		
Female	0.0948	0.0555	0.0231	0.0480	-0.0042
	(0.2290)	(0.2281)	(0.2434)	(0.2648)	(0.2603)
Age	0.0565	0.0562	0.0270	-0.0386	-0.0337
	(0.0375)	(0.0369)	(0.0385)	(0.0396)	(0.0383)
Age*Age	-0.0007 *	-0.0007 *	-0.0004	0.0004	0.0003
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Primary School	-0.4132	-0.4750	-0.1114	0.4804	0.4929
	(0.3962)	(0.3897)	(0.4520)	(0.5797)	(0.5558)
Secondary School	-0.5156	-0.6122	-0.3687	-0.0699	-0.0280
	(0.4234)	(0.4156)	(0.4887)	(0.9242)	(0.8882)
College	-0.4497	-0.6545	0.0187	0.2529	0.1685
	(0.5321)	(0.5277)	(0.5882)	(1.4977)	(1.4564)
Constant	4.9819 ***	5.0996 ***	4.9794 ***	6.3403 ***	6.6792 ***
	(0.9287)	(0.8979)	(1.0170)	(1.3495)	(1.3005)
N	835	854	717	912	949
R-squared	0.0323	0.0283	0.0387	0.0124	0.0213

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01.

Table A1.12
Models of Support for Redistribution in Peru,
Including Beliefs about Wealth, Economic Outcomes, and Poverty
(RESPONSIBILITY Item)

Independent Variables	Wave 3			Wave 5	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Income	-0.0990 *	-0.1125 *	-0.0739	-0.0189	-0.0224
	(0.0582)	(0.0574)	(0.0639)	(0.0577)	(0.0585)
Union	0.0261	0.1017	0.0390	-0.1275	-0.2044
	(0.2770)	(0.2734)	(0.2871)	(0.3529)	(0.3559)
Unemployed	0.4429	0.3579	0.4096	0.7513	0.7132
	(0.4835)	(0.4679)	(0.5434)	(0.4714)	(0.4704)
Self-Employed	-0.3206	-0.3840	-0.4299	-0.1755	-0.2448
	(0.3191)	(0.3174)	(0.3364)	(0.2605)	(0.2661)
Retired	0.1721	0.1266	0.2569	0.0097	-0.1866
	(0.6306)	(0.6259)	(0.6656)	(0.6096)	(0.5929)
Student	-0.0986	-0.2332	-0.2367	-0.2436	-0.2917
	(0.3916)	(0.3811)	(0.4164)	(0.3592)	(0.3640)
Other Status	-0.0239	-0.0965	-0.0779	-0.4671	-0.1923
	(0.3152)	(0.3132)	(0.3408)	(0.3313)	(0.3344)
Wealth	0.0282			0.1311 ***	
	(0.0415)			(0.0409)	
Outcomes		-0.0333			-0.0591 *
		(0.0405)			(0.0340)
Poverty1			0.3175		
			(0.3150)		
Poverty2			-0.1471		
			(0.3900)		
Poverty3			0.5015 *		
			(0.2752)		
Female	-0.1219	-0.0833	-0.0841	-0.0059	-0.1048
	(0.2334)	(0.2300)	(0.2495)	(0.1999)	(0.2006)
Age	0.0983 *	0.0982 *	0.1070 *	-0.0176	-0.0285
	(0.0563)	(0.0544)	(0.0575)	(0.0370)	(0.0366)
Age*Age	-0.0011	-0.0012 *	-0.0014 *	0.0002	0.0004
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Primary School	-0.5917	-0.5136	-0.6267	-0.1117	-0.1893
	(0.4637)	(0.4471)	(0.4841)	(0.3391)	(0.3408)
Secondary School	-0.7530 *	-0.7036	-0.8929 *	-0.3785	-0.4663
	(0.4521)	(0.4367)	(0.4702)	(0.3399)	(0.3433)
College	-1.3174 **	-1.2926 **	-1.5169 ***	-0.2687	-0.3457
	(0.5168)	(0.5053)	(0.5389)	(0.4142)	(0.4219)
Constant	4.6317 ***	4.9150 ***	4.5057 ***	5.4056 ***	6.5001 ***
	(1.1716)	(1.1231)	(1.2030)	(0.8532)	(0.8489)
N	921	951	855	1256	1287
R-squared	0.0227	0.0233	0.0298	0.0195	0.0126

Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; *** prob<0.01.

Appendix 2
Imputation of Income Variable for Argentina in Wave 4 and Wave 5 of the World Values Survey

The first step of the imputation process involved estimating the parameters of the following income equation using ordinary least squares with data from Wave 3 of the World Values Survey:

$$\begin{aligned} INCOME_i = \quad & \beta_0 + \beta_1 FEMALE_i + \beta_2 AGE_i + \beta_3 AGE*AGE_i \\ & + \beta_4 PRIMARY\ SCHOOL_i + \beta_5 SECONDARY\ SCHOOL_i \\ & + \beta_7 COLLEGE_i + e_i \end{aligned}$$

where $INCOME_i$ is the individuals' income; $FEMALE_i$ is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual is male or female; AGE_i is the individual's age; $PRIMARY\ SCHOOL_i$, $SECONDARY\ SCHOOL_i$, and $COLLEGE_i$ are dichotomous variables that indicate the individual's level of educational attainment; and e_i is a random error term. Table A2 below presents the estimates for this income equation.

The income variable was imputed in Wave 4 and Wave 5 by calculating the predicted values of individuals' income based on the estimated coefficients from the income equation and adding a random noise to this predicted value. The random noise was distributed uniformly and ranged from 0 to 1.

Table A2
Results of Estimation of Income Equation

Independent Variables	Coefficient (Std. Error)	
Female	-0.4442	***
	(0.1582)	
Age	-0.0032	
	(0.0265)	
Age*Age	-0.0001	
	(0.0003)	
Primary School	1.3361	***
	(0.2788)	
Secondary School	3.0000	***
	(0.2904)	
College	5.2402	***
	(0.3832)	
Constant	3.1017	***
	(0.6194)	
N	880	
R-squared	0.2761	

* Standard errors in parentheses. * prob<0.10; ** prob<0.05; ***<prob<0.01.

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Vita

Luis Antonio Camacho Solís was born in Lima, Peru. He completed his secondary education at Colegio Santa Margarita in 1996. He received a Bachellor's Degree in Economics from Universidad del Pacífico in 2002 and a Specialization Diploma in Applied Statistics from Pontificia Universidad Católical del Perú in 2005. He entered the graduate program of the Department of Government at The University of Texas at Austin in 2005, earning a Master of Arts in 2008. Luis's research interests are in the political economy of development, including decentralization and local development, governance, and policy processes; he is also interested in the evaluation of development interventions. Luis's publications include *Desempeño del estado y sostenibilidad democrática en el Peru* (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, Consorcio de Investigación Económica y Social, 2008), co-authored with Cynthia A. Sanborn, and *Moviendo montañas: empresas, comunidades y ONG en las industrias extractivas* (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, 2007), coedited with Felipe Portocarrero S. and Cynthia A. Sanborn.

Permanent email: luis.acs@gmail.com

This dissertation was typed by the author.